peaceful 5.pea.003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

No. 197

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 429.

Before receiving your # 605 [a] I had Vice Minister Yamamoto call on the American Embassy as my representative even though we had had no official word from the American Embassy as yet. I sent word to the effect that if the injury to the Tutuila was an actual fact it was a most unfortunate occurrence. The said Minister had a confidential chat with the American Ambassador who said that as yet he had no instructions from his government but that he thanked the Minister for his visit. Furthermore, the Minister of the Navy sent an official to call on the American Naval Attaché —– (last 2 lines garbled).Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 198

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 435.

Re my # 429 [a].

At 2:45 p.m. I requested Ambassador Grew to call on me and at that time I expressed my regrets and the Ambassador presented the official text corresponding to your telegram # 606 [b] (?). I said that I was sure the incident was simply a mistake on the part of the aviator and that without doubt there was something wrong with the “release gear” of the bomber. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG I told him that I had previously had experience with aircraft and that I could well understand such a thing occurring. However, no matter what the cause may be it is very regrettable that such a thing should have occurred for we have been exercising the greatest caution to prevent the recurrence of such incidents and have issued strict orders concerning them. Not only that but according to my recollection orders have been issued very recently again regarding this. As a military man myself I know that the military men are accustomed to give absolute obedience to instructions. I will do the utmost within my power to see that a recurrence of this does not eventuate, I said.

[a] See II, 197.

[b] Not available.

Trans. 8-1-41



No. 199

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 434.

(Utmost secrecy, Chief of Office routing.)

Re your # 612 [a].

In regard to your proposal, please tell the President immediately that in view of the general state of relations between Japan and America, bombing of Chungking will be suspended for a time. In view of these relations between Japan and America this step which you suggested would be a very serious one indeed and if it were publicly announced in America it would give an unnecessary shock to one section of public opinion in Japan. This would defeat the very purpose of the step itself. Please call the attention of America to this point particularly.

My # 435 [b] is an answer to the three questions (of Welles) brought up in your # 608 [a].

[a] Nomura recommends that as the best possible step Japan could take in the Tutuila matter, Japan stop bombing Chungking for a while, and publish this fact immediately, see II, 196.

[b] See II, 198.

[c] See II, 193. Welles summons Nomura and demands explanations of Tutuila bombing immediately.

Trans. 8-1-41

No. 200

FROM: Washington                                                                             July 31, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 623.

(Strictly Confidential. Chief of Office Routing.)

Re your #434 [a].

I called on Welles on the afternoon of the 31st and told him that I wished to have the gist of my separate telegram # 624 [b] conveyed to the President.

Welles expressed his gratitude and said that he would make arrangements immediately.

I said further that in case there was anything the President did not understand, I desired an opportunity to explain it to him, and closed the interview.

(Time 8:10 p.m.)

[a] Nomura is directed to inform the President that bombing of Chungking will be suspended for a time; requesting that this action not be publicly announced.

[b] See II, 201.

Trans. 8-3-41


No. 201

FROM: Washington                                                                             July 31, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #624 (or #622),

(Separate telegram).

Strictly confidential. Chief of Office routing.

I have come to convey to you personally the regret of my government over the Tutuila incident. I am instructed to inform promptly the President of the U.S. that the Japanese government has decided to suspend for the time being all bombing operations over the city area of Chungking. Let me say that this is a step I myself recommend to be taken in the interest of Japanese-American friendship. And I feel that this decision of my government should be held confidential inasmuch as publication of it would arouse unnecessarily a section of public opinion in Japan —– defeat the very purpose for which the measure has been adopted.

I am fully convinced that the Tutuila incident was an accident pure and simple. This, I believe, was made entirely clear to Ambassador Grew by our Foreign Minister, Admiral Toyoda, at the time when he offered his government’s apologies, and it seems scarcely necessary for me to give detailed explanations. I should like to add that the Japanese Government will be prepared to pay indemnities for any damages to American property upon the completion of the necessary investigations.

Trans. 8-6-41

No. 202

FROM: Washington                                                                             July 31, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                       http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG                                                    # 526.

Re my # 623 [a].

During the evening of the 31st, Welles announced that the United States has accepted Japan’s apology in connection with the Tutuila incident and that the matter was now closed.

[a] See II, 200

Trans. 8-5-41

No. 203

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             July 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 591.


According to information emanating from —– office, AP reports from ISTANBUL concerning British-German peace negotiations are not entirely without foundation. However this may be, the President and the Acting Secretary of State have intimated that Mayor LA GUARDIA of New York, former National Defense Head, has let something slip.



