Archive for February, 2009

peaceful 5.pea.003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

February 26, 2009

No. 197

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 429.

Before receiving your # 605 [a] I had Vice Minister Yamamoto call on the American Embassy as my representative even though we had had no official word from the American Embassy as yet. I sent word to the effect that if the injury to the Tutuila was an actual fact it was a most unfortunate occurrence. The said Minister had a confidential chat with the American Ambassador who said that as yet he had no instructions from his government but that he thanked the Minister for his visit. Furthermore, the Minister of the Navy sent an official to call on the American Naval Attaché —– (last 2 lines garbled).Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire


[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 198

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 435.

Re my # 429 [a].

At 2:45 p.m. I requested Ambassador Grew to call on me and at that time I expressed my regrets and the Ambassador presented the official text corresponding to your telegram # 606 [b] (?). I said that I was sure the incident was simply a mistake on the part of the aviator and that without doubt there was something wrong with the “release gear” of the bomber. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG I told him that I had previously had experience with aircraft and that I could well understand such a thing occurring. However, no matter what the cause may be it is very regrettable that such a thing should have occurred for we have been exercising the greatest caution to prevent the recurrence of such incidents and have issued strict orders concerning them. Not only that but according to my recollection orders have been issued very recently again regarding this. As a military man myself I know that the military men are accustomed to give absolute obedience to instructions. I will do the utmost within my power to see that a recurrence of this does not eventuate, I said.


[a] See II, 197.

[b] Not available.

Trans. 8-1-41

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 199

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 434.

(Utmost secrecy, Chief of Office routing.)

Re your # 612 [a].

In regard to your proposal, please tell the President immediately that in view of the general state of relations between Japan and America, bombing of Chungking will be suspended for a time. In view of these relations between Japan and America this step which you suggested would be a very serious one indeed and if it were publicly announced in America it would give an unnecessary shock to one section of public opinion in Japan. This would defeat the very purpose of the step itself. Please call the attention of America to this point particularly.

My # 435 [b] is an answer to the three questions (of Welles) brought up in your # 608 [a].


[a] Nomura recommends that as the best possible step Japan could take in the Tutuila matter, Japan stop bombing Chungking for a while, and publish this fact immediately, see II, 196.

[b] See II, 198.

[c] See II, 193. Welles summons Nomura and demands explanations of Tutuila bombing immediately.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 200

FROM: Washington                                                                             July 31, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 623.

(Strictly Confidential. Chief of Office Routing.)

Re your #434 [a].

I called on Welles on the afternoon of the 31st and told him that I wished to have the gist of my separate telegram # 624 [b] conveyed to the President.

Welles expressed his gratitude and said that he would make arrangements immediately.

I said further that in case there was anything the President did not understand, I desired an opportunity to explain it to him, and closed the interview.

(Time 8:10 p.m.)


[a] Nomura is directed to inform the President that bombing of Chungking will be suspended for a time; requesting that this action not be publicly announced.

[b] See II, 201.

Trans. 8-3-41

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No. 201

FROM: Washington                                                                             July 31, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #624 (or #622),

(Separate telegram).

Strictly confidential. Chief of Office routing.

I have come to convey to you personally the regret of my government over the Tutuila incident. I am instructed to inform promptly the President of the U.S. that the Japanese government has decided to suspend for the time being all bombing operations over the city area of Chungking. Let me say that this is a step I myself recommend to be taken in the interest of Japanese-American friendship. And I feel that this decision of my government should be held confidential inasmuch as publication of it would arouse unnecessarily a section of public opinion in Japan —– defeat the very purpose for which the measure has been adopted.

I am fully convinced that the Tutuila incident was an accident pure and simple. This, I believe, was made entirely clear to Ambassador Grew by our Foreign Minister, Admiral Toyoda, at the time when he offered his government’s apologies, and it seems scarcely necessary for me to give detailed explanations. I should like to add that the Japanese Government will be prepared to pay indemnities for any damages to American property upon the completion of the necessary investigations.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 202

FROM: Washington                                                                             July 31, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                       http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG                                                    # 526.

Re my # 623 [a].

During the evening of the 31st, Welles announced that the United States has accepted Japan’s apology in connection with the Tutuila incident and that the matter was now closed.


[a] See II, 200

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 203

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             July 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 591.

(Secret)

According to information emanating from —– office, AP reports from ISTANBUL concerning British-German peace negotiations are not entirely without foundation. However this may be, the President and the Acting Secretary of State have intimated that Mayor LA GUARDIA of New York, former National Defense Head, has let something slip.

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

As a matter of fact, the German Government has recently again added to its personnel and is successfully engaging in undercover work. This is being fervently supported by Americans of German extraction.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 204

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)                                                        July 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 433.

(Part 1 of 4)

(Message to Berlin # 708)

From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government’s policy and views. Hereafter, will you please act accordingly.

1. In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn. You were informed of it by Circular # 1390 [a]. Ever since then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of that policy.

2. The China incident has already extended over a period of four years, and the Imperial Government’s general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of its energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new situation faces us from the north and from the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.


[a] See II, 103, 104.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 205

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)                                                        July 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 433.

(Part 2 of 4)

(Message to Berlin # 708)

It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well. The German Embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their homeland is not yet as well informed as they are on our position.

3. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly

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asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.

That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 206

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)                                                        July 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 433.

(Part 3 of 4) (Message to Berlin # 708)

Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be easily understood. If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action.

5. I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those objectives. Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the United States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from plunging into the conflict against Germany.

It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germany. For that matter, did not Germany start a war with Russia because of her military expediency when it was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only to settle the Chinese incident but have to meet a new challenge in the north as well as in the south, and this is quite inconvenient.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 207

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)                                                        July 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 433.

(Part 4 of 4) (Message to Berlin # 708)

We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our action.

6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each

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other and while striving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.

Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action.

Please send to Rome. Have sent to Washington.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 208.

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     August 2, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 438.

Re your # 566 [a]. Secret outside the department.

(Part 1 of 3)

We are now considering the proposal very carefully, although as you may well imagine, it would require considerable amount of time before the Japanese Government will be able to express its opinion regarding it because of the fact that the political situation at home and abroad is critical and the matter under consideration is of great importance. However, I would like to have you tell the President that we, realizing the seriousness of the present situation, are giving consideration to our reply and tell him so by covering the following points:

1. The method of disposal referred to in my #434 [b] is an unusual one. It goes to show, in part at least, how eager the Japanese Government is to bring about an equitable adjustment of Japanese-American relations. (This method of disposal excludes the area outside of the Chungking city limits and, therefore, does not apply to military establishments, airfields, etc., in the suburbs. Furthermore, it goes without saying that it is a temporary measure.