As a matter of fact, the German Government has recently again added to its personnel and is successfully engaging in undercover work. This is being fervently supported by Americans of German extraction.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Trans. 7-31-41

No. 204

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)                                                        July 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 433.

(Part 1 of 4)

(Message to Berlin # 708)

From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government’s policy and views. Hereafter, will you please act accordingly.

1. In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn. You were informed of it by Circular # 1390 [a]. Ever since then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of that policy.

2. The China incident has already extended over a period of four years, and the Imperial Government’s general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of its energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new situation faces us from the north and from the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.

[a] See II, 103, 104.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 205

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)                                                        July 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 433.

(Part 2 of 4)

(Message to Berlin # 708)

It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well. The German Embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their homeland is not yet as well informed as they are on our position.

3. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly


asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.

That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 206

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)                                                        July 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 433.

(Part 3 of 4) (Message to Berlin # 708)

Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be easily understood. If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action.

5. I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those objectives. Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the United States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from plunging into the conflict against Germany.

It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germany. For that matter, did not Germany start a war with Russia because of her military expediency when it was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only to settle the Chinese incident but have to meet a new challenge in the north as well as in the south, and this is quite inconvenient.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 207

FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)                                                        July 31, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 433.

(Part 4 of 4) (Message to Berlin # 708)

We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our action.

6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each



other and while striving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.

Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action.

Please send to Rome. Have sent to Washington.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 208.

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     August 2, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 438.

Re your # 566 [a]. Secret outside the department.

(Part 1 of 3)

We are now considering the proposal very carefully, although as you may well imagine, it would require considerable amount of time before the Japanese Government will be able to express its opinion regarding it because of the fact that the political situation at home and abroad is critical and the matter under consideration is of great importance. However, I would like to have you tell the President that we, realizing the seriousness of the present situation, are giving consideration to our reply and tell him so by covering the following points:

1. The method of disposal referred to in my #434 [b] is an unusual one. It goes to show, in part at least, how eager the Japanese Government is to bring about an equitable adjustment of Japanese-American relations. (This method of disposal excludes the area outside of the Chungking city limits and, therefore, does not apply to military establishments, airfields, etc., in the suburbs. Furthermore, it goes without saying that it is a temporary measure.

[a] Conversation between NOMURA and ROOSEVELT regarding HITLER’s war aims and Japanese-German cooperation, see II, 172.

[b] Informing ROOSEVELT that Chungking bombing will be temporarily suspended in view of Japanese-American relations, see II, 199.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 209

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     August 2, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 438.

(Part 2 of 3)

2. As soon as I received the report of damage having been done to the American gunboat by our bombing, I sent to the American Ambassador the memorandum prepared by the former Vice Minister YAMAMOTO, and immediately upon receiving official wire, I personally met the American Ambassador. I have already wired you this fact. In addition


to doing these things, I arranged to offer every facility to American newspaper correspondents and at the same time I had the report banned here so as not to unnecessarily excite public opinion. All this was done simply because we wish to deal with Japanese-American relations in as calm an atmosphere as possible.

Furthermore, in order to avoid the recurrence of such unpleasant incidents as the one in question, it is my earnest desire that the United States would free herself from mere legal theories and cooperate with Japan to eliminate by means of friendly conversation those matters which constitute the cause of disputes between the two countries. For example, inasmuch as the removal of Tutuilia to safe waters at this time would have a beneficent effect on future Japanese-American relations, will you suitably inform the American authorities to take this opportunity to do so.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 210

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     August 2, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 438.

(Part 3 of 3)

If we are to avoid disruption of Japanese-American relations, it would be necessary to mutually exercise a high degree of statesmanship. It is in consideration of this fact that we are taking the aforementioned attitude. However, if the Japanese Government is to continue to maintain such a cool-headed attitude and if the public opinion in Japan is to follow the Government more perfectly with a view to improving Japanese-American relations, I believe firmly that it is necessary that the United States Government reciprocate our attitude by refraining strictly from behavior of fault-finding and maintain instead an intelligent and constructive attitude. Will you therefore persuade the President to consider this point carefully. As I have already told you in successive telegrams, it is my intention to have the Japanese-American diplomatic negotiations continue in the future. Will you, therefore, take every opportunity to enlighten the American authorities, along the lines set forth in my telegrams, on the French Indo-China question as well.

Trans. 8-4-41

No. 211

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             August 2, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 649.