[a] Conversation between NOMURA and ROOSEVELT regarding HITLER’s war aims and Japanese-German cooperation, see II, 172.

[b] Informing ROOSEVELT that Chungking bombing will be temporarily suspended in view of Japanese-American relations, see II, 199.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 209

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     August 2, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 438.

(Part 2 of 3)

2. As soon as I received the report of damage having been done to the American gunboat by our bombing, I sent to the American Ambassador the memorandum prepared by the former Vice Minister YAMAMOTO, and immediately upon receiving official wire, I personally met the American Ambassador. I have already wired you this fact. In addition

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to doing these things, I arranged to offer every facility to American newspaper correspondents and at the same time I had the report banned here so as not to unnecessarily excite public opinion. All this was done simply because we wish to deal with Japanese-American relations in as calm an atmosphere as possible.

Furthermore, in order to avoid the recurrence of such unpleasant incidents as the one in question, it is my earnest desire that the United States would free herself from mere legal theories and cooperate with Japan to eliminate by means of friendly conversation those matters which constitute the cause of disputes between the two countries. For example, inasmuch as the removal of Tutuilia to safe waters at this time would have a beneficent effect on future Japanese-American relations, will you suitably inform the American authorities to take this opportunity to do so.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 210

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     August 2, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 438.

(Part 3 of 3)

If we are to avoid disruption of Japanese-American relations, it would be necessary to mutually exercise a high degree of statesmanship. It is in consideration of this fact that we are taking the aforementioned attitude. However, if the Japanese Government is to continue to maintain such a cool-headed attitude and if the public opinion in Japan is to follow the Government more perfectly with a view to improving Japanese-American relations, I believe firmly that it is necessary that the United States Government reciprocate our attitude by refraining strictly from behavior of fault-finding and maintain instead an intelligent and constructive attitude. Will you therefore persuade the President to consider this point carefully. As I have already told you in successive telegrams, it is my intention to have the Japanese-American diplomatic negotiations continue in the future. Will you, therefore, take every opportunity to enlighten the American authorities, along the lines set forth in my telegrams, on the French Indo-China question as well.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 211

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             August 2, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 649.

(Strictly Secret)

In view of the fact that Japanese-American relations are constantly growing worse with prohibitive limits set on export of oil, today, the 1st, during the forenoon, I secretly called on a member of the cabinet and asked him for the latest news. At the same time I told him the reasons for our having occupied French Indo-China. It appeared that he had already heard of Japan’s arguments from IWAKURO. I said, “It seems that it was clearly stated in the Japanese-French agreement regarding French Indo-China that the occupation was made necessary by the present general situation. It is not of a permanent nature. Do you not think

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it a good plan to conclude an agreement which promises to uphold the integrity of the adjacent countries, waters, colonies, and the Dutch East Indies and to continue the negotiations that have been carried on and thus to facilitate supply of material?” Then he asked the question: “Is not Japan preparing to occupy Siberia?” showing that his interest had not been aroused to any extent. Incidentally, he said “Since Hull was so intensely interested in adjusting Japanese-American relations, he is greatly disappointed. Although he is expected to return on Monday, he is ‘very sick’.” Then he said, “We are now being ridiculed by our colleagues as having been ‘easy men’ for having played into the hands of the Japanese, but there will come a time when we will be quite active.”

He spoke further, saying, “You are well aware of the fact that the President does not want war.”

Now this is the way I look at the matter: The United States is trying to restrain Japan, first of all, by waging an economic war, although the government authorities claim that they are merely taking counter-measures against Japan’s policy. But, that the United States is at the same time making military preparations against the possible eventuality of a clash of arms is a fact with which you are already familiar .Furthermore, it seems that in order to attain her object, the United States is endeavoring to get Soviet Russia and China, to say nothing of Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies, to fall in line and cooperate with her . That the Russo-German war is lasting longer than expected has proved to be an advantage to the United States.

However, the aforementioned cabinet member did not speak so optimistically as the President, in a newspaper interview yesterday, is reported to have alleged his confidant HOPKINS to have spoken (sic). The cabinet member believes firmly in the necessity of this war lasting for several years for the reason that due to destruction of her man (sic) and materials, and due to the shortage of oil, Germany would not be able to do anything on a great scale even after the fighting on the Eastern Front has come to an end, and that since the United States will be able in the meantime to rapidly increase her production, the trend will be in favor of her.

Trans. 8-7-41

No. 212

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             August 2, 1941

TO: Rio, Bogota, Mexico                                                                     # 221.

(Circular)

(Message to Tokyo # 643)

1. The recent petroleum embargo exercised by the United States is attracting attention as the first measure taken to back up the freezing of funds. Its motive has not the slightest connection with the bombing of the Tutuila and is taken to be a warning to Japan against further penetration southwards. It is reported that the United States will not relax this sort of economic pressure until it become clear that Japan is going to put an end to her policy of aggression. All the newspapers print a London report that Japan is continuing to make new demands including military bases in Thai and the press contains comments to the effect that Japan is further increasing her military forces.

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Simultaneously with the petroleum embargo the Chief of Production and Management stopped the sale of silk to the public at large; consequently, stocking manufacturing throughout the whole of the United States, depending upon whether or not they can use substitute materials, can employ but 20 % of their former workers. Great unemployment will be the result, in fact, it is said that 175,000 people are out of jobs.

2. On the 2nd, the Government of the United States issued a statement to the people that the fact that Japanese aggression in French Indo-China was not stopped constitutes a threat to the security of the United States, whose attitude towards France will be determined hereafter by whether or not Vichy surrenders her territory to the Axis. On the same day, WELLES, the British Ambassador; the Australian Minister; and the South African Minister, (doubtless concerning Dakar) held a conference on measures to be taken in the worst eventualities.

The activities of HARRY HOPKINS in Moscow are receiving notice and these activities are being referred to in connection with Russo-American cooperation in case Japan strikes northwards.

Relayed to —–, Mexico, Panama, Rio. Relay from Rio to —–, Buenos Aires.

Trans. 8-15-41

No. 213

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi)                                                          August 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 15.

(Part 1 of 2)

(Message to Tokyo # 142)

Re my # 132 [a].

a. Since then, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Sumitomo Bank have continued to be under surveillance by two Treasury Department inspectors each. Incoming and outgoing wires and mail have to have their details “checked” by these inspectors. Insofar as the Yokohama Specie Bank is concerned, though the account books and bank balances are “checked” daily, domestic business is allowed to proceed much as usual.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG

1. Since the freezing legislation went into effect, all individuals must present affidavits of continued residence since June 17th of last year before they can make first withdrawals from deposits. (There have been occasions when the inspectors have demanded that passports be submitted as evidence.)

2. Though statements are made that these measures are not as a result of the freezing legislation, when withdrawals are in excess of $500., the Treasury Department inspectors make investigations as to what purpose these funds are to be used.

3. When drafts are requested for dispatch to dependents in Japan, actual proof must be submitted that drafts have been sent to these same dependents within the last six months.

The Treasury inspectors see to it that Treasury Department watchmen are sent to both banks to stand guard each night.


[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-6-41

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No. 214

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi)                                                          August 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 15.

(Part 2 of 2)

(Message to Tokyo # 142)

b. NYK, Mitsui and Mitsubishi branch offices are now making applications for general licenses through their respective branch offices in San Francisco. (Temporary licenses have already been issued. Routine office expenses can be paid;) However, Mitsui and NYK branch offices were visited by Treasury Department inspectors for the three days of August 2 to 4, inclusive, at which time their disbursement account books were thoroughly investigated. Though the Osaka Chosen maintains a branch office, since it is an American agency with an American manager, it has no direct bearing in the present situation. The Asano branch office is making application for a general license.

c. Permanently established Japanese firms, maintaining partners in Japan, and to whom money is sent regularly, because of the freezing legislation, may not be able to send funds accumulated since June 1st to their respective sponsoring organizations in Japan. All of these firms are now making applications for general licenses. However, none of these licenses, as yet, have been issued.

Trans. 10-6-41

No. 215

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     August 5, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 445.

Re your # 621 [a].

1. There are no objections to your negotiating regarding the three points you mentioned. The British Ambassador has already made a proposal regarding their foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates in Japan, in harmony with the principle of reciprocity, to the effect that these be exempted from the rules recently put into effect regulating the transactions of foreigners. Also regarding America’s foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates, if America does not apply the rule freezing assets to Japanese foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates and their staff members in America and her possessions, then the Japanese government will in turn exempt American diplomatic establishments and consulates and their staff members in Japan (including Manchuria, Taiwan, and Chosen) from the regulations governing transactions by foreigners. There is no objection to your negotiating in harmony with the above.

2. There has been no proposal of any sort from the American Ambassador in Japan regarding the order freezing assets.

3. Please handle this whole matter there.


[a] Not available.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG

Trans. 8-6-41

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No. 216

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             August 4, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 646.

Yesterday, Sunday, all the newspapers discussed the Japanese-American problem in large headlines, supporting the government’s stiff attitude. According to the Gallup Poll, hostility toward Japan is running rather high, but on the other hand, the press does express the opinion that the door has not been entirely closed. I would say that the Americans at present consider their relations with us as surpassing in importance their relations with Germany. As the days pass, I expect the situation to quiet down more or less. However, much will depend upon the course of the European war, and no man could do anything but guess what the future has in store. IWAKURO and WAKASUGI will make their report to you in Tokyo, but do not forget that things change rapidly these days. Now I am in a responsible position. Though I could not offer any excuses, if I made a miscalculation now, there might be regrettable consequences. Furthermore, my astuteness is quite limited. Therefore, as soon as there is a means of transportation available, I would like for you to send me some such Foreign Office expert well versed in all affairs at home and abroad as Ambassador KURUSU to work with me for awhile.

I know nothing at all about the government’s high policy which is shrouded in secrecy, so how can you expect me to take any action whatever when my hands are thus tied? Please think this over, and send me a man immediately.

Trans. 8-7-41

No. 217

FROM: Washington                                                                             August 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 652.

(Parts 1, 2, 3 of 4)

(Division of parts not indicated)

Strictly confidential.

Wakasugi talked with Undersecretary Welles for over one and a half hours on the 4th. They left no stones unturned in their exchanges of frank opinions. The following is the gist of their discussion:

Wakasugi said that on the eve of his departure for home to report to his government, he would like to get a clear idea of the attitude of the U.S. Government. Also, if there was anything that the U.S. Government would like to have relayed to his home government, he would like to be advised of it, Wakasugi said. After that, Wakasugi continued, he would like, (1) to be advised of what the United States wants of Japan in connection with Japanese-U. S. relations; and (2) to exchange opinions on the set-up of the world following the termination of the European war .

Welles replied that both Secretary Hull and he were exceedingly interested in maintaining and promoting friendly relations between the United States and Japan, and the Secretary has told the Ambassador so on many occasions.

Over a long period of time, he continued, peace has been maintained between Japan and the United States. The friendship which has bound the two together over those years is, indeed, a rare phenomenon in the history of international history. The United States is very anxious that some means be found to make possible the continuance of this happy situation. The United States has absolutely no desire to take aggressive or oppressive steps against Japan. At present, however, the U.S. policy towards the conquered countries sometimes clashes with

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what the United States really wants to do with regard to other countries, which causes some critical situations.

He has had much adoration for Japan since he had a post there 25 years ago, Welles said. He has never experienced as critical times as these, he said. The only remaining hope now is the displaying of extraordinarily brilliant statesmanship, (meaning, not resorting to force of arms).

Wakasugi said that Welles had described the present situation correctly and asked him what sort of statesmanship the United States had in mind. He went on to point out that Europeans and Americans would not or could not comprehend Japanese actions in the Far East. The basis of the differences is that European and American territorial penetrations and applications of economic pressure of recent years conflicted with the ideals for the Far East that Japan-as the mainstay of the Far East-is striving for. The European and American policy described above does not harmonize with the Japanese program of national security which has a direct bearing on Japan’s very existence.

To this Welles replied that he well understood Japan’s aspirations and that the only point that was objectionable was the resorting to arms to gain these aspirations —– (one line missing) —– that which was proposed to the Ambassador was done so from this point of view.

At the request of Wakasugi, he explained that proposal in the following manner: Fundamentally, French Indo-China was occupied by Japan, the Japanese say, (1) to counter the danger of joint action by Great Britain and China (probably including the United States) against Japan; and (2) as a means of being assured access to raw materials.

Now, upon the evacuation of Japanese troops, if Japan, United States, Britain, and China (and possibly the Netherlands) could agree not to threaten French Indo-China’s territorial integrity, and set that area up as a strict neutral, Japan’s aim No. 1 would be automatically satisfied. Incidentally, as was reported to the Ambassador recently, Thailand is to be included in this area.

With regard to Japan’s argument regarding the assurance of accessibility to raw materials, Welles said that he could hardly believe that French Indo-Chinese production would satisfy the demands of Japan. However, if Japan agrees to the terms set up above, the President is prepared to insist to all the nations concerned (including Britain, Netherlands, and China, it is alleged) to grant Japan’s desires of putting her on an equal basis.

Welles added that the United States awaits Japan’s reply to this proposal with much expectancy.