(Strictly Secret)

In view of the fact that Japanese-American relations are constantly growing worse with prohibitive limits set on export of oil, today, the 1st, during the forenoon, I secretly called on a member of the cabinet and asked him for the latest news. At the same time I told him the reasons for our having occupied French Indo-China. It appeared that he had already heard of Japan’s arguments from IWAKURO. I said, “It seems that it was clearly stated in the Japanese-French agreement regarding French Indo-China that the occupation was made necessary by the present general situation. It is not of a permanent nature. Do you not think



it a good plan to conclude an agreement which promises to uphold the integrity of the adjacent countries, waters, colonies, and the Dutch East Indies and to continue the negotiations that have been carried on and thus to facilitate supply of material?” Then he asked the question: “Is not Japan preparing to occupy Siberia?” showing that his interest had not been aroused to any extent. Incidentally, he said “Since Hull was so intensely interested in adjusting Japanese-American relations, he is greatly disappointed. Although he is expected to return on Monday, he is ‘very sick’.” Then he said, “We are now being ridiculed by our colleagues as having been ‘easy men’ for having played into the hands of the Japanese, but there will come a time when we will be quite active.”

He spoke further, saying, “You are well aware of the fact that the President does not want war.”

Now this is the way I look at the matter: The United States is trying to restrain Japan, first of all, by waging an economic war, although the government authorities claim that they are merely taking counter-measures against Japan’s policy. But, that the United States is at the same time making military preparations against the possible eventuality of a clash of arms is a fact with which you are already familiar .Furthermore, it seems that in order to attain her object, the United States is endeavoring to get Soviet Russia and China, to say nothing of Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies, to fall in line and cooperate with her . That the Russo-German war is lasting longer than expected has proved to be an advantage to the United States.

However, the aforementioned cabinet member did not speak so optimistically as the President, in a newspaper interview yesterday, is reported to have alleged his confidant HOPKINS to have spoken (sic). The cabinet member believes firmly in the necessity of this war lasting for several years for the reason that due to destruction of her man (sic) and materials, and due to the shortage of oil, Germany would not be able to do anything on a great scale even after the fighting on the Eastern Front has come to an end, and that since the United States will be able in the meantime to rapidly increase her production, the trend will be in favor of her.

Trans. 8-7-41

No. 212

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             August 2, 1941

TO: Rio, Bogota, Mexico                                                                     # 221.


(Message to Tokyo # 643)

1. The recent petroleum embargo exercised by the United States is attracting attention as the first measure taken to back up the freezing of funds. Its motive has not the slightest connection with the bombing of the Tutuila and is taken to be a warning to Japan against further penetration southwards. It is reported that the United States will not relax this sort of economic pressure until it become clear that Japan is going to put an end to her policy of aggression. All the newspapers print a London report that Japan is continuing to make new demands including military bases in Thai and the press contains comments to the effect that Japan is further increasing her military forces.


Simultaneously with the petroleum embargo the Chief of Production and Management stopped the sale of silk to the public at large; consequently, stocking manufacturing throughout the whole of the United States, depending upon whether or not they can use substitute materials, can employ but 20 % of their former workers. Great unemployment will be the result, in fact, it is said that 175,000 people are out of jobs.

2. On the 2nd, the Government of the United States issued a statement to the people that the fact that Japanese aggression in French Indo-China was not stopped constitutes a threat to the security of the United States, whose attitude towards France will be determined hereafter by whether or not Vichy surrenders her territory to the Axis. On the same day, WELLES, the British Ambassador; the Australian Minister; and the South African Minister, (doubtless concerning Dakar) held a conference on measures to be taken in the worst eventualities.

The activities of HARRY HOPKINS in Moscow are receiving notice and these activities are being referred to in connection with Russo-American cooperation in case Japan strikes northwards.

Relayed to —–, Mexico, Panama, Rio. Relay from Rio to —–, Buenos Aires.

Trans. 8-15-41

No. 213

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi)                                                          August 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 15.

(Part 1 of 2)

(Message to Tokyo # 142)

Re my # 132 [a].

a. Since then, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Sumitomo Bank have continued to be under surveillance by two Treasury Department inspectors each. Incoming and outgoing wires and mail have to have their details “checked” by these inspectors. Insofar as the Yokohama Specie Bank is concerned, though the account books and bank balances are “checked” daily, domestic business is allowed to proceed much as usual.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG

1. Since the freezing legislation went into effect, all individuals must present affidavits of continued residence since June 17th of last year before they can make first withdrawals from deposits. (There have been occasions when the inspectors have demanded that passports be submitted as evidence.)