“By the above explanation,” Wakasugi then said in effect, “do you imply that the United States is prepared to conduct negotiations with Japan concerning the Japanese demands, and that the United States is willing to use her good offices to discuss them with the other nations referred to above if Japan does not resort to force of arms?”

Welles replied that that is exactly what he had meant. Wakasugi continued along the following lines: “Under the national policy of ‘Western Hemisphere solidarity’, the United States has seized control of the Western Hemisphere for her own benefits. However, from all outward appearances, she is unsatisfied with that for it seems as if she is trying to participate in Far Eastern affairs on the pretext of having special interests there, in spite of the fact that the said special interests date no farther back than fifty or sixty years at the most. This makes one think that the United States is trying to seize the police powers of the world.”

“There is very little justification for the United States having that power,” Wakasugi said. “Why doesn’t the United States limit her sphere of influence to the Western Hemisphere? Why can’t she leave the Orient to the Orientals?”

Welles admitted that the special privileges of the United States in the Orient (most of which are in China, he said) dates back only fifty or sixty years. “However,” he continued, “U.S.

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actions are not based on those. The United States is prepared to give up those special privileges at any time. The point on which the United States places the most emphasis is her opposition to the use of force of arms. World peace and order cannot possibly be brought about if a power such as Japan is permitted to convert the small countries in her vicinity into her protectorates one by one in the Hitlerean manner.” (At this point, Wakasugi interrupted by saying that the occupation of French Indo-China was carried out on a peaceful basis with the full accord of the French Government. Welles retorted that the Vichy Government did not have a free will and that the above mentioned “Full accord” was forcefully foisted upon it) .

“When two countries such as the United States and Japan,” Wakasugi then said, “which are surrounded by entirely dissimilar circumstances and which are based on different policies, insist on adhering to their respective arguments and wants, an armed clash between them cannot be avoided. If, however, the prevention of such an eventuality is sincerely desired, the actions of each must be geographically, or by some other means, limited. In the light of that, what is the scope of U.S. demands upon Japan? What are the limits of the wants of the United States herself?”

Welles avoided making a clear reply to these questions. Instead, he said, in effect: “We are in receipt of reports that Japan is preparing a further southward move into Thailand. I greatly fear that conditions will become worse.”

“The United States for one,” he went on, “is convinced that wealth and good fortune would come Japan’s way if only she would pursue and adhere to a strictly peaceful policy.”  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

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schedule 4.sch.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

February 25, 2009

No. 289

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi)                                                            June 10, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 36.

Secret.

To the Naval Attaché from TERAI.

1. Our lawyer is of the opinion that KONO [a] should be (kept in the country for thirty days ?) in view of the danger that he might give evidence unsatisfactory to TACHIBANA [b]. It would be wise to subsidize him. Furthermore, as KONO has no funds, the lawyer has suggested that the Navy be responsible for paying this man a subsidy of $25,000 and all court costs. In order that the Navy be kept out of the picture, some of KONO’s friends should be selected to appear to be supporting him. We are in the process of making these arrangements. Should you have any objection to this manner of procedure, please advise us.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that ‑‑‑‑- is a good friend of the Intelligence Chief and in cahoots with the investigating authorities, it would be wise for the Navy to have little to do with the matter.

2. Though our lawyer would not predict the outcome of this incident, as the hearings will be complicated, at the very earliest it will be tomorrow, the 11th, before counter‑schemes can be developed.

It is going to be necessary for TACHIBANA to have frequent communication with the lawyer; therefore, we believe that it would be ill‑advised for TACHIBANA to go to Washington at the present time.


[a] TACHIBANA’s chauffeur.

[b] Japanese Naval Language Official who has been held on charges of espionage.

Trans. 6‑25‑41

A-153

No. 290

FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi)                                                            June 18, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 44.

Secret.

Re wire # 99 [a] to the Minister.

At noon on the 18th, the immigration official stated that there was no relationship between this and the incident in which Commander TACHIBANA was subpoenaed. Though he stated that he would make a detailed report of the results of his investigation, he has no objection to the condition that this man has resided in the country (a period of twelve months beginning the month of ‑‑‑‑‑) and has gone to and from Mexico without having secured a visa from the American Consul in Mexico. Though it is felt that in order to establish an excuse for his violation of the immigration law, which should appear to have no direct connection with ‑‑‑‑- incidents, we should make it appear to be of similar nature to the cases of Lieutenant Commander OKADA [a] and Secretary WAKATSUKI.

Relayed to Tokyo.


[a] Not available.

[b] Japanese Naval Language Officer.

Trans. 6‑25‑41

No. 291

http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us

FROM: Tokyo (Jap Foreign Minister)                                                  June 21, 1941

TO: Washington (Koshi)                                                                      # 307.

Regarding my # 294 [a]:

Although we have not yet received a reply, please let us know, at once, the facts and the background of this incident.

While it is time that the United States did make a friendly gesture in connection with the TACHIBANA affair, we are constantly watching the restrictions placed on gasoline exports to Japan as a sort of barometer to evaluate the sincerity of the United States toward us.


[a] Tokyo requests Washington to wire his opinion regarding the order prohibiting loading of lubricating oil on the Azuma Maru at Philadelphia, and prospects of future supplies of kerosene, etc.

Trans. 6‑25‑41

No. 292

FROM: San Francisco (Muto)                                                              June 21, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 026.

Commander Tachibana sailed [a] from here without mishap on the 21st by the Nitta Maru.


[a] By request! DoD comment: footnote as in original translation.

Trans. 7‑1‑41

A-154

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 293

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi)                                                          June 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)                                                                    # 098.

On the 17th, courier Yamazaki is sailing for Japan on the Nitta Maru with various documents, wherefore, please see to it that he meets no difficulty with the customs inspection.

Trans. 6‑19‑41

No. 294

FROM: San Francisco (Muto)                                                              May 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 86.

(Part 1 of 2)

Strictly Secret.

While the Nichi Shin Maru, of the Pacific Whaling Steamship Company, was coming into Port Costa (approximately 20 miles from San Francisco) in order to take on petroleum, under suspicion of carrying contraband drugs the interior of the ship was searched by customs officials about noon on the ‑‑‑‑‑. In order to burn them, should the need arise, Naval “SA” code, secret Naval documents in the custody of the captain, secret wireless telegraphy documents in the custody of the Chief Radio Operator, meteorological codes belonging to the Central Meteorological Bureau, planning board codes, and other secret documents, under pretext of passing inspection were taken away. As soon as I had been informed of this by telephone, I immediately filed a protest with the local customs officials and demanded the return of these documents. They replied that they had decided to return these documents at a later date to the fishing vessel after an investigation had been made into the facts of the case.