2. Though statements are made that these measures are not as a result of the freezing legislation, when withdrawals are in excess of $500., the Treasury Department inspectors make investigations as to what purpose these funds are to be used.

3. When drafts are requested for dispatch to dependents in Japan, actual proof must be submitted that drafts have been sent to these same dependents within the last six months.

The Treasury inspectors see to it that Treasury Department watchmen are sent to both banks to stand guard each night.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-6-41



No. 214

FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi)                                                          August 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 15.

(Part 2 of 2)

(Message to Tokyo # 142)

b. NYK, Mitsui and Mitsubishi branch offices are now making applications for general licenses through their respective branch offices in San Francisco. (Temporary licenses have already been issued. Routine office expenses can be paid;) However, Mitsui and NYK branch offices were visited by Treasury Department inspectors for the three days of August 2 to 4, inclusive, at which time their disbursement account books were thoroughly investigated. Though the Osaka Chosen maintains a branch office, since it is an American agency with an American manager, it has no direct bearing in the present situation. The Asano branch office is making application for a general license.

c. Permanently established Japanese firms, maintaining partners in Japan, and to whom money is sent regularly, because of the freezing legislation, may not be able to send funds accumulated since June 1st to their respective sponsoring organizations in Japan. All of these firms are now making applications for general licenses. However, none of these licenses, as yet, have been issued.

Trans. 10-6-41

No. 215

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     August 5, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 445.

Re your # 621 [a].

1. There are no objections to your negotiating regarding the three points you mentioned. The British Ambassador has already made a proposal regarding their foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates in Japan, in harmony with the principle of reciprocity, to the effect that these be exempted from the rules recently put into effect regulating the transactions of foreigners. Also regarding America’s foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates, if America does not apply the rule freezing assets to Japanese foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates and their staff members in America and her possessions, then the Japanese government will in turn exempt American diplomatic establishments and consulates and their staff members in Japan (including Manchuria, Taiwan, and Chosen) from the regulations governing transactions by foreigners. There is no objection to your negotiating in harmony with the above.

2. There has been no proposal of any sort from the American Ambassador in Japan regarding the order freezing assets.

3. Please handle this whole matter there.

[a] Not available.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG

Trans. 8-6-41


No. 216

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             August 4, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 646.

Yesterday, Sunday, all the newspapers discussed the Japanese-American problem in large headlines, supporting the government’s stiff attitude. According to the Gallup Poll, hostility toward Japan is running rather high, but on the other hand, the press does express the opinion that the door has not been entirely closed. I would say that the Americans at present consider their relations with us as surpassing in importance their relations with Germany. As the days pass, I expect the situation to quiet down more or less. However, much will depend upon the course of the European war, and no man could do anything but guess what the future has in store. IWAKURO and WAKASUGI will make their report to you in Tokyo, but do not forget that things change rapidly these days. Now I am in a responsible position. Though I could not offer any excuses, if I made a miscalculation now, there might be regrettable consequences. Furthermore, my astuteness is quite limited. Therefore, as soon as there is a means of transportation available, I would like for you to send me some such Foreign Office expert well versed in all affairs at home and abroad as Ambassador KURUSU to work with me for awhile.

I know nothing at all about the government’s high policy which is shrouded in secrecy, so how can you expect me to take any action whatever when my hands are thus tied? Please think this over, and send me a man immediately.

Trans. 8-7-41

No. 217

FROM: Washington                                                                             August 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 652.

(Parts 1, 2, 3 of 4)

(Division of parts not indicated)

Strictly confidential.

Wakasugi talked with Undersecretary Welles for over one and a half hours on the 4th. They left no stones unturned in their exchanges of frank opinions. The following is the gist of their discussion:

Wakasugi said that on the eve of his departure for home to report to his government, he would like to get a clear idea of the attitude of the U.S. Government. Also, if there was anything that the U.S. Government would like to have relayed to his home government, he would like to be advised of it, Wakasugi said. After that, Wakasugi continued, he would like, (1) to be advised of what the United States wants of Japan in connection with Japanese-U. S. relations; and (2) to exchange opinions on the set-up of the world following the termination of the European war .

Welles replied that both Secretary Hull and he were exceedingly interested in maintaining and promoting friendly relations between the United States and Japan, and the Secretary has told the Ambassador so on many occasions.

Over a long period of time, he continued, peace has been maintained between Japan and the United States. The friendship which has bound the two together over those years is, indeed, a rare phenomenon in the history of international history. The United States is very anxious that some means be found to make possible the continuance of this happy situation. The United States has absolutely no desire to take aggressive or oppressive steps against Japan. At present, however, the U.S. policy towards the conquered countries sometimes clashes with



what the United States really wants to do with regard to other countries, which causes some critical situations.