Trans. 6‑11‑41

No. 295

FROM: San Francisco (Muto)                                                              May 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 86.

(Part 2 of 2)

I think that it is necessary, in addition to immediately stopping the use of these codes, to take drastic emergency measures to prevent the recurrence of this sort of thing.

Furthermore, according to the report made by the captain who presented himself at this office immediately after the incident had occurred, these documents had been placed for safe‑keeping in the Chief Radio Operator’s room because of the great inconvenience of keeping them in the captain’s room. While the Chief Operator was alone in the room six customs officials burst in in order to search it. Upon finding these documents, they laid hands on the Chief Operator and by brute force took them from him.

Trans. 6‑11‑41

A-155

No. 296

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     May 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 263.

Re messages # 86 [a] and # 87 [b] from San Francisco to this office.

We understand that our Naval Attaché made a representation to the U.S. Navy Department concerning this matter. Regardless of what the official reasons were, it seems apparent to us that it was done at Britain’s request. It was done in the hopes of obtaining some definite proof that Japanese ships on the “black list” prepared by Britain were aiding Germany.

Even if we put aside the legal aspect of the incident, in which such extreme measures were taken with the vague excuse of searching for narcotics, the effect this incident has upon the already critical U.S.‑Japanese relations is very serious. In view of this fact, will you make appropriate representations to the bureau concerned of the State Department?


[a] Available, See II, 194 and 195.

[b] Concerns seizure of papers on West Coast by narcotics agents.

Trans. 6‑2‑41

(Nos. 297-304 not in text. LWJ)

No. 305

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 2, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 325.

Re my # 319 [a].

On the 20th of June, the Office of the Governor General of CHOSEN submitted a telegram saying that if the State Department or the mission headquarters will arrange to have this missionary removed to his native land, the Governor Generalcy is prepared to settle the matter in the manner described in part 1 of my caption message. Will you immediately go and ask the State Department to have this missionary brought home. Please wire me back the results.


[a] In which the Governor General agreed to cancel the prosecution of missionaries alleged to have distributed dangerous literature on condition that they are ordered home.  http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us

Trans. 7‑5‑41

No. 306

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             July 2, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 458.

Re your # 325 [a].

Will you please wire me back the names of an memoranda concerning the Americans in question?

The State Department says that the appellants are only accused of distributing disturbing printed matter and that this is not enough to warrant our demanding the removal of all fourteen of them.


[a] See II, 305.

Trans. 7‑5‑41

A-156

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 307

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             July 8, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 472.

Re your # 332 [a].

None of the names of those concerned are known at the State Department either. Please repeat, giving the full names in English.


[a] Not available.

Trans. 7‑10‑41

No. 308

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 8, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 344.

Re my # 325 [a].

We have received the following advice from the office of the Governor General of CHOSEN:

The trial of OKADA was finished on July 4th, and the verdict will be passed on the 21st. The United States has put it up to us that, if we expect a lenient decision, an indispensable term will be that the defendant must be taken out of the country. Now, the prayer meeting incident is a parallel case; so, will you please negotiate with the American Government to have the accused likewise evacuated.

In spite of what you said in your # 458 [b], we do not wish the question of the evacuation demanded by the office of the Governor General to be left pending for a long time now that Japanese‑American relations are so strained. Therefore, we think it quite proper that you return to the State Department and inform the officials that we wish them to comply with our request.


[a] See II, 305 in which Tokyo requests Washington to ask the State Department to have the missionary brought home.

[b] See II, 306 in which Nomura wires Tokyo that the State Department does not think the accusation of distributing disturbing printed matter is enough to warrant demanding the removal of all 14 of the Americans in question.

Trans. 7‑9‑41

No. 309

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             July 8, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 480.

Re your # 344 [a].

On the 8th, IGUCHI [b], informed Section Chief HAMILTON of the contents of your instructions, saying that he hoped all of the accused would be evacuated. HAMILTON replied, “The State Department knows that BOTT (?), etc., are charged with distributing pamphlets advocating peace which were distributed in various countries throughout the world. The crime is very slight and the deportation of all people concerned would be a severe punishment. Furthermore, the Church authorities are also undesirous of seeing these people evacuated. In exchange for

A-157

the friendly manner in which we handled the TACHIBANA incident, don’t you think you could drop this matter in some way or other? Now, with respect to DeCAMP and ROWE (?), you are pressing us very hard. If possible, I would like for you to have this matter discussed with the Church officials in Korea.” IGUCHI replied: “The Chosen authorities, in view of their policy of a political solution, are combining the two incidents into one and, unless those involved in the prayer meeting incident are also evacuated, it may be difficult to show any leniency to DECAMP and ROWE (?); however, I will report all you say.”

Will you please report this to the Governor General and take what measures you deem proper? Please wire me back.


[a] See II, 308 in which Tokyo tells the advice received from the Office of the Governor General of Chosen and asks that the State Department be informed that they wish them to comply with Japanese requests for the evacuation of the accused missionaries.

[b] Japanese Embassy Counselor in Washington.

Trans. 7‑14‑41

No. 310

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             July 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 491.

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Re my # 480 [a] .

On the 9th, Representative HOOPER of the Presbyterian headquarters in New York came to Washington and I had IGUCHI interview him. HOOPER said: “Our branch in Keijo will first decide upon whether or not the missionaries are to be evacuated from Chosen and then seek the concurrence of the main headquarters. Now, if as a result of representations made by the Governor General to our representative in Chosen, HERBERT BLAIR, the latter should request the headquarters to agree to the evacuation of DeCAMP and ROWE (?), we will wire them back our approval immediately.” Furthermore, with respect to the prayer meeting incident, HOOPER presented the following plea: “When the accused translated into Korean the English text, they did so in such a manner as to prevent any misunderstanding on the part of Japan. They even first submitted them to the Police. They are endeavoring to cooperate with the Japanese and since Dr. Clark, Miss Covington and Mrs. Moore have already decided to leave Korea, cannot the matter be dropped at that?”

I think that it would be a good idea for us to agree to this as a friendly gesture for the way they have settled the TACHIBANA incident.


[a] July 8, 1941; II, 301.

Trans. 7‑14‑41

A-158

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 311

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)                                                        July 14, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 363.

Special.

The “prayer‑meeting incident” comes under the Army‑Navy Criminal Law and the Law for the Provisional Control of Disturbing Literature. In connection with this important event, the Procurator’s Office has started investigation of 16 of the approximate 30 persons concerned. As a result of the prosecutor’s investigation, four, BUTTS, BLAIR, POLLARD and MOORE, are regarded as ringleaders. Others considered to be deeply involved in the incident are BERNHEISELL, HILL, CLARK, DELMARTER, ROSS, COVINGTON, COOK, BERGMAN and CROTHEGS. Magnanimity is shown in the requirement, along lines of fixed policy, that the above‑mentioned 13 persons must withdraw to their home country. The others are being overlooked (disregarded).

The sentence of the two involved in the Oasa affair will be postponed until the 11th. In regard to this withdrawal (return), with the consent of the Executive Committee of the Northern Presbyterian Church in the Eastern district, it was advised that guarantee of withdrawal be given. This will be submitted after the urgently convoked resolution of the committee.

Trans. 7‑16‑41

No. 312

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 17, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 380.

We have settled the incident mentioned in the Director of the Foreign Section Suwa’s telegram # 50 to Tokyo by having two members of the legal committee of the American Presbyterian Mission in Chosen, Miller and RAINA give guarantee that RO and DEKINYANPU would be evacuated.

Regarding the prayer meeting incident there has been a request to have the matter “dropped” with the return of three members, however the authorities concerned are doing their best from a legal standpoint to settle the matter as leniently as possible but they desire to have arrangements made with the other party immediately for the return of the 13 persons most seriously involved, (excluding Clark who is returning on account of illness).

Furthermore, Mrs. Moore is a Methodist missionary and is not a member of the Northern Presbyterians. The members at the New York headquarters of the Northern Presbyterians said at first that they would have the English translated into Korean and then before distributing the literature they would send it to the police station. However, there is no evidence of their ever having done so. In spite of the fact that this point concerns the publication we are willing to overlook that point, and merely treat the question as matter of seditious literature. Please convey this to the New York head office.

Trans. 7‑18‑41

A-159

No. 313

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 17, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 370.

Re my # 362 [a].

The government‑general sent word again as noted in my separate telegram # 380 [b]. In reply, I told the government‑general that it was impossible to show any more leniency than had been shown. Please make strong representations to America to make settlement along the lines of my separate telegram and wire the result.


[a] Not available.

[b] See II, 312.

Trans. 7‑18‑41

No. 314

http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us

FROM: Washington                                                                             July 19, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 533.

Re your # 380 [a].

The State Department has taken the position from the first that this matter was not a request from the State Department but rather an appeal to Japan’s “goodwill”. Moreover, the church headquarters say that conditions are such that it is very difficult to advise the return of the missionaries. The State Department goes a step further and says it cannot interfere in the matter and while it regrets the matter it cannot act as an intermediary in the return of the 13 missionaries. (It requested that it be informed upon the settlement of Matsuo incident). Again, the church representative Hooper was summoned by Iguchi, who made an earnest statement regarding the government‑general’s kind intentions. (Indicating your telegram # 380 [b]). Hooper expressed his thanks for the government’s kind intentions and at the same time explained that the church, from matters of policy, could not return the missionaries living in Korea in connection with the prayer meeting incident, nor issue orders for their return.

In regard to the RO incident he said that he thought there was no other way to handle it than to confer directly with the local church authorities on the spot. Please arrange to have this done immediately. If this does not result in a solution to the problem I think there is nothing to do but drop the matter of the return of the 13 persons.

Furthermore, inasmuch as the pamphlets concerned in the prayer meeting incident were translated directly from the English to Japanese in Tokyo and then distributed, I do not see how there could be any problem in this connection.


[a] The authorities concerned are doing their best to settle the prayer meeting incident as leniently as possible, but they desire that arrangements be made for the return of the 13 persons most seriously involved. July 17, 1941, II, 312.

Trans. 7‑24‑41

A-160

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 315

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 19, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 386.

Re your # 472 [a].

The full names of those whose evacuation the Governor General demands, are as follows:

1. Miss Alice Mabel Butts

2. Mr. H. E. Blair

3. Miss H. E. Pollard

4. Mrs. J. Z. Moore (Ruth Benedict)

5. Mrs. C. F. Bernheisel (Helen K.)

6. Mr. H. J. Hill

7. Mr. C. A. Clark

8. Miss J. Delmarten

9. Miss L. Ross

10. Miss H. Covington

11. Mrs. W. T. Cook (Maude H.)

1 12. Miss G. 0. Bergman

13. Mrs. J. Y. Crothers (Ellen Ann McClung)


[a] Ambassador requests a repetition of names from Tokyo. July 8, 1941; II, 299.

Trans. 7‑21‑41

No. 316

FROM: Washington (No signature)                                                      June 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Oimatu)

HUDENANA

As Japanese Embassy has already been informed in regard to Kokuyo Maru, should Japanese government wish to establish for Toei Maru the full status of public naval vessel further information with regard to the ships is desired by this government°. If, in the meanwhile, Toei Maru should enter Los Angeles as commercial vessel, no objection is perceived to such visit.


[a] U.S. Government.

Trans. 6‑16‑41

No. 317

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)                                                                   June 13, 1941

TO: Washington (Koshi)                                                                      # 290.

Re my letter # 84 under date of 16 May.

We have been advised by the Navy Ministry that the movements of the Iro (commanded by Naval Captain Jyoe Mizuguti) have been changed to arrive Los Angeles, 9 July, and to depart the 14th. Please arrange accordingly.

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

A-161

Also please make the following changes in the schedule pertaining to the same cruise:

Eliminate “Sada 7 July”, and under Oudo change “23 August” to “30 August” (Saturday), and under Siriya change ” 30 August” to “9 August” (Saturday) respectively.

usual 4.usu.0003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

February 25, 2009

No. 47

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

FROM: Helsinki (HELGS)
May 26, 1941

TO: Circular: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief General Staff)
#319.

“B”[a] Intelligence.

According to intercepted wireless messages, recently 30 (ck. 30) submarines of the Baltic Sea fleet have been diverted to the Black Sea area. (Ultra secret.)

[a] OTSU

Trans. 1-15-45


No. 48

FROM: Stockholm (STOCK)
June 11, 1941

TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff)
#208.

Swedish Intelligence.

[30]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

[a] Germany has recently set up a Latvian National Bureau in Konigsberg. Under the aegis of a Latvian named ALPS, it is making Batavia its base for the development of political activity and an intelligence net directed at Russia.

Although ALPS was very astute in his work against Russia as head of the political police bureau in Riga from 1920 to 1930, he resigned because he was suspected of graft. He then operated in industrial areas which brings us down to the present time. He claims that the number of his followers has already reached 3000.

[a] Only part available.

Trans. 1-11-45  http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO


No. 49

FROM: Rome (ITRRK)
June 20, 1941

TO: Circular: Bucharest, Moscow (RIKUDUN)
#303.

According to a spy report German Supreme H. Q. has already been located at Konigsberg for about a week. The source is the same as wire 300[a].

[a] Not available.

Trans. 2-28-45


No. 50

FROM: Rome (ITRRK)
May 8, 1941

TO: Tokyo
#265.