He has had much adoration for Japan since he had a post there 25 years ago, Welles said. He has never experienced as critical times as these, he said. The only remaining hope now is the displaying of extraordinarily brilliant statesmanship, (meaning, not resorting to force of arms).

Wakasugi said that Welles had described the present situation correctly and asked him what sort of statesmanship the United States had in mind. He went on to point out that Europeans and Americans would not or could not comprehend Japanese actions in the Far East. The basis of the differences is that European and American territorial penetrations and applications of economic pressure of recent years conflicted with the ideals for the Far East that Japan-as the mainstay of the Far East-is striving for. The European and American policy described above does not harmonize with the Japanese program of national security which has a direct bearing on Japan’s very existence.

To this Welles replied that he well understood Japan’s aspirations and that the only point that was objectionable was the resorting to arms to gain these aspirations —– (one line missing) —– that which was proposed to the Ambassador was done so from this point of view.

At the request of Wakasugi, he explained that proposal in the following manner: Fundamentally, French Indo-China was occupied by Japan, the Japanese say, (1) to counter the danger of joint action by Great Britain and China (probably including the United States) against Japan; and (2) as a means of being assured access to raw materials.

Now, upon the evacuation of Japanese troops, if Japan, United States, Britain, and China (and possibly the Netherlands) could agree not to threaten French Indo-China’s territorial integrity, and set that area up as a strict neutral, Japan’s aim No. 1 would be automatically satisfied. Incidentally, as was reported to the Ambassador recently, Thailand is to be included in this area.

With regard to Japan’s argument regarding the assurance of accessibility to raw materials, Welles said that he could hardly believe that French Indo-Chinese production would satisfy the demands of Japan. However, if Japan agrees to the terms set up above, the President is prepared to insist to all the nations concerned (including Britain, Netherlands, and China, it is alleged) to grant Japan’s desires of putting her on an equal basis.

Welles added that the United States awaits Japan’s reply to this proposal with much expectancy.

“By the above explanation,” Wakasugi then said in effect, “do you imply that the United States is prepared to conduct negotiations with Japan concerning the Japanese demands, and that the United States is willing to use her good offices to discuss them with the other nations referred to above if Japan does not resort to force of arms?”

Welles replied that that is exactly what he had meant. Wakasugi continued along the following lines: “Under the national policy of ‘Western Hemisphere solidarity’, the United States has seized control of the Western Hemisphere for her own benefits. However, from all outward appearances, she is unsatisfied with that for it seems as if she is trying to participate in Far Eastern affairs on the pretext of having special interests there, in spite of the fact that the said special interests date no farther back than fifty or sixty years at the most. This makes one think that the United States is trying to seize the police powers of the world.”

“There is very little justification for the United States having that power,” Wakasugi said. “Why doesn’t the United States limit her sphere of influence to the Western Hemisphere? Why can’t she leave the Orient to the Orientals?”

Welles admitted that the special privileges of the United States in the Orient (most of which are in China, he said) dates back only fifty or sixty years. “However,” he continued, “U.S.


actions are not based on those. The United States is prepared to give up those special privileges at any time. The point on which the United States places the most emphasis is her opposition to the use of force of arms. World peace and order cannot possibly be brought about if a power such as Japan is permitted to convert the small countries in her vicinity into her protectorates one by one in the Hitlerean manner.” (At this point, Wakasugi interrupted by saying that the occupation of French Indo-China was carried out on a peaceful basis with the full accord of the French Government. Welles retorted that the Vichy Government did not have a free will and that the above mentioned “Full accord” was forcefully foisted upon it) .

“When two countries such as the United States and Japan,” Wakasugi then said, “which are surrounded by entirely dissimilar circumstances and which are based on different policies, insist on adhering to their respective arguments and wants, an armed clash between them cannot be avoided. If, however, the prevention of such an eventuality is sincerely desired, the actions of each must be geographically, or by some other means, limited. In the light of that, what is the scope of U.S. demands upon Japan? What are the limits of the wants of the United States herself?”

Welles avoided making a clear reply to these questions. Instead, he said, in effect: “We are in receipt of reports that Japan is preparing a further southward move into Thailand. I greatly fear that conditions will become worse.”

“The United States for one,” he went on, “is convinced that wealth and good fortune would come Japan’s way if only she would pursue and adhere to a strictly peaceful policy.”  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire


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