1. According to a reliable report from Italian government sources, Italy has decided to give assistance to Iraq by sending (her) 4 or 5 (ck. 4, 5) air squadrons. Prior to this (Italy) has also considered the transfer of Italian planes to Iraq —1G—.

2. It has been confirmed that yesterday, 7 May, HITLER and MUSSOLINI held a conference at a certain place in Northern Italy.

Trans. 4-25-45


No. 51

FROM: Teheran (PRSRK)
September 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN) (Head, General Affairs Dept.)
#432.

Persia Wire #41.

KO MOUDDAKKER[a] came to Tokyo around 1939 or 1940 and organized a Mohammedan temple there. At the time of the world Mohammedan Congress, he was appointed as a representative of the Netherlands East Indies.

Presently his picture is appearing on propaganda letters from Tokyo in behalf of the Mohammedan federation.

[a] Imperfect text at beginning of name.

Trans. 4-23-45

[31]


No. 52

FROM: Teheran (PRSRK)
September 22, 1941

TO: Rome
#446.

A. In regard to the Russian Army’s invasion of Persia:

1st: There are 36 tanks, 52 planes and 1 cavalry brigade at Meshed.

2nd: Northeast Persian and Caspian Sea units combine ordinary and inferior equipment and it appears that with the departure of the 83rd (check 8, check 3) Rifle Division (SIDAN) they are mobilizing new forces.

3rd: Air bases are under construction at Sari, Gurgan and Tabriz.

4th: Communication lines are being laid (1) between Tabriz and Dzhulfa; (2) between Tabriz, Ardebil and Astara.

5th: The Russian Army is confiscating rice, wheat and imported silk within the territory it has occupied and is sending these back to Russia.

6th: It appears that England has thus far sent no material and not more than 10 planes to Russia.

B. In regard to the Persian Army.  http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO

1st: On the Russian front Persian forces have all been (?wiped out?).

2nd: On the English front the 6th (check 6) and 16th (check 1, check 6) Divisions (SIDANS) and the Teheran government are falling back to Isfahan.

Addressee: General Staff Headquarters, Germany, Italy, and Turkey.  http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO

Trans. 2-17-45


No. 53

FROM: Teheran (PRSRK)
September 22, 1941

TO: Rome (RIKUGUN)
#447.

Russian forces that entered Teheran:

1 cavalry regiment. 1 tank regiment (about 60).

English forces:

1 armored mechanized brigade (partially Indian troops, such as vehicle drivers; greater part of troops, English). Addressee: General Staff Headquarters, Germany, Italy, Turkey.

Trans. 2-15-45


No. 54

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD)
May 3, 1941

TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN (HEAD, GEN. AFFAIRS DEPT.))
#822.

1. According to a spy report, CROSBY, the English Minister in Bangkok, has received communications from the American authorities.

Following is a telegram which was dispatched to the French-Indo China Governor-General.

“You (French-Indo China Governor-General) will arrive in Corregidor in the Philippines (?tomorrow, the 13th?). We would like you to take the arms and ammunition America has consigned to you. You will —2G— in accordance with ship sailings to Singapore.”

2. After investigating the authenticity of the above, please report. Addressed to the General Staff.

SUMITA

Trans. 9-1-45

[32]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 55

FROM: Tokyo (NERNS) (Vice-Chief, General Staff)
May 17, 1941

TO: Bangkok (RIKUGUN)
#796.

(Strictly Secret.) We are sending Major AOYAMA KAZUICHI to Siam to work under your orders in the intercepting and deciphering of British and American Army codes used in the South Seas area. He is expected to leave early in June.

Major AOYAMA will have with him Interpreter KAZAMA RYU, operators SATO JIN JURO and BABA TERUKUNI, and employee NAOMIYA NAOYOSHI. AOYAMA will be attached to your office and the others will have the status of attache office personnel.

Trans. 6-16-45


No. 56

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD)
May 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Autumn (Head, Gen. Affairs Dept.))
#861.

Intelligence from Japanese Agents who have infiltrated Victoria Point (at the southeast tip of Burma).

1. About 200 GURKHA and Indian troops are stationed there, and they have some light tanks.

2. Central part. There are two emergency airfields, but no warplanes are in evidence. Furthermore, there are no hangers, and planes land but infrequently.

3. In the bay there are some small ships, two of them being gunboats; also there are two destroyer squadrons on patrol.

4. It is rumored that 1000 Chinese troops are stationed at Moulmein.

Trans. 9-21-45


No. 57

FROM: Tokyo (NERNS) (Vice Chief Gen. Staff)
July 26, 1941

TO: Bangkok (RIKUGUN)
#016.

1st. We have received Siam Special Message #54 (check 54) and thank you for the timely and valuable information.

2nd. Please report as soon as possible on the following matters relating to the PHNOM PEN BANGKOK RAILROAD:

1. The degree of completion and future prospects of completion of the ARAZANYA-SISOPHON railroad.

2. Situation on equipment for the SISOPHON MONGKOL BOREY railroad.

3. Is through-service between PHNOM PEN and BANGKOK possible from a technical standpoint?

Trans. 2-13-45


No. 58

FROM: Bangkok
July 31, 1941

TO: Tokyo (SUMMER RIKUGUNJIKAN) (Vice-Chief, General Staff, and Vice-Minister of War)
#021.

Re enemy aggression against French Indo-China.

[33]

On the 29th, the Siamese authorities issued the following declaration concerning their general policy.

1. Maintenance of good neighborly relations.

2. They feel that they will not suffer either militarily or economically at the hands of any nation whatsoever.

3. They believe that they need not fear military invasion from any foreign power.

4. A policy of non-intervention.

5. A desire to continue trade with foreign countries as usual.  http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO

Items 1 and 4 above represents not only the stand of the Siamese but are items fervently desired as well.

Trans. 2-24-45  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

cruising range 6.cru.1 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

February 5, 2009

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire .  FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) October 6, 1941 TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO FUKKAN (War Office, Sen. Adjutant)) #922. Please transmit to Air Headquarters. 1. As regards joint designing with the “ME” Co., we proposed the designing data as per your recent instructions from Japan. However, after thorough study, the “ME” Co. replied that if they were to incorporate the points requested by Japan, it would be very difficult to get any good [46] THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR results in cruising range. Therefore, please let us know the points on which we can make concessions. 2. Are the civilian personnel coming on the ASAMA MARU to have status as people attached to the Army or to the various companies. 3. We expect to have our first conference with Dr. MESSERSCHMIDT at Augsburg at the end of this month. Trans. 5-24-45 FROM: Tokyo (HSZRY (WAR OFFICE, GEN. ADJUTANT)) October 8, 1941 TO: Bangkok (RIKUGUN) #000. Air Headquarters Wire #1199. From the Chief of the General Affairs Section. Please report this to Lt. Colonel —2G—. From Colonel NAKAYAMA. 1. We understand that 300 kilotons of brass and 100 kilotons of copper have been obtained in Bangkok by special secret means and we have arranged to have the material shipped by the Continental Trading Co. 2. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO We ask you to put the —1M— for foreign use into safe-keeping at the attache’s office. 3. It is planned to have the contract for this matter specially drawn up at Shanghai. Trans. 9-13-45 FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) October 15, 1941 TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUN JIKAN) (Vice Minister of War) #972. Complete in 2 parts. Part 1. Committee wire #76. Please transmit to the Chief of the Fuel Section of the Army Ministry and to the Chief of the Fuel Ministry. In December of last year the HOKKAIDO SYNTHETIC OIL COMPANY (HOKKAIDO JINSEKI) signed a contract with the RUHR CHEMIE COMPANY for the purchase of the right to use FISCHER SYNTHETIC OIL as the basic material for the manufacture of aviation lubricating oil. The plans (for the plant) are to be forwarded on the ASAMA MARU through the MITSUI COMPANY in the near future. According to this contract, the RUHR CHEMIE COMPANY was to send to Japan the equipment and the technicians needed to lead out in operating this process. But the present international situation makes it impossible to send these Germans to Japan and it will also be difficult for the HOKKAIDO SYNTHETIC OIL CO. to send technicians to Germany. The foregoing contract —3G—. Part 2. It will be difficult to supply Japan immediately with the desired production equipment, other than the thermal cracking and refining units. Fortunately Major (? YOSHIDA ?) and Engineers HANAOKA and KINOSHITA of the Army Fuel Department (RIKUGUN NENRYOSHO), in connection with purchase of these rights are expected to be given about one month’s instruction in the technique of the process and they can at the same time minutely observe all the details of the operations. While the importation of skilled technicians would be the proper procedure, the local MITSUI office wishes to make the above suggestion to the HOKKAIDO SYNTHETIC OIL CO., and would like to have their opinion regarding this proposal. [47] As soon as you have contacted the HOKKAIDO SYNTHETIC OIL CO., and the other quarters concerned, please send your answer immediately. Trans. 7-25-45 FROM: Tokyo (HSZRY (War Office, Sen Adjutant)) October 21, 1941 TO: Bangkok (RIKUGUN) #000. Military affairs wire #1001. Reply to your wire #216[a]. The industrial diamonds which the SHOWA COMMERCE COMPANY has ordered from the Ordnance Bureau amount to 235 karats. At your convenience, please remit 23874 (?yen?). [a] Imperfect text allows #286. Trans. 9-21-45 FROM: Helsinki (Helgs) October 22, 1941 TO: Tokyo (Summer, Vice Chief, Gen. Staff) #559. Complete in 5 parts. Part 1. Otsu [“B”] Intelligence: Report on the Russian Army’s MIG-1 type destroyer (fighter) plane (Report is based on the statements of captured officer pilots of this plane. It is the same plane which we have been calling the “I-17” type in our country): 1. The power plant consists of 1400 H.P. liquid-cooled (M-35) type engine. It displays maximum power at an altitude of 5,000 meters. Part 2. 2. The body of the plane is of metal construction and is about 2.64 meters high. The engine and the underside of the fuselage are finished in sheet-copper of a thickness of about 6 mm. Furthermore, for the back protection of the pilot they have constructed a shield 10 to 12 mm thick. Part 3. 3. Performance: a. Level-flight speeds. Maximum—660 K.P.H. Cruising—580 K.P.H. b. Rate of climb: One minute 20 second to get to an altitude of 2,000 meters; 3 minutes to get to an altitude of 5,000 meters; 11 minutes to get to 10,000 meters. c. Ceiling: 10,000 meters. d. Time of flight: 1 hour and 40 minutes. e. Taxing range for takeoff and landing: Takeoff—about 750 meters, landing—300 to 350 meters. Part 4. Armament: a. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO Fuselage: Three 12.7 centimeter machine guns on the front part of the plane. Two 22 centimeter cannon, one on each wing. Two 50 kilogram bombs. b. The number of rounds carried for each machine gun is 2000. Number of rounds for each cannon is 40. [48] THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR c. Rate of fire: 250 rounds per minute for machine guns and 40 rounds per minute for cannon. Part 5. 5. Other details: a. It is very easy for this plane to tip over on takeoffs or landings; and if by chance one had the misfortune to fall into a tailspin, at 2000 meters or lower it is impossible to pull out of it. b. The cooling apparatus is of two types, the large and the small. The small type is put on both wings, and the large type is on the underside of the engine. Since they have no (protective) coverings, it is a good idea to direct one’s fire at them. c. Only veterans of over four or five years’ experience are used as pilots for this plane. d. The fuel used has an octane rating of 90. e. Places where this plane is manufactured include Leningrad and Voronezh. Trans. 7-12-45 FROM: Helsinki (HELGS) October 23, 1941 TO: Tokyo (Summer (Vice Chief, General Staff)) #560. 4 parts complete. Part 1. OTSU (“B”) Intelligence: Report on the Russian Army’s “IL” type assault plane (source of report same as that of Finnish wire #559): 1. This plane is a low-wing monoplane type with twin engines. The front half of the fuselage is of metal construction; the latter half of wood construction. 2. Performance: a. Speeds: maximum—520 K.P.H. cruising—480 to 490 K.P.H. b. Taxiing range—for takeoff—250 to 300 (meters). Part 2. 3. Armament and equipment: a. Five 12.7 MM machine guns; two 22 MM cannon; in addition to these a 500 kilogram bomb. Two tanks for scattering gas. b. Four of the machine guns are on the front part of the fuselage. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO One machine gun is set to be able to fire from the forward underside (this machine gun presents an angle of 45 degrees with the fuselage). d. [a]A cannon on each (side of the) wing. e. The gas tank(s) are to the rear of the wheel. Part 3. 4. Armor: a. The front half of the fuselage is protected by steel plate 7 to 8 mm thick. b. A protective shield for the pilot has been constructed around the seat (12 MM in thickness). In addition to this there is a (cockpit) cowling which can be swung open and shut at will. c. This (cockpit) cowling consists of a glass plate 180 MM thick which is impenetrable by small-arms fire. Part 4. 5. Other details: a. Power plant: “V” type 18-cylinder engines, but the other data about them are not known. b. This plane has very excellent maneuverability. c. A hard-surfaced airfield is required for this plane. [a] Item “c” omitted in text. Trans. 7-13-45.   Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire .