Archive for April, 2009

demetobolization 2.zet.001 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

April 30, 2009

The Demetabolization of Humanity: If Not Now, When?

Lou Sheehan
Harrisburg University of Science and Technology

ABSTRACT
Humanity has great reproductive potential vis-à-vis other members of the Zetan species.  Additionally, Humanity has significantly superior intellectual capacity vis-à-vis almost all intelligent species in the Galaxy.  However, Humanity’s irrationality is dysfunctional and can be exploited as a terminal weakness in the Galactic power struggle.

Background

Zeta Reticuli is a system comprised of two stars both of which are about 1 billion years older than the Earth’s sun.  Zeti Reticuli is 39.2 light years from Earth and Zeta I is approximately one-eight of a light year from Zeta II  (Friedman, 2008).
In 1947, two Zeta Reticulan I Ovoid-Class extraterrestrial lenticular-shaped aerodyne craft collided while on an observance-only mission over the atomic testing grounds in the State of New Mexico, USA,  Earth  (Friedman, 2008).   Radar film and tower logs from American Holloman Air Force Base reflected the merger of three objects prior to collision and subsequent crashes with the third object believed to be an unrecovered test balloon (Majestic Twelve Project, 1952). The two Ovoid-Class craft experienced non-planned ground contact at two dispersed sites in New Mexico.    Four Zeta Reticulan I bodies were recovered, three of which were unevacuated in a damaged escape cylinder and one of which was found several yards from the cylinder (Majestic Twelve Project, 1952).  Three of the four were nonmetabolic and badly decomposed as a result of exposure and assumed predatory action.  The fourth – the evacuated body –  became nonmetabolic within the first hour of the American Army Air Force recovery operation (Briefing Document, 1952).
Years of intensive Human study of the retrieved components of the two Ovoid-class craft seeded numerous Human technological advances.  Within decades of the recovery, the reverse engineering of recovered components led to the fruition, as examples, of fiber optics, integrated circuits, lasers, Kevlar and accelerated particle beam devices (Corso, 1997).
In 2021, Human scientists at the Furey Institute, Harrisburg University, fully replicated a functioning Ovoid-class power source (Cheng, 2022).  The reactor was fueled with Element 114 in a closed system.   Fueling was the initial step in the provision of amplified Gravity-✜ and Magnetic-✜ waves allowing Knaubian travel (http://www.boblazar.com).
The reactor bombarded Element 114 with hydrogen protons using a microparticle accelerator.  The hydrogen protons fused into the Element 114 nucleus creating the misnamed  “radioactive”  form of Element 115 (“R-115”).  The almost simultaneous decay of R-115 produced one particle of Anti-Hydrogen, a form of antimatter, as well as a large number of neutrinos.  The flux of Anti-Hydrogen particles produced in the reactor were channeled through an evacuated tuned tube within a flowing stream of neutrinos where it was reacted with plasma in a Naccian Annihilation Reaction.  This Annihilation Reaction released/exposed the inherent Subquarkian gravitational and magnetic forces of the reacting R-115 and, further, amplified the Gravity-✜ and Magnetic-✜ waves as a result of the “Island of Stability” properties of element 114 (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/sciencenow/3313/02.html).
The generation of the Hyper-Gravity-Magnetic-Gate theoretically allowed the craft to “fall” through space to its targeted (a.k.a. “attracted”) position at theoretical “speeds” of up to 1,000 times the speed of light (“1000-c”).  However,  the inefficiencies of the Human constructed “Model A.X” restricted Knaubian travel to speeds of under 12-c.
With the Human National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s successful test of the first Human interplanetary flight in the Schiavelli Program (the first manned extra-Earth program after the suspension of the Apollo Program), overt and nonconcealable  Zeta Reticulan contact was initiated in compliance with Zeta Reticulan Containment Policy: Earth (Pyramid 0099742.7760.04, -65,778,912).
The Zetan Founders evolved on a planet orbiting Zeta I Reticuli and populated a Zeta II Reticulan planet with a domestically genetically altered species version – to accommodate different environmental conditions – of their species.  Subsequently, on Earth the Founders attempted to genetically modify a native species of simians to approximate the Founders’ appearance and abilities in the context of yet another divergent environment.  As represented in many artistic representations as well as written and oral traditions, Humanity has a long record of the Founders’ involvement with Humans (Von Daniken, 1970).  Yet, consistent with Human behavior, all such involvement was officially denied and actively concealed.

Rorschach Analysis for Psychological Operations
This paper’s analysis builds upon the previous research performed by agent Gregorius of Rome  in Human year 590.  Agent Gregorius’ report lists the following seven fundamental human weaknesses: gluttony, greed, lust, envy, wrath, pride and sloth (Gregorius, 590).
Your humble agent has uncovered the following Human Directive relating to the above-mentioned Ovoid-class crash categorized as “TOP SECRET – RESTRICTED” and herewith uses it as a succinct instrument for evidencing the current state of the Human mind as well as ongoing Human psychological weaknesses.
The Human decision in 1947 to conceal the New Mexican crashes was premised on the following rationales  (Lt. Gen. Nathan F. Twining Mission Assessment, 1947) :
a.  Public trust of the political institutions might be eroded and possibly held in disrepute.
b.  A complete re-evaluation might take place among institutions of higher learning, thus calling into question the certainty of scientific knowledge.
c.  The ability of the Armed Forces to ensure National Security might be put in jeopardy and possibly lead to public fear and disorder.
d.  History and religion in the political context would probably suffer the most damage causing unprecedented upheaval in social and psychological well-being.
e.  Political repercussions might occur in our diplomatic efforts of containing the Communist threat to our democratic interests.
f.  If such an announcement was made by the current Administration, it could be perceived by the opposing party as a trick, laying open the possibility of unethical posturing and manipulation of the public’s mind.
How prescient and revealing was Lt. General Twining’s 1947 Assessment?

Public trust of the political institutions might be eroded and possibly held in disrepute.

In fact, public trust in Human/American institutions rapidly deteriorated subsequent to 1947 in the contexts of Vietnam, Watergate, Operation Desert Freedom, Bailoutgate, FDAgate, EPAgate, and NSAgate.  Nevertheless, the United States remained a distinct and sovereign entity until a few years after “First Contact.”  As is evident from numerous meta-analyses of Human nature, Twining’s peers’ decision to cloak their own short-run interests as equating to Humanity’s best interests for the simple purpose of maintaining the current economic inequalities led to the collapse of Human political organization (Marx, 2029).  In sum, the Human impulse toward gluttony distorts Human rationality and results in foreseeable periods of extreme intra-species destruction.

A complete re-evaluation might take place among institutions of higher learning, thus calling into question the certainty of scientific knowledge.

Perhaps the greatest strength of the Human branch of the Zetan species is its ability to comfortably live with intellectual ambiguity (Brooks, 2008).  If properly channeled, the phenomena of  “Selective Consciousness” and “Fuzzy Logic” augurs well for the Zetan races for purposes of any future war with the Reptillian Co-Prosperity Sphere.   However, the Human Achilles’ Heel is rooted in the same phenomena and exposes the Zetan Confederacy to multiple dangers.  Indeed, these phenomena led directly to both Humanity’s relatively rapid technological advancement  (Meek, 2023) but also to the massive population losses – estimated to be nearly 45% of all Humans who lived past the age of one (0.06793 Zetan I, 0.00044701 Reptilloid) solar year – caused by intra-species greed  (Simcox, 2029).

The ability of the Armed Forces to ensure National Security might be put in jeopardy and possibly lead to public fear and disorder.

The Human Social War (2024 – 2028) had the effect of reducing the Human population from approximately 11 billion to under one billion.  Nevertheless, in comparison with the Zeta I population of  approximately 4,000 and the Zeta II population of approximately 850, the Earth branch of the Zeta species — having the capacity for incessant lust and therefore the desire for rapid reproduction —  has experienced only a short period of disorder and, by their standards,  small population loss (Wagner, 2029).  Analyses of the causes of the Social War point not to fear relating to insecurity but, rather, to individual desire to have —  i.e., envy for — the material objects possessed by other Humans (Olivetti, 2031).  Once again, the only conclusion possible is that Human leadership employed misleading rhetoric so as to manipulate and thus retain control over Humanity over the short-run.  Of course, the rest of Humanity compliantly remained delusional.

History and religion in the political context would probably suffer the most damage causing unprecedented upheaval in social and psychological well-being.

Given inherent Human intellectual plasticity and the historical evidence, Lt. General Twining’s fourth contention is laughable to the Reptillian mind.  As one example, within months of First Contact the major Human  religious texts had all been reinterpreted – each, in turn, in numerous ways — to accommodate First Contact as well as other follow-on facts relating to same.  More, Zeta’s own truth traditions, i.e., “Shokesiansanity,” gained Human adherents and, not surprisingly, several antagonistic and wrathful Human groups developed with differing interpretations of that Faith (Sagan, 2031)!

Political repercussions might occur in our diplomatic efforts of containing the Communist threat to our democratic interests.

This self-serving supposition was not relevant at the time of First Contact as this particular competing subset of Humans – i.e., “Communists” – had been incorporated into a rival, i.e., the proud American, system of economic exchange in less than 50 Earth years after First Contact (Gibbons, 2012).  Evidenced, once again, is the lack of correlation between Human “reasoning” and reality; what other intelligent species cannot plan 50 years in advance?  The Zetan-Human subspecies is not inclined to connect in-puts and out-puts.

If such an announcement was made by the current Administration, it could be perceived by the opposing party as a trick, laying open the possibility of unethical posturing and manipulation of the public’s mind.

Ironically, of course, to avoid overly disruptive intra-leadership competition, Human leadership determined it was appropriate to adopt a unified leadership policy of tricking Humanity by adopting unethical postures and to otherwise manipulate the public’s mind in conjunction with the assumption that the historical pattern of sloth would guarantee Humanity’s unquestioning acceptance of the leadership’s pronouncements (Adams, 2024).  In lieu of reality, the leadership chose to focus Humanity’s attention on reproduction (Massengale, 2029).

Conclusion

Humanity has enormous intellectual and reproductive capacities.  Concurrent with these gifts, however, is a profound irrationality.  Your humble agent concludes that proper utilization of Human weaknesses will not only negate Human advantages but will, further, allow the Reptillian Co-Prosperity Sphere to undermine what, if any, intellectual advantages the Founding Zetans have.  At a minimum, we should continue to situate the Humans as if they are in Cosmic Kindergarten, i.e., requiring tremendous amounts of the Founder’s time for supervision.
To avoid Humanity’s ever-increasing ability to detect our presence, it is recommended that our installations on both the Earth’s Moon and on Mars be removed.  Additionally, we should continue to both randomly distribute gold to Humans and, further, target the distribution of gold to violent Human organizations.
All of the evidence suggests that Humanity has not been able to overcome its flaws during the past 1,500 Human years.  At this juncture, the Reptillian Co-Prosperity Sphere should have little trouble exploiting the seven significant Human weaknesses and thus stymie the Zetan Confederacy’s gambit for rapid expansion.  Further, given its inherent abilities, unpredictabilities, and contradictions, it is recommended that Humanity be eliminated proximate to the elimination of the populations on Zeta I and Zeta II as a precautionary measure for our future eggs’ sakes even if it means such operations require the elimination of the Earth habitat.
Subsequently, and assuming the destruction of Earth’s habitat, Earth may still be used as a base in our expanding Galactic Transportation System, as a source of heavier minerals and water, and as an encampment for prisoners of war (if any).

References

Adams, N. (2024). Look It Up Yourself! Harrisburg University: Illiteracy Project.

Bates, H. (1940, October), Farewell to the Master.  Astounding Science Fiction

Magazine.

Briefing Document. (1952). Operation Majestic 12 Prepared for President-Elect

Dwight D. Eisenhower. (Project Operations Group, White House.)

Washington, DC: White House.

Brooks, M. (2008).  13 Things That Don’t Make Sense.  New York: Doubleday.

Cheng, N. (2022).  My Life as a Rocket Scientist.  Shanghai: Run-ooooon Books.

Cinup War. (n.d.) In Zetapedia. Retrieved April 24, 2039, from

http://zeta.en.zetapedia.org/wiki/Cinup_War

Corso, P. (1997).  The Day After Roswell.  New York: Pocket Books.

Element 115. (n.d.). Bob Lazar. Retrieved April 23, 2039, from

http://www.boblazar.com

Friedman, S. (2008).  Flying Saucers and Science.  New Jersey: New Page Books.

Gibbons, E. (2012). Decline and Fall of the Communist Empire.  Moscow: Rasputin

Disappearing Ink, Inc.

Gregorius, R. (590). Operation Hannibal Barca.  Tikal: Geico Office of Records.

Island of Stability. (September, 2006). Nova scienceNOW.  Retrieved April 24, 2039,
from   http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/sciencenow/3313/02.html

Lt. Gen. Nathan F. Twining Mission Assessment. (1947).  Recovered Lenticular

Aerodyne Objects and Implications.  (Project Operations Group, White

House.) Washington, DC: White House.

Majestic Twelve Project. (1952). First Annual Report. (Project Operations Group,

White House.)  Washington, DC: White House.

Marx, C. (2029). Menschlich Beschaffenheit Weltanschauung.  Berlin: Econ-Verlag,

GmbH.

Massengale, R. (2029).  Look Over There!  Chicago: Playboy Press.

Meek, P. (2023).  The Point Is: Was Cartman Right?  Tahiti: South Park Press.

Olivetti, J. (2031).  The Social Wars Decoded.  Antigua: Partyland Publications.

Pyramid 0099742.7760.04. (-65,778,912). Containment Policy: Earth.  Akenhaten:

Central Office of Records.

Pyramid 3301003.0020.54. (1947). Student Handpyramid.  Akenhaten: Central

Office of Records.

Radioactive Decay.  (April 23, 2009.) In Wikipedia.  Retrieved April 24, 2039, from

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radioactive_decay

Sagan, K. (2031). Humanity’s Gift: Spiritual Chaos.  Jerusalem: Temple Scrolls.

Simcox, E. (2029).  We’re Different.  Ontario: Aboot Books.

Lt. Gen. Twining. (March 9, 2009). In Wikipedia.  Retrieved April 24, 2009, from

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nathan_Twining

Von Daniken, E. (1970).  Chariots of the Gods? New York: Bantam Books, Inc.

Wagner, J. (2029).  Piece It Together.  Kalamazoo: Paperwork Press.

Saved at: Element115.doc

Advertisements

Accordingly b.8.2. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

April 29, 2009

No. 1155
September 9, 1941
#950.
FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

Re my #852[a].

(1) I am pressing them for a reply in regard to the San Diego Maru, but on the 8th when I called, HO told me that the government had decided not to permit “special Tarakan” exports. I then told him that according to Mitsui’s, the Finance Ministry had told BPM that permits would not be issued for the “gasoil” and “Tarakan diesel” that they had expected to load on the Kiyo Maru and the Teiyo Maru, and asked him if this was true. HO replied that in the case of “gasoil” and “diesel” and also petroleum of any kind, they would be unable to make any statement until the Netherlands Government should decide upon its general policy governing export permits, and that until that decision is reached the N.E.I. authorities would not be able to give any permits on their own initiative; and BPM must have misunderstood the statement of the official in charge in regard to this.

I, therefore, asked him when he expected the general policy would be settled upon. HO replied that the Netherlands Government had not completed its consideration of the subject and that, therefore, he was unable to say when there would be a decision upon it.

(2) I told HO that in this unwarrantable attitude the Dutch were ignoring the understanding reached at the time of our negotiations, and repeatedly asked for an explanation. He remained obstinate, asserting that all this was before the invasion of French Indo-China, that at the time it was made very clear that everything would be worked out all right, providing no serious change should take place in the relations between the two countries, and that there is no occasion for our denunciations now. From the impressions I received during our conversation—–they are trying to settle upon their future policy of exports of goods other than—–to Japan from the standpoint of their own position, but in regard to petroleum, the intervention of Britain and the United States is strong, and they seem to be in a position of not being able to decide upon anything without the consent of Britain and the United States. The results are most unsatisfactory from our standpoint, as I think I have made clear in my reference message.

(3) This, as I have reported previously, is all based upon the threat they feel from our invasion of the southern part of French Indo-China, and upon the pressure exerted by Britain and the United States. Accordingly, unless we remove this feeling of being menaced, on the one hand, and devise plans for eliminating the activities of Britain and the United States on the other hand, merely to continue negotiations based on promises never carried out will never accomplish our ends.

(4) Therefore, when you come to negotiate with Pabst, please have these circumstances in mind and do what you can to make the best of the situation. At the same time, because of the fact that it is difficult for the government to purchase petroleum, and even if some could

[A-589]

be secured it is evident it would not meet our needs, I think the sooner we take the attitude that we do not care, and set up counter measures, the wiser we will be.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-16-41  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire


No. 1156
September 9, 1941
#948.
FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

Strictly confidential.

Re your #531[a].

I have reported from time to time on the matter of couriers however, very recently conditions here have taken a turn for the worse. When Nomoto arrived here recently, the authorities, saying that a courier’s duties had been fulfilled when he had delivered his documents, refused to grant him permission to travel away from the Consulate and in spite of continued negotiations, they have refused to modify their stand. I am sure that the couriers up to the present have been very careful on the above points, but if the courier is not skillful in foreign languages, and if his attitude and conduct are not in accord with that of an employee of the Foreign Office and, if, when he travels, he asks pointless questions of the resident Japanese, which will arouse suspicion, then the Dutch authorities will tend to become alarmed and the next step will be the prohibition of the courier system itself.

I think in this connection, it would be well not to dispatch as couriers any one other than members of the staff. Also, I think it would be desirable in view of the situation to send as a courier a secretary or someone of even higher rank, someone who is well versed in the policy of the office and cognizant of the internal situation and who would be able to carry back to the head office circumstances that defy expression in telegrams and documents.

Please make arrangements to put such a system into effect immediately.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-17-41


No. 1157
September 8, 1941
#940.
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

Secret outside the department.

Because telegraphic clerk YAMAGUCHI wants to discuss telegraphic matters, he wishes to be sent to Soerabaja, Makasar, Menado, Medan, Thai, and Singapore. Please grant permissions for this, and may we hope for a speedy reply. Besides this, will you kindly agree to NOMOTO being sent home, as he wants to return after YAMAGUCHI returns to his post.

Trans. 9-12-41

[A-590]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 1158
September 9, 1941
#564.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia

Strictly confidential.

Re your #921[a].

The results of the conference with the Finance Ministry were as follows:

1. There is some question in regard to the method of accepting the money on deposit. Even though the money is deposited in the Specie Bank or the Bank of Taiwan the books concerned should be placed in charge of the Consulate.

2. Since there may be orders issued to the head offices of the Specie Bank, and the Bank of Taiwan for the purchase of the guilder funds, it is desired that an understanding be reached with the depositors of those funds regarding the necessary procedure in the matter of issuing orders for this purchase of guilder funds and the sale again in Japan—–.

Please wire as to the total of the guilder funds on hand.

3. In case worse comes to worst and this matter should leak out to the Dutch authorities, the matter might not stop with the mere adoption of counter measures, but might result in the closure of the Consulate hence it is necessary to exercise extreme caution in all the steps taken. (For example, it might be well not to notify all evacuees but simply to take over the funds of those who request it.)

[a] See III, 1143.

Trans. 9-17-41


No. 1159
September 9, 1941
#946.
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

Referring to your Circular #1946[a].

With reference to items 1, 2, and 3: at present the Dutch require special permission for the withdrawal of current and demand deposits, and it is risky. Planters’ profits are entirely in local deposits, and the withdrawal of current and special deposits here is virtually impossible. —–(8 groups missing)—–please consider the following points:

(1) The issuing of certificates of balances of current and special deposits of evacuees (notification being impossible in the case of special accounts);

(2) When this has been done, the banks concerned shall earmark the entire balance, or part of it, and notify their head offices in Japan. Loans may be advanced in Japan up to the limit of these earmarked funds.

(3) The method of safeguarding the withdrawing of new deposits was described in my message #921[b]. Further,

(4) These certificates of balances shall be presented, together with passports, as documentary proof whereupon

(5) Remittances to home may be permitted, letters of credit issued for travel use, and loans advanced in Japan against a part of these deposits.

[a] See III, 1144.
[b] See III, 1143.

Trans. 9-16-41

[A-591]


No. 1160
September 10, 1941
#109.
FROM: Medan (Hayasaki) http://Louis1J1Sheehan1Esquire.us
TO: Tokyo

(Part 1 of 3.)

1. a. At Pangkalan-Brandan and SC(ban ?) airplane direction detectors and observation posts had been set up.

b. Three-fourths of the petroleum factories are under heavy guard.

c. Artillery troops have come over from Java and are engaging in marksmanship exercises; however, with none too good results.

d. Just as in the case of the factories, explosives have been piled around the wells, and the Netherlands officials boast that they can blow them to smithereens in ten minutes. The other day, however, they tried to blow up some drum cans but were unable to rend them.

e. An assistant engineer of the BPM Company, a certain Malayan, came and told me confidentially that it takes time for the employees inside and outside the factories to flee to Shelter and that the destruction of the factories will require at least an hour. Still, nothing could really be done to prevent their razing. As for the oil fields, however, he said he knew where all the electric wires were laid, and in case of emergency it would certainly not be impossible to cut them.

Trans. 10-1-41


No. 1161
September 10, 1941
#109.
FROM: Medan
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 3.)

2. Up until July, there were 4 cannon emplacements, 8 machine gun emplacements, and 20 trenches between Belawan[a] and Prapat[a]. (There is great difference in activity, depending on how much smuggling is being done by the Chinese; (land and sea defense lines ?)) 25 kilos to its south. However, since then there has been a marked increase, and even a motor road has been constructed. Everything is camouflaged.

3. (1) The Netherlands East Indies Government is strongly urging the hongoro in each village to recruit volunteers. http://Louis1J1Sheehan1Esquire.us One village near Belawan has had as many as 50 volunteers. However, I have been confidentially informed that in a crisis they would revolt.

(2) A Batak[b] driver employed by the—–authorities confidentially informed me that 1000 bags of cement had been transported to Prapat and Tanjonbarei[c], respectively.

(3) ABASU[c] (an Atsuchie[c]), son of the Rajah of Kutaraja[d], who was exiled to Java nineteen years ago, planned to (take refuge?) in Japan.

[a] In northern Sumatra.
[b] Negro tribe in the Malay.
[c] Kana spelling.
[d] Northern tip of Sumatra.

Trans. 10-1-41

[A-592]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 1162
September 10, 1941
#109.
FROM: Medan (Hayasaki)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 3 of 3.)

4. (1) According to our Rajamura[a], cannons have been emplaced on the Hajubukitsuto[a], Heights on the Island of Samosir[b] in Lake Toba[b] and stout bamboos have been driven in crisscross fashion on the emergency landing fields all over Atjeh[b].

(2) The road between Lake Toba and this city is 175 kilometers long and that between Pisoso[a] and this city is very steep and is 100 kilometers long. The Hongoro[a] (formerly Chief of Police) is familiar with the geography of this region.

5. (1) The Manager of a Netherlands tea plantation, whose common-law wife is Japanese, (a reserve officer (?)) confidentially told me that in case of an emergency all male Japanese will be interned in a building which was formerly a hospital in—–, (at one time this building housed 480 Germans—it is big enough to accommodate 1000 persons), and that the women will not be confined in such a manner.

(2) It is rumored that the last place of internment is situated at Burankejyaren[a], south of Kotochane[a]. We have made a secret investigation but have found no trace of it. It is also rumored now that there are places of internment at the point where the road from Bakanshiapipi[a] runs into River Rokan and at Paguruarama[a] to the southeast of Benkulen[b], but we have not been able to ascertain whether this is true.

6. According to what a Tonkoarifu[a] (an Atjeh) at Kutaraja[b], the construction of the hangers at Saban[a] and other military facilities is being supervised by a Captain of———-.

[a] Kana spelling.
[b] In Sumatra.

Trans. 10-7-41


No. 1163
September 10, 1941
#951.
FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa)
TO: Tokyo

Re your #558[a].

Payment to the BPM has been completed, but if, as reported to the main office of the Yokohama Specie Bank from its branch, this ship is now stopping at Purobukomu[b] in the British possession (please refer to your #473[c]), it means that the material in question will be loaded in British territory. Therefore, I think there is no other way but to have the APC and RA Companies apply to the Singapore authorities for permission. The Economic Ministry here claims that it has nothing to do with this matter, and so will you please re-investigate.

This message has been transmitted to Singapore.

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.
[c] This number must be in error, as #473 concerns the Netherlands East Indies’ prohibition of the use of the Japanese language in communication.

Trans. 9-12-41

[A-593]


No. 1164
September 10, 1941
#953.
FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

Message to Shanghai #13.

Re your #1318[a] addressed to the Minister.

I was under the impression that this question had been settled as a result of your efforts. However, I understand that they are experiencing difficulties in connection with the loading of the third ship (the least quantity) because of change of the official in charge and of other reasons. The Netherlands authorities have again requested us to lend our good offices. Will you, therefore, look into this matter and endeavor to settle it. After doing so, please let me know the results. This message has been transmitted to the Minister.

[a] See II, 1109.

Trans. 9-12-41


No. 1165
September 11, 1941
#966.
FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa)
TO: Tokyo

Strictly confidential.

Rumors have been going around among the Dutch recently that November will be a critical month. Again according to secret information received from a Chinese working in the East Asia Bureau all local government offices in anticipation of the worst are apparently making secret preparations to move to Bandong and all workers in the East Asia Bureau have been given secret orders to make preparations for the move to Bandong during this month. I have not yet ascertained whether these rumors are so or not, but I am passing them on for what they are worth.

Trans. 9-13-41


No. 1166
September 11, 1941
#967.
FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

Re your #559[a].

On the 10th I called on Hofstraaten and requested an explanation of the Tzisalak’s departure on the 7th without loading the goods.

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  He replied that on the 6th the government of the Netherlands East Indies instructed the ship to leave on the 7th, regardless of whether it had completed loading or not. We were aware of these orders, he said. (See my message #936[b].) The final permit of the Japanese Government, he continued, was granted at last during the afternoon of the 6th. However, in view of the various loading arrangements that had to be made, the captain probably was convinced that he could not possibly complete loading in the specified time limit. That was undoubtedly the reason the vessel sailed without loading the goods, the N.E.I. spokesman said.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[A-594]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

I then advised him that we would be willing to load goods on Japanese ships from Japan to N.E.I. in accordance with the offer made by our government and asked him if export permits would be granted to ship goods out of N.E.I. on this Japanese ship’s return voyage. Hofstraaten expressed his gratitude for this courtesy on our part and added that he would be delighted if at the same time the unfulfilled part of the goods internationally agreed upon could be shipped on said ship too. As to the goods to be loaded on the ship on her return voyage, he said that there would be no objections to exporting sugar and corn. As for other goods, the N.E.I. officials are at present considering the establishment of a new policy regarding exports to Japan, and requests that we await until that is determined to make any applications for export permits.

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 9-15-41


No. 1167
September 11, 1941
#970.
FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

Re your #567, Part 1.[a]

I negotiated through Imagawa and today the 11th received permission for the transfer of 60,000 guilders to the Specie Bank and at the same time the director of the control bureau stated that there was no objection to rescinding the freezing regulation of the Java Bank when necessary to permit transfer of funds to the Specie Bank in the future. Hence, there is now no obstacle in the way of the South Seas enterprise and since further negotiations concern the general problem, they will be postponed. (Imagawa concurs in this.)

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-17-41


No. 1168
September 11, 1941
#968.
FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa)
TO: Tokyo

Re your #543[a].

Thinking it would be well to sound out the attitude of the Dutch once more, I explained to ROOFINKU the official in charge of the bureau, Japan’s friendly attitude in allowing the use of the Dutch language, and stated that it would be to the advantage of both parties for the international telephone service to be continued on the condition that the use of the Japanese language be permitted in return. RO replied that with marital law in force now, the prospects of permission to use the Japanese language are meager.

Accordingly I think it best to suspend the international telephone service. If it is suspended please have your office advise Minister Pabst, or else have the Ministry of Communications advise the communications authorities of the Netherlands Indies, and report the results to me by dispatch.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-13-41

[A-595]


No. 1169
September 12, 1941
#575.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Batavia

(Secret.)

Re your #938[a].

1. Today, the 11th, I summoned PA[b] and had the Chief of the Trade Bureau converse with him. The Chief said, “The other day the Vice-Minister spoke to you about what HO[c] had told Consul General ISHIZAWA; namely, that the Japanese army should withdraw from south French-Indo China, etc. Now, how did you report it to your Government? The fact is that according to the Consul General’s report, HO had given what was strictly his private views but because you had sent a report he was questioned by the Governor General and the Chief of the Economic Bureau regarding the confidential conversation and was thereby greatly embarrassed.”

PA replied, “Since I was asked by the Vice-Minister whether HO’s views could be justly taken as being representative of those of the Netherlands East Indies Government I had addressed an inquiry to my Government. Although I have not yet received any reply regarding this matter, if, as you just said, the Netherlands East Indies Government leaders are questioning HO, it is clear that the views in question were entirely those of HO; and so would it not be well to assume from this that the question has naturally been settled?”

To this, I understand, the Bureau Chief remarked, “I believe it is well to say that this marks the closing of this question.” Please be so informed.

2. Incidentally, the Bureau Chief pressed for a reply to the request which the Vice-Minister had made with regard to the oil fields for mineral oil and petroleum. But PA replied that he had not yet received any instructions from his Government and that he believed that his Government would not decide upon its attitude until international situation becomes more definite.

Thereupon, the Bureau Chief spoke of the extreme hardships the crew of the tankers, sent to the Netherlands East Indies, have had to suffer because of food and fuel shortage during the month or so that they have been waiting for permits to be issued for shipping of petroleum and machine oil and he earnestly requested that the permits be issued at once even as a temporary measure for these tankers.

PA replied that he was entirely in sympathy with the Bureau Chief and he would urge his Government to immediately issue a reply one way or the other. (This paragraph was included for your reference.)

[a] See III, 1147.
[b] PABST, Netherlands Minister to Tokyo.
[c] HOOGSTRATEN, Chief of Commerce Bureau, Netherlands East Indies.

Trans. 10-2-41


No. 1170
September 12, 1941
#974.
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re your #564[a].

[A-596]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

1. To be sure, you have already discussed the matter with the Finance Ministry. However, to place the money in custody of the Yokohama Specie Bank, etc., might, in view of (1) in paragraph 1 of my #921[b], cause the scheme to be exposed sometime in the near future as illegal and would, at the same time, have the danger of causing (2) to happen, whether it is carried out openly or secretly. However, if the money is placed in care of the consulate, there is no danger of such a thing happening. Therefore, we would like to have the money placed in such custody outwardly, but actually to have the business connected with this disposal left for the sake of convenience in the hands of the branches of the two banks. The cash will be handled, as a whole, in the two branch banks as belonging to the suspense accounts of the consulate and be entered in the books as such; but books in which detailed listings of the depositors are made will be kept in care of the consulate.

2. (a) A detailed list will be sent on each occasion as explained in my previous telegram.

(b) In the matter of getting the approval of the depositors, when a deposit is to be made the depositor should be asked to accept the proviso that all matters connected with the deposit will be left entirely in the hands of the Consul and that the depositor has no objection to payments being made to creditors from the deposit whenever a formal repayment request has been made by the creditor to the depositor. Since this plan has not yet been carried out, we are not in a position to know what the total amount would be in guilders, but with the withdrawal from the islands of Japanese residents, the amount will gradually increase.

3. Execution of the aforementioned plan in the islands, while the South Seas Development Company assumes the role in Japan of a loan agency, I believe, would make it possible for us to avoid such a serious question as the closing of our consulates by the Netherlands authorities.

We shall be very careful so as not to disclose the details either to the Netherlands authorities or to the Japanese residents in general.

4. We would like to have your approval for carrying out the aforementioned plan (including the South Seas Development Company) at once, and so will you please take up the matter again with the Finance Ministry and wire me your reply (I have discussed this matter with IMAGAWA). Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 1143. http://Louis1J1Sheehan1Esquire.us

Trans. 9-18-41


No. 1171
September 15, 1941
#582.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia

Strictly Confidential.

Regarding your #974[a].

The results of the conference with the Finance Minister are as follows:

1. Entering these accounts on the official books of the bank would not be a decrease, but would result in a temporary increase in the funds of the bank, and even if they were carried in a suspense account credited to the Consulate, there is grave danger of the Dutch discovering the procedure; hence, the funds should be left in the custody of the consulate.

2. Is it not possible to send Guilder Paper currency to Japan by some very safe method?

3. We interpret the word creditor of your caption message, paragraph 2 B to mean banks in Japan proper, which will make loans against collateral. Is this correct? (It will be impossible in the future to make loans using—–funds as security for everyone in general.

[A-597]

4. We would like to have the South Seas Association render all the assistance it can. However, the Finance Minister is opposed to their using their financial strength in the mediation.

5. Please give study to the above points, and wire us your reaction.

[a] See III, 1170.

Trans. 9-19-41


No. 1172
September 13, 1941
#577.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia

Re your #927[a].

Should a decision such as reported in your telegram be made report it as soon as possible. Also exercise all the care and discretion you can.

Furthermore, in regard to the above report should the use of code telegrams be suspended as you suggested or should conditions become acute, send a plain text telegram “please note details”, (ISAIRYOSHO).

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-17-41

HOOGSTRATEN HO CHIANG KAI-SHEK Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

April 29, 2009

No. 1139
September 2, 1941
#900.
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

(Request message.)

To KURIBAYASHI from SAITO.

We see no opportunity of bettering the trade situation now in the doldrums. Of military goods we have been able to secure 230 tons of copra and 50 tons of hemp. In addition, we have made application for the export of 15 tons of cotton cloth and 825 tons of hemp thread for the manufacture of tatami[a]. It is possible for us to purchase 40,000 guilders’ worth of material during the month of October. Therefore, please secure the approval of the Treasury Department, as well as the Yokohama Specie Bank so that our enterprises here can carry on their business affairs.

We shall endeavor to maintain at present figures the number of employees and coolies necessary for the operation of compressed air machines, equipment for the dehydration of products, as well as other necessary works. It is urgently required that we develop a counter-policy to offset the ever-expanding—–.

[a] Floor matting.

Trans. 9-341


No. 1140
September 2, 1941
#904.
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET

For my information, please send the fact concerning the mass resignation of the Japanese staff of the Handels Bank in Japan and of other Dutch firms as well as the facts concerning other boycotting actions.

Trans. 9-4-41

[A-580]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 1141
September 2, 1941
#906.
FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

Secret outside the Department.

On the 4th, Secretary YAMAGUCHI is leaving Soerabaja for Japan aboard the Johore Maru. Since I am sending secret documents in his custody; please arrange at your discretion for his passing the customs at Yokohama with ease and convenience. Likewise, please make special arrangements to send a telegraphic official in order to take these things into custody afterward.

Trans. 9-5-41


No. 1142
September 2, 1941
#902.
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

Re the first part of Circular #261[a] from Ambassador HONDA.

1. Conditioned by our military invasion of French Indo-China, it is a fact that the government of these islands has drastically stepped up their anti-Japanese tendencies and very evidently assumed an attitude of aid to China. This is evidenced by the unconvincing control exercised by the authorities here over the anti-Japanese editorials of the Chinese press, the solicitation of funds for the construction of military airplanes for Chungking among Chinese resident here, and their demand for suspension of publication of the Japanese-operated East India Daily News, Chinese character edition, as well as the Malayan language magazine, Sinarusuratan. However, on the other hand, in order that we may give a sufficiently clear picture of the situation, there is a small group of Chinese resident here whose anti-Japanese tendencies have slightly improved as a result of the activities of the government here. However, no sooner than they got the impression that these Chinese were coming slightly closer to us in feeling, it could be seen that they began to exercise their old tendencies on a still greater scale. Japanese who had good contacts with Chinese here were unmercifully exiled, and these Chinese friends were hauled unceremoniously to the police stations for questioning or possibly taken before the person in charge of Chinese affairs here. It has been anonymously reported that a statement has been made that they are in danger of their lives. Thus, they have begun to hinder our schemes with regard to the Chinese with more and more determination.

2. Therefore, when an excellent opportunity presented itself, I deliberately took the occasion to exchange arguments on the Sino-Japanese incident with the Chief of the Far Eastern Section, RO[b], who is chiefly in charge, within the government circles, of the handling of the Chinese question. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET At that time, the fundamental points of his argument relating to the Chinese here, I am giving below for your information.

(a) “I have lived in China, many, many years. In addition, since my return to the Netherlands East Indies, ten years ago, I have gradually come into repute in my handling of the Chinese question. I think I am pretty well aware of matters having to do with the Chinese, but the fact that Japan has set up the Nanking regime and is very anxious to overthrow the regime of CHIANG KAI-SHEK is, I think, extremely foolhardy and has slight chance of success. I, personally, cannot condone Japan’s effort to beguile the Chinese masses from CHIANG KAI-SHEK through the establishment of the Nanking Government made up of second-rate or worse individuals. There is no more logical course for Japan to follow in the settlement of the China incident than to reach a compromise with CHIANG KAI-SHEK. This is my firm belief.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[A-581]

(b) “Though it is said that there are practically no Chinese living here in the Netherlands East Indies who support the Nanking Government, this is actually no exaggeration. All Chinese here give their support to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Furthermore, the Dutch Government recognizes the CHIANG regime, and because she does not recognize the Nanking regime, it can be clearly seen that the Netherlands Government entertains the same convictions.

(c) “WANG CHING-WEI, who heads the Nanking Government, is sold on the Asia doctrine. He advocates Sino-Japanese peace. His fundamental policy is the expulsion of the white man from East Asia. It is but natural that the Netherlands East Indies Government should oppose this theory. Therefore, the consequent reaction here is the decision to follow a course of seeing, to it that the Chinese on these islands are not swept off their feet.

(d) “At the present time, martial law has been put into effect on these islands, and everything is on a wartime footing. The people are united, and in order that the Netherlands home government might be restored, they are ready to fight. The 1,500,000 Chinese resident here on these islands are an important and integral part of the society of the Netherlands Indies. Their well-being greatly affects the peace, order, and economic livelihood of all living on these islands. Therefore, the Netherlands Indies authorities have definitely decided to follow a policy of unequivocally crushing out political schemes from abroad directed toward the Chinese resident here.”

3. Having said all this, I endeavored to refute him with all the strength that I could command. RO, however, would not be convinced and adamantly stuck to his statements. Not only is the situation like this, but recently the fact that the police strength on these islands has been greatly augmented has made it extremely difficult for us to carry on our schemes toward the Chinese residents here. As a consequence, the situation practically means that we can do nothing directly. Therefore, I would like to have our organs here for the manipulation of public opinion as well as those who work in the development of our schemes remain passive for a little while. For the time being, we are concentrating our efforts in the collection of intelligences having to do with the activities of Chinese here as well as other things.

4. Therefore, in the meantime, until we have securely brought French Indo-China and Thai within our sphere of influence, I think that it would be most propitious for us to strengthen our schemes with regard to the Chinese here. For this purpose, I would like to have sent to these islands influential persons in whom the Nanking Government has much confidence, who can command large numbers of followers among the Chinese here, who will have for their main objective the preaching of the doctrine that the Chinese and the Japanese are one, as well as set up organizations to influence Chinese opinion. These men would have absolutely no relations with either this office or with Japanese persons but would meet in large and small groups and talk with influential Chinese as well as substantial individuals of that group here.

Please transmit this message to Ambassador HONDA in China, and to other competent diplomatic officials to whom this information, in your good judgment, might be usable.

[a] Not available.
[b] ROFINCK.

Trans. 9-4-41


No. 1143
September 4, 1941
#921.
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

[A-582]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Secret outside the Department. Re your #510[a].

1. Since then I have conferred with the banks concerned to work out a practical method and have drawn up the following proposal:

(1) Permission has not yet been issued generally with regard to receiving of deposits made by Japanese.

(2) In the case of bank deposits, we believe that we should accommodate those who are withdrawing from the islands by our accepting their deposits but that we should do so on condition that a method of payment be held in reserve so that we may avoid the danger of the deposits being assessed in case of default in payment of obligations. Those who are withdrawing from the islands should, before their departure, follow the procedure of filling out a fixed form requesting the consulates to take custody of their money in guilders, but actually have the Yokohama Specie Bank or the Bank of Taiwan take the money in trust (in case of those residing in islands in which there are no Japanese Banks, the money should be collected at the consulate and remitted to either Soerabaja or Batavia). —–the banks which have thus accepted the money in trust should draw up a detailed list of the deposits and send the list through the consulates to both the Foreign Office and to their main offices and complete all procedures that would enable the banks to make loans.

(3) In view of the necessity of keeping secret from the Netherlands Government the fact of thus making loans of the money in Japan, the South Seas Association should be made to act as an intermediary body, giving all advice relative to the movement of those who have withdrawn from the islands, as well as determining quickly in all cases the amount of loan to be made and thus be responsible for issuance of loans.

2. We would like to put this proposition into effect at once if you have no objections to offer and so we would appreciate your wiring us your reply at once.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-6-41


No. 1144
September 6, 1941
Circular #1946.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Batavia

It is necessary to decide what sort of explanation should be given in Japan and in your area with regard to deposit security loans to be made to agriculturists and to the Japanese who are withdrawing from the islands. Will you, therefore, take up the matter with the branches of the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan respectively and wire me at once your decision with regard to the following items? Will you also keep the matter in strict secrecy, since there is no telling that there is no danger of the plan failing as a result of carelessness on the part of Japanese residents, and devise methods most suited to the actual conditions. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

1. In the case of cash accounts of special cash accounts, would it be possible to convert that portion which serves as a loan security into a fixed deposit and to keep the certificates of deposit in care of the branch banks? Is there not a danger of its becoming known to the outsiders even if it is possible?

[A-583]

2. In case the certificates cannot be kept in the banks, is there a convenient method whereby they could be transferred to the Consul Generals’ office for keeping and whereby the depositors could thereafter be prevented from drawing on the deposits?

3. What method should be used to establish connection for the purpose of ascertaining the difference resulting from loan repayment and deposit repayment in the event it is impossible to carry with oneself a bankbook or a certificate of deposit.

4. In the case referred to in paragraph #3, by what method would it be possible to identify the drawer with the depositor?

5. In case some members of a family are withdrawing and the other members are remaining, by what method may information be exchanged with regard to the (amount?) of loan to be made between loan payments and deposit payments? Is there any method whereby the withdrawal of the portion applied to loan security can be prevented?

Trans. 9-11-41


No. 1145
September 6, 1941
#38.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Menado

Re your message #94[a].

Secret outside the Department.

While I have great sympathy for the blows suffered by our people living abroad, the complete settlement of the problem is not simply a question of our relations with Netherlands East Indies. In a time of difficulty like the present, Japanese living at home and abroad must impartially bear sacrifices. I am very much afraid that people who, as a result of temporary discomfort and unnecessary panic, give up their rights and privileges by such a compromise as leaving the country will find it impossible to get new passports and come back to reopen their businesses unless there is a complete change in the future. Even if there is no possibility of attracting business now, try to persuade our people to stay for a few months at least, even if their books show a deficit. Get them to stand firm rather then flee from danger, and work out a policy which fits the local circumstances. For the present there is nothing to do about trade and shipping except to decide again when Netherlands East Indies shall have issued definite instructions in regard to supplying goods to Japan.

Please notify Batavia, Macassar,—–,—–, from Batavia—–to here —————.

[a] Not available. Trans. 11-17-41


No. 1146
September 5, 1941
#547.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia (Riyoji)

Re your #333[a].

Am sending all of the 4000 yen disbursements for this year out of the trade promotion fund, office expense and miscellaneous funds. Therefore, please arrange for intelligence reports to be sent from time to time.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-9-41

[A-584]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 1147
September 6, 1941
#938.
FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa)
TO: Tokyo

(To be handled in government code.)

To the Vice-Minister.

1. On the 5th, HO[a] called on me and said that according to a report sent by Consul ISHIZAWA to PA[b], the Netherlands East Indies Government will hereafter refuse to permit the export of petroleum to Japan unless Japan:

a. Issues a statement declaring that by her occupation of French Indo-China, she has no intention of attacking the Netherlands East Indies; and

b. Withdraws her troops from—–.

He proceeded to explain, saying, “Even if the aforementioned a and b were carried out, an unconditional export of petroleum would not be permitted, and the kinds of oil which will be permitted will be limited to those which would not increase the fighting power of Japan.   Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  Experts were at work then in order to decide what kinds of oil will be included in this category. Since I had expected the results to be defined in the near future, I confidentially gave you the information, and since you persistently questioned me, I confidentially disclosed to you in a frank manner what I knew of trends in the Government. I did not make any demands upon—–. However, the content of a telegram from PA differed greatly from the information I had given you, and since it was given in such a form as if the Netherlands East Indies Government was demanding the withdrawal of troops, I have been questioned by the Governnor-General and by MO.[c] If what I tell you in confidence and as a special favor is going to be misrepresented in such a way, I had better refrain hereafter from telling you frankly what I think.”

There was nothing in my report which could have caused such a misunderstanding. This, it seems to me, was due to Minister PA himself confusing the issues pertaining to concessions, with those pertaining to the sale of oil, because of his lack of sufficient understanding of the history of the matter. I would like to have a wire of inquiry sent.

2. Now HO had spoken frankly about this matter to me as a special favor because he was in close touch with me five years ago when he was assisting HA in arranging the ISHIZAWA-HARUTO agreement, and because after the agreement had been signed, he had, together with me, assisted in the solution in Japan of the questions which arose between the Exporters’ Guild and the Netherlands business firms. As it may be clearly gauged from the conversations which took place between me and HO during the recent Japanese-Netherlands negotiations, in many cases HO’s opinions ultimately form the policy of the Netherlands East Indies Government and, therefore, should he hereafter cease talking to me, it would become extremely difficult for us to judge the trend of affairs. I, therefore, ask you to invite Minister PA to your office as soon as possible and get him to wire a telegram of explanation in order to correct this misunderstanding. I think this would help to clarify my position as well as HO’s to the Governor-General and Mo, and so please—–the matter and wire me the gist of the conversation you had.

[a] HOOGSTRATEN.
[b] PABST.
[c] VAN MOOK, Director of Economic Affairs.

Trans. 9-20-41

[A-585]


No. 1148
September 6, 1941
#552.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Batavia

Re my #550[a].

At noon today, the 6th, the Finance Ministry granted, as a special favor limited to this time only, export permission to the Dutch firms. The permit covers the total amount of 1,588,100 yen and about 1200 or 1300 tons. Please tell HO[b] the circumstances which I have explained in my past telegrams and which led the Foreign Office and the related offices to offer this facility. Furthermore, no matter in how friendly a manner it is considered, under the present circumstances we cannot issue a permit for the amount handled by Handel’s. Both the Ministry and HA understand the situation very well, and they are wiring the details to the Netherlands East Indies Government. Please be so informed.

[a] Not available.
[b] HOOGSTRATEN.

Trans. 9-10-41


No. 1149
September 6, 1941
#553.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Batavia

From the Fuel Bureau to B.O.M.

We think that 12,000 gilders’ worth of crude oil will not keep up business for more than a single month’s time.

It is true that recently 10,000 gilders were remitted through the Mitsui Bank, but the Dutch East Indies officials, having frozen it, did not reimburse us; and so, henceforth, for the sake of continuing business, we believe that we must once more devise a means of raising funds. After conferring with the Consul-General, the Yokohama Specie Bank, and other competent persons regarding the above policy on raising funds, by all means please wire me your ideas.

Now, in addition, I want you to do everything in your power in connection with refunding the 10,000 gilders to Mitsui.

Trans. 9-11-41


No. 1150
September 6, 1941
#935.
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

Repeat message.

From the B.O.M. Home Office to the Fuel Bureau.

The Exchange Control Board notified the Mitsui Bank in Soerabaja that it will not permit remittances to be sent from Japan to the B.O.M. accordingly, although we are now conferring with each of the interested parties with regard to some counter plan to this. Yesterday, we received a wire to the effect that 10,000 gilders had been remitted from the guilds. After

[A-586]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

this until there is an order from this office, do not let anything like this happen. Address all wires meant for B.O.M. to this home office.

Will your office kindly assume the responsibility of wiring this to the guilds.

Trans. 9-10-41


No. 1151
September 6, 1941
#934.
FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa)
TO: Tokyo

Secret outside the Department.

Re telegraphic matter.

1. Will you please devise code words and send them by return wire for the following firms in addition to the list which you have given in your Circular #1907[a] and your separate telegram #531[b]:

B.O.M.; Takeda Chobei; Nanyo Kaiun; Nomura Toinko Shokusan; Daido Boeki; and Iwai Shoten.

2. There are two of your messages numbered #544[b]. One deals with a German Consul embarking on a Japanese ship and the other has to do with the loading of ships in Thailand and the Netherlands East Indies. Please be informed that we have filed the latter as your #549[b].

[a] See III, 644.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 9-12-41


No. 1152
September 10, 1941
#570.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Batavia

Re your #934[a].

Code Words Company
OTFUV Takeda Chobei
OVDAW Nanyo Kaiun
OSGOT Nomura Kaigaijigyobu
IFTIG Daido Trading Company
IGSOH Iwai Shoten

As to messages having to do with B.O.M., those whose content—–requires strict secrecy should be sent in machine code or in some secure Foreign Office code.

[a] See III, 1151.

Trans. 9-12-41

[A-587]


No. 1153
September 6, 1941  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Cir. #1947.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET
TO: Singapore, Batavia

(Strictly secret.)

After you have made an immediate investigation on the following matters, please make a report, sending it to us in an appropriate manner.

1. Please inform me as to the various types of fishing entered into by Japanese from the point of view of their use in fishing of gasoline-powered vessels (“gasoline-powered vessels” is a military term for vessels known as “sea arks” which have a considerable cruising ability).

2. In regard to these fishing concerns who operate these so-called “sea arks”;

(a) List the number of vessels for each concern separately.

(b) Give the tonnage of each vessel.

(c) The speed of each vessel.

(d) Whether or not they have wireless equipment.

(e) Give the present position of each ship.

(f) Should we require the use of these fishing vessels, please advise us as to the method by which we could transmit instructions for each vessel. (This is particularly important.)

(g) The time of day we should wire these orders. (This is particularly important.)

(h) Please ascertain the length of time required subsequent to receipt of orders to move from their present position to the southern part of French Indo-China.

Trans. 9-10-41


No. 1154
September 8, 1941
#943.
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

Strictly Secret.

Re your Circular #1947[a].

1. The Taichen Company (owned and operated by Noboru Ogura) and the Oshiro Company (owned and operated by Moryuki Oshiro) are the two fishing Companies operating here.

2. (a to e) The Taichen Company operates four ships; the Oshiro two ships. All vessels are propelled by 80 h.p. gasoline engines. The tonnage of these ships is 20 to 25 tons. They have a speed of 7 knots. Cruising range for the vessels of the Taichen Company is thirteen days and nights each. The vessels of the Oshiro Company can stay out of port nine days and nights. None of these vessels have communication facilities. All of these vessels ply alternately from the fishing harbor of Batavia to the fishing areas of Banga and Belitoeng and return.

(f) This office can communicate to the vessels in Batavia harbor on the same day. It will require approximately one day and a half subsequent to receipt of instructions by this office for those vessels on the fishing grounds to be informed. Six days and nights will be required for these ships to sail from Batavia to the southern end of French Indo-China. With each of these vessels towing two fishing barges, eight days and nights will be required to navigate that distance.

Furthermore, three days and nights are required in sailing from the northernmost fishing area in Netherlands East Indies waters to the Natoena Islands. In their considered opinion, they must be advised at least one week before they are to start for southern French Indo-

[A-588]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

China, in order that each of the vessels mentioned above may make preparations and make such repairs as are necessary for a safe voyage.

[a] See III, 1153.

Trans. 9-13-41

what KAGESA confidentially told me 3.kage.0001002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

April 29, 2009

No. 1071
August 14, 1941
No number.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

Re your Government Code telegram sent in the afternoon of the 14th to Ambassador HONDA.

The evening of the 14th when———-I called on WANG, I explained to him in detail what you had wired me. WANG said that since———-is a reorganization of the administrative set-up and changes in the personnel accompany it, the transfer of members in the Foreign Office will not, of course,———-until after definite replies have been received from prospective successors. He said further that, since he had informed me briefly by telegraph, he presumed that the matter would be discussed between me and Ambassador HONDA and that it would be well for me to explain by wire the situation being faced within the People’s Government and have him accept the fact by informing him that, for the sake of the highest policy of the People’s Government, it cannot be helped. Then, HIDAKA attempted to sound out WANG’s real intention by asking if he were right in understanding that WANG will carry out his plan of transfer as originally planned; whereupon WANG replied that, regrettable as it is, for reasons given above he———-despite Ambassador HONDA’s wishes.

Trans. 8-18-41


No. 1072
August 16, 1941
#360.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

Message to Shanghai #832.

Strictly Secret.

Secretary NISHIDA of the Embassy at Nanking, who is carrying the code to the various offices in the Central China area, sails from Kobe on the 18th aboard the Yawata Maru. Please handle inspection when he arrives.

I want him to stop over for two or three days in order to explain the use of this code to the telegraphic office.

Trans. 8-21-41

[A-545]


No. 1073
August 20, 1941
No number.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

Because of the fact that the code system used by the Nanking Government has not yet been fully developed, if we continue to use the system as heretofore between Japan and this city, there is danger of messages being intercepted by Chungking and our policy being known to them through decipherment. I would like to suggest that the foreign office and the Ministry of communication confer on this subject and decide that, in respect to every route and on condition that the telegraphic matter be handled only by those on the inside, all telegraphic communications between Japan and the Nanking Government be sent by the customary telegraphic system. If necessary we shall direct the telegraphic companies for this purpose. Please reply by wire.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 1074
August 22, 1941
Cir. 257.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Peking, Tientsin and Tokyo

(Message to Shanghai #318.)

Re -—71 and #71 (2) from Peking to this office.

1. The Nanking Army headquarters has already wired to the North China Army that it did not deem it necessary to be deeply involved in the individual personnel questions affecting the customs officials and that it would be best not to organize within the Special Affairs organizations bodies for the supervision of customs affairs because of the present international situation. It has already been arranged with the Army headquarters that the general question of personnel should be left to the discretion of Foreign Office officials (the gist of the telegram from Peking had been confidentially transmitted to the Army headquarters).

2. Therefore, this personnel question, I trust, will be handled by you in the best manner. As to our suggestion, granted that the facts of the case are such as reported in the telegram from Peking I think this is a good time to transfer ISHII to Shanghai or some other place (as you remember, it was proposed once that ISHII and KOYAMADA be exchanged).

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 1075
August 22, 1941
Circular 442.
FROM: Peking
TO: Nanking & Shanghai

(Message to Tokyo #563.)
(To be handled in Government Code.)
(Strictly Secret.)

Re my #559[a].

On the 22nd, HAYASHI confidentially told me the following:

[A-546]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

1. After that, because the YEN[b] faction by special messenger, had informed us that they wanted to get through with the signing without delay this month, each of the stipulations in detailed report in my #445, Staff Officer TSUCHIDA of the First Army arrived in En[c] on the 19th, (?) in order to confer with Chief of Staff TSUKIYAMA who, at present, is in En.

2. The Yen faction urged these signatures because Yen has severed his connections with the Central Military authorities, who had had about 10,000 troops of the South Army—–[d] invade Yen’s domain.

[a] Not available.
[b] YEN HSI-SHAN, Chief of Military Commission. Member of Central Executive Yuan, Head of Shansi Army.
[c] More often called Enan by the Japanese, Yenan-Fu in Shensi Province.
[d] (Possibly Kiangsi Province. Translator’s note.)

Trans. 8-28-41


No. 1076
July 26, 1941
#519.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

Re the 300,000,000 yen loaned to the People’s Government.

On the 26th WANG agreed with Adviser KAGESA over the loan and said, “Since it is Japan’s idea, I have no objections to using yearly allotments to the extent of 100,000,000 yen a year. http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us We feel that we would like to use this fiscal year’s allotment chiefly in the purchasing of weapons. In fact, during the last few days, after the announcement of the loan by the Minister, various requests have poured in from all quarters; and as things are now, we fear that conditions will become such that we will be unable to get them. Now I would like to have the People’s Government draw up a plan as speedily as possible and present it to the Japanese authorities, especially as the junior staff officers will be graduating soon, and it is a fact that we must supply them with weapons. I want you to cooperate with the Advisory Office in drawing up a concrete plan of action.” Thus he requested.

I immediately asked instructions with regard to this matter from the Central Military Headquarters and from the authorities of the General Army. This is all for the present. For your information.

Now, according to what KAGESA confidentially told me, actually the government is hoping for a great deal of military supplies, as it is true that due to the lack of weapons, both military establishments and instructions are extremely hindered. I replied that it will be very fitting for Japan to give courteous consideration to WANG’s requests.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Trans. 7-30-41


No. 1077
August 23, 1941
#592.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

Re my #519[a].

According to confidential statement by Major General Kagesa, the National Government has suggested a grant of various kinds of military equipment as a part of this year’s allotment of 50,000,000 yen of the 300,000,000 yen loan. Adviser Kagesa has passed this on to the Foreign

[A-547]

Office through the General Army, after squeezing it down to about 10,000,000, but—–in regard to naval necessities and civilian necessities,—–(garbled out).

[a] See III, 1076.

Trans. 9-18-41


No. 1078
August 26, 1941
#1545.
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

(Message to Nanking #270.)
(Secret outside the department.)

Re the Foreign Minister’s wire to me #877[a].

When your Excellency was here a short time ago, we had conversations concerning this matter. Now as it is necessary to fix the day for the conference for Consul Generals in China, please make such decisions as you feel are essential.

Furthermore should nothing else interfere we here think it would be most convenient to convene an intelligence meeting on or about September 20.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-3-41


No. 1079
August 27, 1941
#599.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

From Minister Hidaka to the head of the East Asia Bureau:

Following the Consul-General’s meeting, with the approval of the directors concerned, a business and intelligence meeting would be appropriate, it is felt. This would be for 2 days from September 24th in Nanking. Please get in touch with the China Affairs Board and after conferring on their views wire me.

Trans. 9-16-41


No. 1080
August 30, 1941
#376.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

(Part 1 of 2.)

The recent freezing of foreign currency kept in the reserve bank—–resulted from the fact that the Chinese refused to act in accordance with directions we gave them and continued to delay the matter. All of the government offices concerned are regretful that this has had to happen. However, today, after the freezing had been effected, to exchange this foreign cur-

[A-548]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

rency into special yen currency would affect the reserve held in the National Treasury for the Yokohama Specie Bank. If this is done, not only would it mean that we shall have to, for the time being, make good the loss which the Chinese would suffer, but also it would bring up the question of earmarking the gold which would be necessitated by such an action and this, in turn, would influence our exchange question which has, of late, become extremely complicated. This, therefore, is a very serious question insofar as we are concerned. However, if we allow the matter to stand as it is and if the fact that the foreign currency in the possession of this bank has, to a large extent, been frozen leaks out, this bank’s credit would suffer in consequence, and there is danger of its operation being interrupted. Furthermore, such a step would not harmonize with the policy we had in the past decided on in our dealings with this bank. Officials concerned are now conferring on some method that could relieve the situation, but even if relief is given, it would be necessary to effect it on certain strict terms.

Trans. 9-3-41


No. 1081
August 30, 1941
#376.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

(Part 2 of 2.)

Furthermore, this question is not so simple as can be settled by our officials and the bank officials conferring. In fact, there are some people who say that the Chinese authorities should appreciate the seriousness as well as the difficulty of it and formally request us for our assistance as a question which the Chinese government itself should deal with. However that may be, in view of the circumstances which led up to the freezing of the funds, I have been thinking that it would be necessary for you to take advantage of the situation politically to the end of taking this opportunity for making their policy with regard to exchange and loans increasingly cooperative with and dependent upon Japan. This does not mean that you should at once direct the Chinese authorities in this way. I am suggesting this for your consideration.

Trans. 9-3-41


No. 1082
August 30, 1941
#604.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

Hitherto the Nanking Petroleum Guild had bought local, refined gasoline from the Shanghai Foreign Oil Dealers, and had distributed it to the Chinese and Japanese military officials and civilians; but on the 28th the Foreign Oil Dealers prohibited the sale of gasoline outside of Shanghai bound for the interior. Thereupon the Japanese authorities drew up a plan for intense distribution and had the Chinese provide the facilities in accordance with this plan. At present the amount in stock does not exceed that of one month’s supply.

Since this problem is one which pervades throughout central China and is vitally connected with the transportation of principal commodities as well as the problem of peace and order, we are getting in touch with the military authorities without delay, and are considering a counter plan. This is all for the present.

[A-549]

Will the Minister kindly contact the East Asia Development Company; and will Shanghai kindly contact central China on this matter.

Trans. 9-9-41


No. 1083
September 1, 1941
Circular #266.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Net

Action Tokyo as #605.

(Abstract.)

The German Charge in Nanking has stated to Minister Hidaka that his government has discussed with the Japanese Embassy the question of appointing Germans as honorary Chinese Consuls and also the question of the protection of German nationals in China.

Trans. 9-16-41


No. 1084
September 3, 1941
#1632.
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

Re #270[a] from Shanghai to Nanking.

I think that it will be most convenient to hold the intelligence meeting for four days from the 29th following the Consul Generals’ meeting when a special intelligence official dispatched from Moscow will be present. Please make arrangements previously regarding attendance, expenses, personal affairs, etc.

[a] See III, 1078.

Trans. 9-13-41


No. 1085
September 5, 1941
#618.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

Re #1632[a] from Shanghai to Tokyo.

From Hori to Counselor Tashiro.

Following the completion of the Consuls General’s meeting 24th, the intelligence meeting will be held for three or four days from the -—th.

The Manchuria, Tientsin, Peking, Hankow, Canton, Hong Kong, Nanking, and Shanghai Consuls General will be summoned and any others who desire to attend may do so.

(I have contacted Nanking.)

[a] Not available, dated about 1 September.

Trans. 9-13-41

[A-550]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 1086
September 4, 1941
Cir. #269.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo and Peking

Today, the 4th, Minister of Foreign Affairs JO is leaving alone by plane for Tientsin. After making a two-day stopover there, he will proceed to Peking, where he plans to remain for two or three days. He is returning to his post in Japan but doing so by this present northern trip, and en route he will pay a courtesy call on Commander OKAMURA. (In Japan, he is unofficially connected with the Embassy, but this point is for your information only.) Since the purpose of his returning by this northern way is to observe the conditions as they exist in North China today, I have sent messages of introduction and recommendation to yourself and to Director SHIOZAWA. Will you kindly do everything within your power to assist him?

Kindly send this communication to the military authorities and to the liaison officials of the East Asia Development Company.

Trans. 9-8-41


No. 1087
September 5, 1941
Circular #460.
FROM: Peking
TO: Shanghai

Peking to Tokyo as #591, 5th.

Re my #563[a].

Secret information from Hayashi on the 5th as follows:

In order to complete the understanding between Japan and EN and have it ratified, Tanabe, Chief of the General Staff of the North Army from Japan, (Accompanied by Hayashi and RYOJOCHIN) and CHOSHOJU[b] from EN will meet on the 8th at—–.

Colonel Hongo of the North China Army is scheduled to leave for TAIGEN on the 11th with the details of the agreement. It is expected to take about two weeks.

[a] See III, 1075.
[b] Chao Chen-shou Confidante of Gen. Yen Hsi-shan. N. China Army. Chinese Army Leader.

Trans. 9-11-41


No. 1088
September 16, 1941
Cir. #469.
FROM: Peking
TO: Nanking and Shanghai

(Secret.) (Message to Tokyo #611.)

Re my #591[a].

The following is confidential information given me by HAYASI who arrived in Taiyuan on the 15th.

1. Accompanied by staff officers SIGEZAKI: TSUKIYAMA of the First Army; and TSUCHIDA; the Chief of Staff of the North China Army, TANABE (HAYASI also accompanied

[A-551]

the group), together with the Governor of the Shansi Province who had arrived at Fencheng[b] previously, conferred on the 8th with the party headed by CHO SHO JU[c] representing EN[d]. http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us However, no agreement was signed on that day because much time was spent in exchanging telegrams between CHO and EN concerning the questions of the Northwestern Business concern and of the return of the Do Ho Railway.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire   After deciding that the details should be disposed of by a commission consisting of both Japanese and Chinese experts in the future, an armistice agreement was signed between the two parties at 11:00 A.M. on the 11th.

2. It seems that those on the side of EN wish to have their forces increased to 300,000 or 500,000 men (they claim that they have at present 17—–, but in reality they probably have 50,000 or 60,000 men). But this is no more than an ideal; it would take many months before it could be realized. In supplying military funds and materials, the form to be followed is the same as you have indicated in your telegram.

3. Although the Japanese have requested EN to announce the fact that he had severed his relations with Chungking and the fact of Japanese-Chinese joint action as soon as the Japanese representatives signed the armistice agreement, it is the desire of those on his side that the announcement be issued after the distribution of the Shansi Army into various sections of the province (so that they could cooperate with the Japanese forces), and after disposal has been made of the question of the treatment to be given to the Central Army and to the 8th Route Army. It is expected that all this will take several months to accomplish.

4. It is planned to use the main power of the Shansi Army for political purposes. The Japanese do not attach much military importance to the army. The value of the move lies in the fact that they have succeeded in embracing EN’s political influence and in the fact that they are now in a position to influence through him both YU HSUEH CHUNG[e] and FU TSUO I[f] (they expect to continue to institute plans of this nature). Economically, they will be able to appeal to Chinese traders in distant places through the financial interest in Shansi, and they believe that this would make a turning point in the disposal of the China incident, etc., etc.

Relayed to Shanghai and—–,—–Hong Kong.

[a] See III, 1087.
[b] In Shansi Province.
[c] CHAO CHEN-SHOU, Commander of the 8th Army.
[d] Probably YEN HSI-SHAN, member of the Central Executive Yuan and Commander of the Shansi Army.
[e] Governor of the Hopeh Province and member of the Military Commission of the Nationalist Government.
[f] Chairman of the Suiyuan Province and Commander of the 37th Division.

Trans. 9-18-41


No. 1089
September 12, 1941
#646.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re your #393[a].

Since June of last year, WANG CHING-WEI has been conferring with the authorities of the Joint Army Command. The Army authorities, who sent letters to EN[b] on several occasions have—–. If EN goes to war, we think it will be satisfactory to give him not only the rank of Chairman of the Military Council, but also that of Vice-Chief of the Government. The authorities of the Joint Army Command also are in total agreement with the second point in your message concerning the conclusion of the war. Accordingly, with regard to the disbursement

[A-552]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

of expenditures regarding this matter, it is true that WANG CHING-WEI immediately gave his consent. (According to the explanation of the Army authorities, they first of all gave 1,000,000 yuan from the secret funds in addition to the 12,000,000 yuan. It seems that they promised disbursement covering a period of three months.)

Furthermore, we have received representations on successive occasions from the authorities of the Joint Army Command and from Advisor KAGESA with regard to—–. For your information.

[a] Not available.
[b] EN SHAKU ZAN, Kana spelling for YEN SHI-SHAN, Member of the Central Executive Yuan and Commander of the Shansi Army.

Trans. 9-25-41


No. 1090
September 9, 1941
Circular #1973.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai and Peking

Tokyo to Nanking #395.

(1) In regard to the Central China—–operations, for the present, not to exceed 30,000,000 yen will be disbursed, and further study will be given to the matter of other necessary expenditures to follow.

(2) This amount of 30,000,000 yen will be considered a refund in an amount equal to the reserves, for foreign loans and reparations moneys that have been accumulated by the affiliated six banks in North China, since 30 March 1940, the time of the setting up of the National Government and the Yokohama Specie Bank will lend this money to the responsible Japanese on the ground who are directing the work of the yen loan (?). The definite conditions etc. for drawing upon these funds will be decided upon separately.

(3) In connection with the preceding paragraph, the foreign loan money of the six banks in North China which has accumulated in Shanghai Maritime Customs incomes since 30 March 1940, when the National Government was set up, will for the time being, be held by the Specie Bank, in Chinese currency in an amount equal to the said allotment of 30,000,000 dollars, as a special reserve fund of the six banks.

(4) The intent of this will be made clear to the National Government. If the National Government desires the refunding to be done in the form of a transaction from the Specie Bank to the National Government, it will be understood that this will not interfere with changes being made in the parties to the contract.

Trans. 9-18-41


No. 1091
September 8, 1941
#630.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

Re your #376[a].

I quite agree with you in what you say. It is regrettable that delay in the business on the part of the—–reserve bank has caused the Japanese authorities inconvenience. I, personally, will see to it that hereafter the advisors direct the work more carefully.

[A-553]

As to the plan of settlement which you gave in your telegram, if you are going to make it conditional, it would be necessary to have such terms that would harmonize with the actual situation and be effective, as well as adaptable. With this in view I am having Advisor AOKI go to Shanghai on the 11th. Will you, therefore, see what he suggests and discuss the matter with him.

Please contact the East Asia Development Bureau in a manner which you think best.

[a] See III, 1080-1081.

Trans. 9-12-41


No. 1092
September 8, 1941
#388.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

CORRECTED TRANSLATION.

(To be handled in government code.)

According to talks between the Japanese and the British, some time near the end of this month (precise date uncertain, but appreciably earlier than estimated), because of the evacuation of Japanese from Europe, a Japanese ship (name uncertain, but it will be a first-rate boat) will leave for Lisbon. Is not Ambassador to Germany, RISEIGO[a] of the People’s Government, together with his party, expecting to go by this boat? After you have made inquiry, please let me know at once. (There are no restrictions as to the number of passengers.)

[a] LI SHENG-WU.

Trans. 9-15-41


No. 1093
September 9, 1941
#392.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Nanking

Re my #388[a].

It has been decided to have the said ship (the Asama Maru) sail from Yokohama (?) on the 20th directly for Lisbon by way of Durban (?). (Due to lack of time, it will not call at Shanghai.) We desire to have Li Sheng-wu and all others who desire to embark make immediate preparations so that they will not miss the boat.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-13-41

[A-554]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 1094
September 9, 1941
#633.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

Secret.

Re your #392[a].

I am making inquiries in regard to China’s attitude. However, in order to go to their posts in Germany and Italy, it will be necessary to pass through countries which have not extended recognition[b]. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire   Please wire as to whether there will be any difficulty over visas or not.

[a] See III, 1093.
[b] To Nanking.

Trans. 9-13-41 http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us

Chang Chun-li, Chang Po-ling, Chang Chun, and Chang Li-luan Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

April 28, 2009

No. 1038
October 1, 1945 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
#319.
FROM: Canton http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US

TO: Tokyo

(To be handled in Government code. Strictly Secret.)
(Separate telegram.)

1. Concerning control of military supplies as well as other materials benefiting the enemy and being shipped into the unoccupied territories:

[A-525]

(a) Banning of shipment into enemy territories by way of unoccupied coastal region centering around Macao, Burma, and Koshu District of French Indo-China. Also strict control of shipment of all materials other than the above which would benefit the enemy.

(b) Especially the inflow of materials beneficial to the enemy is being effected by smuggling ships from Macao sailing with full intention of breaking through Japan’s anti-Chinese blockade. Therefore, the port of Macao should be watched constantly, and all smuggling stopped.

(c) Japan should cooperate with the Macao Government for the purpose of stopping as well as controlling the following two items. With this purpose in view, the Government of Macao should accord all facilities necessary for cooperating with the personnel and ships belonging to Japanese organizations within the Macao territory and should also be responsible for their protection.

2. They should close the organizations connected with the Chungking regime as well as expel enemy persons whom the Japanese have indicated.

(a) There are espionage organizations of the Chungking regime, and these organizations are working toward creating disorder within the unoccupied territories. The Macao authorities should disband these organizations as they are indicated to it by the Japanese.

(b) These authorities should thoroughly suppress as well as punish members of the enemy firms and transportation companies who have formed themselves into secret societies.

3. A thorough-going suppression of anti-Japanese propaganda, opinions, as well as societies.

(a) They should control anti-Japanese newspapers whether printed in Chinese or in any other language; also opinions, broadcasts, moving pictures, and political movements inimical to the Nanking regime.

(b) Suppression of terroristic activities and refusal of admittance into the country of terroristic persons.

Trans. 8-23-41


No. 1039
October 13, 1941
Circular 2166.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Net

Lisbon to Tokyo #194.

I called on the director of the bureau of political affairs of the Foreign Office on other business, and the director told me that on the night of the 16th of September a Portuguese patrol boat at Macao belonging to the Government Office was fired upon without warning by a Japanese military patrol boat. A flag was flown immediately to show that it was a Portuguese vessel, but the firing continued. Fortunately, there were no casualties, but representation was immediately made to—–and protests were also lodged in Tokyo.

While he had not asked me to call especially for this, he wanted to take this opportunity to acquaint me with the facts—–. As there are matters I need to take up with the Colonial Ministry, please advise me as to the facts of this incident by return dispatch.

Trans. 10-16-41

[A-526]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 1040
August 20, 1941
Cir. #747.
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Net

Message to Tokyo #1553.

HQ spy report.

1. The leaders in Enan[a] announced on the 15th that besides TINSYOU (Ch’en Shao-yu)[b] mentioned in my #1533[c], RINYO (Lin Piao)[b], RINSOKAN (Lin T’su-han), RYURAKUSHO (Lin Po-Chao) and others have decided to leave by air for Moscow on the 24th; and that by taking advantage of the British-American-Soviet Conference, they would bring about a favorable turn in the boundary settlement.

2. TOEICHO (Teng———-) arrived in Hong Kong on the 17th. The reason for his visit was to confer with each faction, and to have them request headquarters to convoke the National Association for Assisting the Administration as promptly as possible, as well as assisting the liaison officials in Chungking in preparation for the Moscow conference.

3. The leaders in Enan sent a wire to Latimore to the effect that it was in favor of the joint negotiations among Britain, America, the Soviet and China; and at the same time said strongly that the demands of the headquarters consisted of none other than for its legitimate existence, recognition of equal treatment for the Communist Army, and for the development of the northwest section. We understand that SHUONRAI (Chou En-lai)[b] also expounded at length to Latimore that the Communist Party’s political demands consisted of reorganization of the National Association for Assisting the Administration; partial reorganization of the JU. GYO Administration Bureau, and abolition of the Right Wing of the Anti-Communist platform.

Relayed to Peking, Nanking, Hsingking and Hong Kong.

[a] Yurian-Fu, Shensi Province.
[b] Chinese Communist leader.
[c] Not available.

Trans. 8-30-41


No. 1041
September 4, 1941
#1640.
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

Re my #1553[a].

HQ reports that he has found out that MAO TSE-TUNG[b] arrived at Hami[c] on August 19th and left on the 25th for Moscow. MAO, it seems, remained for six days in Hami, busying himself with general discussions concerning the future development and expansion of the Chinese Communists, as well as discussions concerning the establishment of better relations between the Nationalists and Communists. His business in Moscow concerns a complete compromise on all problems between the Nationalists and the Reds, together with the equipment and instruction of the Communist forces. MAO is planning to expand both the area and activities of the Communists and to work out a concrete joint policy between the Chinese and

[A-527]

Soviet Red forces. It appears that in Moscow he plans to work out the details of future anti-Japanese strategy and the new and greater role to be played therein by the Communists.

[a] See III, 1040.
[b] Chinese Communist Leader.
[c] Town in E. Sinkiang, China. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US

Trans. 9-26-41


No. 1042
September 1, 1941
Cir. #1916.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking, Nanking & Shanghai

(Message from Hong Kong #441 on August 30.)

The following is a report made by XYZ.

At a reception held for—–, KO EN BAI[a], who is now in Hong Kong, spoke in the following manner regarding the question of joint action.

1. It looks as if joint military action between Soviet Russia and China will be agreed upon at least formally with the aid of Britain and the United States. In reality, however, the anti-Soviet faction made up of such persons as KA O KIN[b], RI SO JIN[c], and CHIN SEP, fearing Soviet Russia, has been following an opportunistic policy of compromising with Japan while advocating lengthy anti-Japanese resistance. (The—–is not satisfied with this state of affairs ?.)

2. The materials from the United States intended to give aid to China are not reaching in time their destination where they are needed. Take, for instance, airplanes. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  Although 200 machines have already reached China, since it is taking two days to assemble one plane, it would be more than a year before 200 planes will be used in the war. Consequently, despite the fact that 700 out of 1,000 pilots who have been training in the United States have reached China, they cannot be effectively employed. Furthermore, the best troops of the government are still far behind the front lines and are in—–and (Fukien ?). They have not yet given up their policy of putting pressure upon the Chinese Communists. Their so-called anti-Japanese counterattack is nothing more than more propaganda. Therefore, nothing will save Chungking but the formation of an anti-Japanese encirclement by Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia which is being brought on by Japan’s advance either northward or southward. Even if a war breaks out between Japan and Soviet Russia, most people are of the opinon that it will not benefit—–. Chungking will probably demand as a price for joint action with the Communists the (surrender ?) of—–in Sinkyo and Outer Mongolia, as well as the 18th Army. It seems that before taking joint action against Japan, Chungking will take steps to attain this objective. However, in view of the fact that the power to strike back at Japan is quite weak, joint action will not be effective.

3. Friction between—–and—–is as common as ever. The Chinese Communist Party leaders are afraid that should the Russian capital fall, the Nationalist Party would suddenly increase its pressure against them, and civil war will inevitably ensue. Furthermore, there is a tendency within groups all over China of separation taking place between the Nationalists and the Communists, and since in this Chungking cannot be asked to mediate, there is danger a split taking place very soon within the government. It being extremely difficult for the

[A-528]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Nationalist Party to unify these conflicting factions, the Chinese political prospect is a matter of deep concern.

[a] HUANG YEN-PEI, an educator.
[b] HO YING-CHIN, member of Central Executive Yuan.
[c] LITSUNG-JEN, Inspector, Chief of 4th Army.
[d] CHEN CHENG, Commander of 18th Army and 14th Division.

Trans. 9-5-41


No. 1043
September 6, 1941
#1658.
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

Message from JK received on the 4th.

It appears that the anti-Communist, pro-German trend is on the increase among the leaders of the Chungking general headquarters and it is understood that they recently adopted the following plans:

1. To spread propaganda to the effect that the subversive activities of the Chinese Communists render the continuation of resistance impossible and thus to increase the atmosphere favoring their schemes.

2. To unify the various armies and to increase the power of the purely Nationalist forces.

3. As far as diplomacy is concerned, to make it appear that they are in line with England and the United States, but in the meantime to seal amicable relations with Germany and Italy on the sly.

4. TANG EN-PO’s main forces are in the Funiu-Shan—–Tai Betsu San area[a]. TANG, as a Commander in name only, will lead the forces of LI PIN HSIEN[b] in an attack on the Indo-Chinese troops.

[a] In Honan Province.
[b] Commander of forces between Anhwei and Hankow.

Trans. 9-26-41


No. 1044
September 12, 1941
Cir. #814.
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Peking

Message to Tokyo #1702.

According to HQ, toward the end of September CHIANG KAI SHEK is planning to formally establish in Kunming military headquarters for southwestern territories and to appoint KA O KIN[a] as Commander in Chief and then to transfer to Kansi[f]—–and Yunnan the 140,000 men of the army under the command of RYU JI TAN.[b] However, HAKU SU KI[c], RI SAI SIN[d] and others are joining hands with RI KAN KON[e] and are persuading the Keietsu commanders to commence a southward movement. Especially RI SAI SIN on the 3rd and the 6th of September emphatically pointed out to CHIANG KAI SHEK that the Keietsu commanders were opposed to the southward move of the Central Army and urged that the Keietsu forces be per-

[A-529]

mitted to return from Szechwan, Hupeh, Honan, Hunan and Kwangsi and thus strengthen the defenses in the southwest. As a result of all this, it is said that CHIANG’s plan of establishing the military headquarters had ended in a failure. CHIANG then sent a telegram summoning KA O KIN, who was staying in Kunming, and after watching developments for eight days, telegraphed HAKU SU KI in Kunming to organize the military headquarters instead of KA; however, HAKU replied by wire to the effect that he would like to have CHIANG himself go to the southwest and give his final word as to how the headquarters should be established.

Relayed to Nanking and Peking.

[a] HO YING-CHIN, Member of Central Executive Yuan.
[b] LIU TZU-TAN, Commander of Communist 26th Army.
[c] PAI CHUNG-HSI, Commander 9th Route Army, also Member of Central Executive Yuan.
[d] LI CHI-SHEN, Member of Central Executive Yuan, Military Inspector in Charge of Training.
[e] LI HAN-HUN, Commander, 56th Div. (Kwantung forces).
[f] Kana spelling.

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: It is not clear what is meant by “Keietsu.” The translator’s guess is that the word is a designation for the territories beyond Chungking.

Trans. 9-16-41


No. 1045
September 17, 1941
#599.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsingking

(Moscow to Tokyo #1139.)

Relaying #1139 from Moscow to Tokyo.

McAvoy, a reporter of the Chicago Times (who arrived here about a month ago via Chungking and Hami) told a member of the staff on the 12th that he had flown from Chungking to Alma Ata via Lanchow and Hami and then taken the train from there, arriving in Moscow about two weeks later. He seemed to think that Soviet aid to Chiang Kai Shek would not amount to much. There appeared to be many Soviet soldiers in Suchow and Lanchow and Hami, and ten Soviet soldiers accompanied him from Suchow and Lanchow to Alma Ata, he reported.

Trans. 9-24-41


No. 1046
September 26, 1941
#987.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

(Secret outside the Department.)

According to reliable information, a group of 120 Air Corps officers of the Chungking Government sailed for the United States on board the President Pierce which left your port on September 22. Please send me details regarding this matter.

Trans. 10-1-41

[A-530]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 1047
September 26, 1941
#677.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

(Strictly secret.)

On the 25th, CHOU FUO-HAI[a] told HIDAKA[b] that in Hong Kong the other day ORIEN YUNG-MING told him the following:

Before allowing itself to be wheedled into a peace by the United States, Chungking wishes to be sure that it will be a sincere, complete, and lasting peace. It seems that CHIEN sent CHIANG KAI-SHEK recommendations that he make peace, and CHIANG replied that he would, as a matter of fact, welcome the cessation of hostilities but he could not be certain of making a good peace because Japan is so untrustworthy; that even if an agreement were entered into, after advancing either south or north and strengthening her international position, Japan would only come back again and bomb Chungking some more; that this is, as a matter of fact, her arriere pensee; that an understanding between Japan and the United States is impossible because opinion is so divided in Japan; http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US

that SADAO ARAKI, TEIICHI SUZUKI, as well as SEIGO NAKANO are making incendiary statements liable to produce a governmental upheaval; that by autumn Germany will do her very level best to take Moscow, because if winter sets in before the fall of the Soviet capital, it will be a cold, hard time for the Nazis, and in the meantime England and the United States will be growing stronger and stronger; that, of course, Japan realizes that Germany will act with celerity and intends to keep pace with her.

CHIEN continued, “About October 30th I am going to Chungking and again warn CHIANG, but I don’t expect to get any results. In any case, if you have anything you want to tell him, please let me know. The other day CHOU TSUO-MIN came to Shanghai from Hong Kong, and he said that the United States is not telling the Chinese Ambassador HU-SHIH anything about the negotiations supposed to be going on between Japan and the United States. SOONG TSU-WEN, of course, should be in a position to know the facts, but his correspondence with CHIANG would lead you to believe that he is in complete ignorance. Thus, Chungking seems to be utterly in the dark. The other day a rumor was going the rounds in Chungking to the effect that the United States was going to be satisfied with the evacuation of Japanese troops from Honan only and that she would let the Japanese forces remain in Hopei. CHIANG grew quite belligerent and went so far as to make a statement that he captured Lang Chow September 18.”

[a] Minister of Finance and Police.
[b] Commercial Attache in Shanghai.

Trans. 9-30-41


No. 1048
September 27, 1941
Cir. #494.
FROM: Peking
TO: China Net

Peking to Tokyo #637.

Confidential within the Ministry.

From the Ambassador to the Foreign Minister.

On the 27th, Harada, in a casual conversation with Yang Yu-hsun, the Director of the National Socialist Party, learned that Lu Ting-kuei, the Shanghai Secretary of the party, had

[A-531]

gone to Hong Kong to explain the purposes of the National Socialist Party to a select group there, and to obtain the consent of party leaders there to establish contact with Chang Chun-li. It is rumored that a meeting of the party will be held in the near future, probably during October. It would be unfortunate if the party’s reputation were to be impaired. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

The “Four Chang Movement” (Chang Chun-li, Chang Po-ling, Chang Chun, and Chang Li-luan) had been advocating a peace on all fronts. Since the death of Chang Li-luan it is evident that the three Changs will have to carry on for the sake of the party’s future.

The substance of this message has been repeated to Shanghai. Please repeat to Hong Kong.

Trans. 10-2-41

70,000,000 piasters 0.pia.1993 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

April 27, 2009

No. 1014
October 2, 1941
#432.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

On the 25th, Ambassador HENRY called on this Minister and said that the Japanese Army in South Indo-China had addressed a demand on the 21st to the Governor-General asking for transference for the use of the army, one building in Saigon, several factories, and hangers, and for free use of two air fields in Cambodia, and warned that unless the demand is complied with by the 26th, these objects will be occupied by the army. However, the Governor-General

[A-513]

rejected the demand on the grounds that these objects, being used by the—–army, were at present not transferable and that the air fields in question were not included in the agreement for joint-defense. The Ambassador requested that since such was the state of affairs, he would like to have me issue instructions to the army in French Indo-China, telling it to avoid any unfortunate incident arising from use of force. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

In reply to this, this Minister said that unless a guarantee is given for the acceptance by the French of the demands made by our army, I could not issue instructions and that without my issuing instructions, it would be only natural that the Japanese Army would resort to force as it predicted to do so; and that since we do not want to create trouble unnecessarily, if the Ambassador would strongly recommend to the Governor-General acceptance of the demands of the Japanese Army, we would also advise the army in French Indo-China to settle the matter peacefully. The Ambassador agreed to do so and left the room.

I, therefore, got in touch with the army here and had them transmit to the army in French Indo-China this intention of the French. According to a report received on the 28th from the Army here, the Governor-General finally gave in to the demands of the Army, and the question was settled satisfactorily.

Trans. 10-6-41


No. 1015
23 September 1941
#523.
FROM: Vichy (Japanese Ambassador)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

Re your Circular #1906.[a]

1. Radio-telegraph agency.

2. Favorable reception from 6 to 7. When necessary, we receive broadcasts directed toward America and also the South Seas. Reception from JUP and JUQ is in general good.

3. The time of broadcasts and the amount is in general O.K. However, the interval between the final broadcast and the first one the next morning is rather long, and it might be well to utilize DNB or Reuters. Also, a short sports news broadcast about 6 A.M. French time is desired. (I have ascertained the above regarding tele-radio.)

4. It is necessary to exercise extreme caution in regard to items concerning—–for example such things a Domei’s continually harping on the matter of Japanese-American negotiations and predicting their completion (whereas in America they are denied each time) is very annoying. I think that the handling of such broadcasts had better be left up to foreign news commentators. Also items dealing with crime, etc., and those deleterious to Japan might well be omitted.

5. Fair reception OFI (for national distribution). An average of 5 headings a day. Furthermore, it appears that a large amount of the tele-radio is being relayed to North and South America, the Balkan countries and Portugal. The amount that Portugal utilizes is particularly large.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-25-41

[A-514]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 1016
September 30, 1941
#539.
FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

Re your Circular #2022[a].

The results of the experimental broadcast and our desires are as follows:

Although there was interference and static, reception of JUP was good on all three days.

As to JAP and JUO we tried to detect it on each day. Because there was a powerful French broadcast using the wave length close to ours and because the broadcast lasted for only ten minutes, despite the fact that there was only one machine, we could not detect the broadcast and we were not able to receive anything.

In the future, when making experimental broadcasts, we would like to have you, even in case of simultaneous broadcasting, follow a uniform procedure and use a frequency identical in wave length with that used in the broadcasts.

In the future when sending telegraphic messages we would like to have the message repeated twice as a precaution against poor reception, and furthermore, we would like to have you send tentatively any urgent and short message which you intend to send properly at a later time. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-2-41


No. 1017
October 8, 1941
Unnumbered.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Hanoi

According to Reuters and other foreign dispatches, the military authorities in your city arrested over 100 Chinese hostile to Japan on the 25th and 26th of last month. It seems that the French Indo-China government office has made a protest and requests their release. Please wire me the facts in the case.

Trans. 10-23-41


No. 1018
October 2, 1941
#432.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

The following is the gist of #390[a] addressed to this Minister from Hanoi:

Re my #387[a].

I understand that Lt. Col. HAYASHI of the Sumida organ addressed on the 27th a communique to the following effect in reply to a protest made by the Governor General of French Indo-China that we were violating the sovereignty of that country:

“We have repeatedly demanded the expulsion of the leaders of the anti-Japanese Chinese residents. Notwithstanding that about six months have passed, you have not complied with this demand, giving for your reason that the Chinese have not caused disorder in French Indo-

[A-515]

China. However, these Chinese are not only resorting to every available means to get hold of our secrets, especially secrets of the Army, but also have been preventing the Chinese residents in French Indo-China from becoming friendly to Japan. This is a matter of a too serious nature for us to overlook. What is more, their activities have of late increased, and since they were under secret orders to spy on our camps in French Indo-China, we finally had our gendarmerie take emergency measures for the purpose of investigating. In other words, the Army found it necessary for reason of self defense to take the minimum precaution necessary. You protest against us, saying that this was an infringement of sovereignty, but so long as you have recognized the occupation by our Army, we would like to have you understand that any action on our part which we find unavoidable in the interest of self-defense is incidental to that recognition.”

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-6-41


No. 1019
October 2, 1941
#1204.
FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

Secret.

PIERRE FAUQUENOT, an Annamite, who has been here since September of last year, and who was formerly the editor of L’Alerte, a French language newspaper published in Saigon and who has been an advocate of Japan-French Indo-China cooperation——————– (—————had been serving a prison term since December 1939 in France, but in June of last year when the country was occupied by the Germans, he was released and later came here by way of—–. He has been keeping in touch with the officials of the Japanese Consulate in French Indo-China. I believe you know who he is). He has been wishing for sometime to return to his home and, therefore, I had a member of this office confer with him on several occasions and investigate his character and ideology. We found him to be a person whom we could use in our policy toward French Indo-China. I would like, therefore, to help him, if possible, satisfy his desires. However, before doing so, I would like to have him go first of all to Japan on board the Asama Maru. There might be some difficulty in returning him at once to French Indo-China. In that case, it might be well to have some organization in Japan employ him and assure him his living. Regarding this possibility Military Attache BANZAI in this city has already communicated with OKAMOTO, Chief of the Sixth Section of the General Staff.

Furthermore, YUZO SATSUMA, who has recently returned to Japan, is expected to confer with KARASAWA, director of the Toa Kenkyusho on the matter. One of these two will request that he be allowed to take charge of this man. Will you kindly contact them and wire me the results. As soon as it has been decided who should be responsible for this man, I shall issue a Japanese passport and have him take the steamer. His fare as far as Lisbon will be defrayed by us. The steamship fare could be taken care of by a governmental order, but I prefer to have his would-be guardian, if possible, pay it.

Since, as I have pointed out already, this man was imprisoned because he had advocated that Japan and French Indo-China join hands, we should both protect him and treat him hospitably regardless of what our present policy toward French Indo-China happens to be. I, therefore, would like to see this matter handled as favorably as possible.

Trans. 10-7-41

[A-516]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 1020
October 3, 1941
#436.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

In 3 parts, Part 2 missing.)

Re my #428[a].

Part 1.

Conditions regarding “free yen,” foreign currency, and gold, are as stated below, however, inasmuch as it is imperative that acceptance of this matter be effected without delay, please consider the three points stated below and then negotiate on the basis of having the total amount payable in gold.

1. Foreign currency.

(a) American, British, and Dutch currencies are at present frozen and hence cannot be utilized for payment to French Indo-China. There is little leeway in N.E.I. currency anyway.

(b) Furthermore, the balance of Swiss franc funds is small and the only way it could be procured is through the “free yen block” (?) and as far as Japanese-German financial transactions are concerned Japan owes Germany marks and hence Japan is reluctant to offer marks, therefore, currency cannot well be supplied in this manner.

The matter of procuring this balance through Italy might also be considered but it is attended with difficulties. The possibility of obtention by transfer of gold—–.

(c) There remain the Escudo and the Peseta, Portuguese and Spanish currencies respectively. These have not been used recently and funds in these currencies are very small. In regard to obtaining these there are the various methods of free marks, Swiss francs and the transfer of gold, however, the difficulties and impossibilities involved are the same as in the preceding paragraph.

Part 2 missing.

Part 3.

3. Gold.

The amount of gold held by this country has reached a comparatively large sum and hence there would be no difficulty in alloting it. Since the possibilities of French Indo-China’s obtaining foreign currencies are about what I have outlined above, it is not difficult to imagine that French Indo-China will desire to have settlement made in gold. I also recognize the possibility that the other party might use the fear of inflation as an excuse for not receiving gold and ask to be paid in commodities. In regard to this, in view of the trade agreement that exists between Japan and French Indo-China, it is only natural that Japan should do her utmost to promote said trade and to see that it increases. In regard to the above item, it is possible that a part of the payment might be made in some special commodity. The other party for instance, desires iron and non-ferrous metals, and petroleum. However, circumstances are such that these cannot be supplied in a hurry and a great deal of time would necessarily be consumed in negotiations. To simply state in general that payment would be made in commodities or in free yen—–I think.—–. I fear—–. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US

Please negotiate these points.—–paragraphs a, b, c,—–.

(Translator’s note: Many gaps in last part of the message.)

[a] See III, 1009.

Trans. 10-8-41

[A-517]


No. 1021
October 4, 1941
#437.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

Re your #542[a].

1. The requirements referred to below apply principally to the army of occupation in southern Indo-China, but part of it also applies to the Northern Army.

2. It is very difficult at this time to predict what the total requirements from January to December next year will be; however, during January to March approximately 30,000,000 additional piasters (10,000,000 per month) will be needed to complete our military establishment. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  It appears that a total of some 70,000,000 piasters will be required (about 6,000,000 per month) to cover the maintenance expenses of our troops for one year.

This matter has to do with military secrets, therefore, in taking it up with the Foreign Office it should be explained simply that a total of 100,000,000 piasters is estimated to be required, of which part is to cover expenses in connection with the northern occupation and part is to meet the overhead and extraordinary expenses of the army from January to December. These estimates are subject to change, depending upon the course of events.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-16-41

Yokohama Specie Bank in Saigon 6.spe.0098 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

April 26, 2009

http://Louis-j-sheehan.com

No. 967
August 13, 1941
#459.
FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

Re my #456[a].

On the 12th Harada called upon ARUNARU[b] on other business but took the occasion to press the matter of rubber also. ARUNARU replied that as yet he had had no reply from the Colonial Office, but in regard to the part for America the agreement has already been signed and inasmuch as it is necessary for French Indo-China to maintain its trade status with American it would be very difficult to divert that rubber to Japan.

To this Harada replied that Japan was not necessarily seeking revenge but that they merely desired half that amount (ARUNARU expressed his appreciation at this), and he requested that ARUNARU try again to prevail upon the Colonial Office.

ARUNARU said further that plans were being laid for the transportation of rubber to France via South America in spite of the fact that this was bound to prove a very dangerous undertaking. And in view of the fact that at least a part of it would have to be diverted to Germany he begged for Japan to consider the poverty of France at this time and to consider this problem as one unrelated to France and to give it our most favorable consideration. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US

[a] Not available.
[b] Arnald of the Vichy Foreign Office.

Trans. 8-15-41

[A-491]


No. 968
August 28, 1941
#474.
FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

Re my #459[a].

The French Foreign Office has delivered a note to us dated the 26th which I have summarized in my separate wires #475[b] and #476[b]. Subsequently I had HARADA call on ARNALD[c]. The French attitude with regard to the question of French ships in Saigon is more shilly-shallying than ever before. There is no foretelling the result. Though a speedy settlement of this question is urgently desirable and should be negotiated here in Vichy, the French express a desire to negotiate in Tokyo or, with regard to the portion to be sent to the United States, they feel that they should first secure the approval of the American authorities. Or, since under the present circumstances payment in dollars is impossible, in order to make an explanation to the United States that there is no recourse but to use free yen in these transactions, ARNALD feels that at the same time the French make representations to the United States, Japan should advise the United States in some form or other. ARNALD is understood to have expressed himself further as being willing to negotiate at a later date on the manner of payment.

[a] See III, 967.
[b] Not available.
[c] Minister at Vichy.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Trans. 9-1-41


No. 969
August 30, 1941
#480.
FROM: Vichy (Kato)
TO: Tokyo

Re your #361[a].

On the 30th I had HARADA submit to ARNALD a request to the effect that since there is no other method of payment except by transferable yen, we would like to have their agreement to this manner of payment. ARNALD replied that some officials in the French Finance Ministry were opposed to this method because there is a large accumulation of yen currency in France, but that he would study the matter.

Incidentally, ARNALD, referring to the request which Ambassador ARERII[b] recently submitted urging Japan to speed up her exports to French Indo-China, asked that the Japanese Government make greater effort in this direction.

[a] Not available.
[b] Probably HENRY.

Trans. 9-12-41

[A-492

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 970
August 30, 1941
#481.
FROM: Vichy
TO: Tokyo

Re my #474[a].

On the 30th ARUNARU[b] told HARADA that as a result of conversations with the United States, it will be possible to transfer to Japan the 5,000 tons of rubber which was to go to the United States. Of the remaining 7 tons of French Indo-China rubber, the French Government has finally decided that 4 tons will be allotted to Germany and 3 tons to Japan, and Japan is asked to be satisfied with this arrangement.

HARADA replied that this new proposal still meant that Japan would lack 6 tons for her requirements, but that he would transmit the proposal to Tokyo. Furthermore, he asked that if, before the end of the year, it was found to be impossible to ship any part of France’s or Germany’s allotments, these quantities also be transferred to Japan.

To this it seems “A” replied that although it was a reasonable point and he would like to agree to it, no such stipulation had been added to the decision arrived at by the special conferees who had met for the purpose.

Please wire me your decision in connection with the new French proposal.

[a] See III, 968.
[b] French Minister at Vichy.

Trans. 9-15-41


No. 971
August 16, 1941
#464.
FROM: Vichy (Kato)
TO: Tokyo

Re your #275[a].

The French Foreign Office, by note under date of August 14, inquired the opinion of the Imperial Government concerning the three following clauses.

1. The business involved in the exchange concerning the payment of occupation expenses shall be left up to the Bank of Indo-China and the Bank of Japan.

2. Whenever the Imperial forces in French Indo-China need piastres, they shall so notify the Bank of Indo-China, and at the same time they shall pay to the Bank of Indo-China the dollars or transferable yen requested by the French Government. Thereupon the Bank of Indo-China will pay out an equivalent in piastres.

3. All other technical arrangements will be left up to the Bank of Indo-China and the Yokohama Specie Bank.

It seems, furthermore, that suitable instructions have already been issued to the Bank of Indo-China.

[a] See II, 971A.

Trans. 8-29-41

[A-493]


No. 971A
July 12, 1941
#275.
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Vichy

Special message. Secret.
To be handled in Government Code.

Regarding the amount of troops sent to French Indo-China.

1. The French Indo-China authorities are to guarantee to supply this amount in piastres through the organization set-up. The specific method will be brought out in a separate agreement. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US

2. The amount to be paid for the balance of the year is 23,000,000 piastres (monthly amount, 4,500,000 piastres). This is to be paid in “free yen” (literal translation), American dollars, or in gold, whichever the French Indo-China authorities desire. Furthermore, the amount of 1,000,000 piastres a month ‘loaned’ to the army stationed in the Northern section is not included in the above figures.

Trans. 7-15-41


No. 972
August 18, 1941
Unnumbered.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Vichy

Extra.

(Translator’s Note:) (This message, being extremely garbled, cannot be translated word-for-word. The following, as a consequence, is merely a summary.)

Re your #466[a].

I am rewiring per your request as follows: #354. Circular #1821 from Tokyo to Hanoi and Saigon.

(Strictly Secret.)

According to a report from the Finance Ministry to Yokohama Specie Bank, acting as an agent of the Finance Ministry, has been momentarily expecting receipt of funds stipulated in the terms of the recent Franco-Japanese agreement since July 23rd. The payment stipulation called for the turning over of funds to cover military expenses of the army of occupation. The August allotment of 4,500,000 Hi[b] dollars is urgently needed. In spite of the fact that the terms of payment as specified in the text of the treaty for the use of the northern(?) army of occupation do not exceed being merely technical ones, their lack of—–is hard for us to condone. As soon as you have heard the facts of the matter from NAKAGAWA, who is the Yokohama Specie Bank representative in charge of this matter, I would like to have you take such measures as are advisable so that receipt of 4,500,000 Hi dollars can be had since the military authorities are insisting that the receipt of the August apportionment by the night of the 16th is absolutely necessary. Please make formal representations to the Governor-General for the

[A-494]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

continuance of conversations on payment terms with the Yokohama Specie Bank representatives on the spot. Relayed to Vichy.

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 8-21-41


No. 973
September 1, 1941
#250.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Hanoi

Message from Vichy #479 on August 30th.

Re your #361[a].

Before receiving your wire, I received one from the French Foreign Office. The Yokohama Specie Bank in Saigon had consented to the payments in gold for materials for the troops stationed there, in the allotment for the first month; but owing to the fact that it is impossible to get export permits for it, they are taking temporary measures, and France has consented to accept transferable yen.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  The export permits for this gold have been granted (autoriser le transfer). Because France is not operating with our exported Japanese money to French Indo-China, its holdings of transferable yen have already actually amounted to considerable sums. Accordingly, in case it is impossible to pay for the materials in dollars, they are hoping to be paid to some extent in gold. There is also preparation for negotiations here, and if it was not already agreed to pay the full amount in gold on the spot, please inform me by return wire.

Relay to Hanoi.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-3-41


No. 974
August 21, 1941
#232.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hanoi

Tokyo to Berlin #752.

Referring to Nos. 308[a] and 310[a] from Hanoi to the Foreign Minister.

1. With reference to the German plan to set up some kind of a representative delegation in French Indo-China, we have no basic reason to oppose this move. In view of the present Franco-Grerman relations, however, we feel that the Armistice Commission is sufficient. Our position is that there is no positive and essential reason for the Germans to establish such a delegation in Indo-China and we do not like it.

2. Thus, if the Germans establish such a body, we cannot avoid recognizing that, because of such a situation, we would have to adopt entirely new measures regarding the present Franco-Japanese defense cooperation and all Japan-Indo-China relations. The German Government’s formal proposals for discussion must be settled after careful consideration.

[A-495]

3. Please report the results of proposals to the German Government, based upon the foregoing.

Relay to Vichy. Relayed to Hanoi. [a] Not available.

Trans. 8-28-41


No. 975
August 21, 1941
#233.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hanoi

Tokyo to Berlin #753.

Re #308[a] and #310[a] from Hanoi to Tokyo.

(1) The protocol recently made between Japan and France has put relations between Japan and French Indo-China on an entirely new basis, and in order that the Imperial Government may be able to effectively carry out her part in the joint defense plan, we expect that in case French Indo-China enters into any new permanent political relations with any other country, French Indo-China and the other country involved will of course give friendly notice of such action (at least if it is not a potential enemy nation). Accordingly, in this matter it would be proper for Germany to notify us in advance.

(2) It might be all right for Germany to think of establishing some representative agency in French Indo-China, but the Germans, as far as the political aspects are concerned, have acknowledged that they have no “claims” on French Indo-China, and in the economic field, it is our intention to give Germany full assistance in the matter of supplying necessary commodities, (see my #413[b]), and therefore, not only is there very little real reason for Germany’s having a representative agency in French Indo-China but also this would needlessly complicate the “status” of French Indo-China, and put her in position between Japan and Germany where it would be harder to assist—–. In view of these considerations the said plan is not one that the Imperial Government could favor. You will please therefore investigate whether it is true, and if it is true, ask the Germans to reconsider in the light of the above.

Relay to Vichy. Relayed to Hanoi.

[a] Not available.
[b] In reply to a request from Vichy as to what steps Japan should take regarding Vichy’s refusal to permit the sending of a German economic representative to F.I-C, Tokyo states that Japan has done her utmost to supply German with F.I.-C. materials, and had it been necessary to dispatch anyone to F.I.-C. Wohlthat, who is now in Tokyo, would have been consulted. (Dated 17 May.)  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Trans. 8-28-41

[A-496]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 976
August 22, 1941
#1058.
FROM: Berlin (Osima)
TO: Tokyo

Re your #755[a].

In response to the notice given to the German Foreign Office in compliance with your #485[b], the German Government said that it had no intention of interfering with Japan’s plan and that they had taken the matter up because the French Government had made known their desire to join the air route in question and had requested the German Government for permission on the basis of the terms set forth in the armistice agreement. It said, furthermore, that it is a general rule with the German Government not to issue permission, because of military considerations, for expansion of French civilian aviation either in France proper or in the colonies, but that this time, in consideration of Japan’s plan, they have decided not to reject the French request at once but to agree to France’s negotiating along the lines the French have submitted, on condition that the German Government reserve to itself the final decision in the matter.

It is clear from this reply they gave that what the German Government considers to be a question has to do largely with allowing France to join the air route (please refer to clause #12 of the armistice agreement). I believe, therefore, the quickest way to the realization of this plan is to explain to the French authorities the aforementioned situation, to postpone the settlement of the question as to whether the French should join the air route, and to carry on intensive negotiations so that the Japanese demands will be recognized.

[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 977
September 2, 1941
#253.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Hanoi

Message to Vichy #375.

Re my #345[a].

The French Indo-Chinese authorities have on successive occasions replied to us concerning this matter that the Governor General had no authority to sanction this unless we had first secured the understanding of the German authorities through the Vichy Government. In such a way as this they have constantly procrastinated. The German authorities, as evidenced by Berlin’s wire to the Foreign Minister, #1058[b], have clarified their stand in offering no objections to the institution of this service. Therefore, I would like to have you, in accordance with the gist of the latter half of my caption message, immediately and strongly insist upon the acceptance of our demands. Wire me the results.

[a] See III, 958.
[b]See III, 976.

Trans. 9-4-41

[A-497]


No. 978
September 4, 1941
#487.
FROM: Vichy (Kato)
TO: Tokyo

Re your #375[a].

On the 4th, I had HARADA request another discussion with ARNALD to inform him that hereafter relations between France and Japan will be settled by compromise since we are adhering to the original bill in all respects, and since it appears that the German authorities, as a matter of principle, have no objections with regard to this matter.

[a] See III, 977.

Trans. 9-16-41

izawa 9.iza.991 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

April 18, 2009

No. 479 October 15, 1941 #668. FROM: Tokyo TO: Washington Re paragraph 2 of your #944[a]. As explained in my Circular #1819[b], the regulations regarding foreigners leaving the country are being applied to all foreigners alike and not merely to Americans only. Particularly at this time when Americans are desirous of utilizing the ships that are being arranged at this time we have talked to the departments concerned about making the red tape as simple as possible along the lines you suggested. However, the Americans who have remained up to the present time will require at least two or three weeks simply to dispose of their effects and make preparations after they have decided to return home, hence, many of them will not be ready for the boat this is being arranged now. This is a problem that is in no way connected with the leaving the country permit problem. Also, the American Ambassador resident in Tokyo should be fully cognizant of this situation. [a] See III, 478. [b] Not available. Trans. 10-16-41 [A-247] No. 480 October 13, 1941 #659. FROM: Tokyo TO: Washington Re your #921[a]. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET  The interests of Yugoslavia in Japan have been taken care of by France ever since 1919, but recently we had a note from the British Embassy in Tokyo to the effect that from now on the care of Yugoslav interests will devolve upon the said Embassy. Oral reply was made by the official in charge here that inasmuch as Japan has already recognized the Croatian nation, and does not recognize the existence of the Yugoslav nation, such a representation could not be acknowledged. You will please make reply accordingly in case any representation is made to you by the Yugoslavian Minister there or by the U.S. Government. [a] Not available. Trans. 10-14-41 No. 481 October 14, 1941 #945. FROM: Washington (Nomura) TO: Tokyo Request was made by the State Department on the 14th in an “Oral Statement” regarding fuel oil for heating and hot water for the Tokyo embassy and the Yokohama Consulate General. The Embassy and Consulate General made request for a permit to import this oil, but it was refused. Inasmuch as this concerns the efficiency of the work of the above two offices, the State Department requested that I make telegraphic request to the Japanese government for permit for the immediate importation of said fuel oil. While I realize that it will be difficult to accord special treatment to the American diplomatic establishments only, there is the problem of the supply of bunker oil to the Tatsuta, Hikawa, and Taiyo Maru to consider, and so I request that after due consideration arrangements be made to grant the above permit. Trans. 10-20-41 No. 483 October 15, 1941 #947. FROM: Washington TO: Tokyo On the 14th, the U.S. War Department announced orders issued to requisition for aid to Russia a shipment of light bombers which the Peruvian government had purchased in Canada, but whose permit for shipment had been withdrawn by the United States. The above (planes) appear to be 18 Douglas light bombers, for the most part completed two years ago. It is not entirely clear whether these will be shipped directly to Russia, or via England. Trans. 11-20-41 [A-248] THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR No. 484 October 16, 1941 #481. FROM: New York (Morishima) TO: Tokyo Re your #222[a]. AOYAGI is desirous of returning home at once for family reasons, though there is no telegraphic reply to my wire #39[a] regarding his appointed time. Since we are making preparations for his boarding the Tatsuta Maru, I plan to have AOYAGI take the ashes of WATANABE and one suitcase full of WATANABE’s personal effects. Kindly arrange for these pieces to be taken through customs. [a] Not available. Trans. 10-27-41 No. 485 October 16, 1941 #82. FROM: New York (Morishima) TO: Buenos Aires, Lisbon Circular Message to Tokyo #483. Re message from Rio to you #425[a]. The documents of this office have been sent by Courier KOGA (sailing from San Francisco on September 9 on return to Japan via Shanghai). [a] Not available. Trans. 10-31-41 No. 486 October 16, 1941 #1909. FROM: Shanghai TO: Tokyo “WA” report. I had a secret agent get from the United States Naval wireless station here the original text (in plain text) sent on the 11th by Secretary of State HULL to the Consul General in Shanghai. It is a telegraphic reply to the appeal sent by the American Chamber of Commerce in this city for relaxing the export license system and the control now being exercised over exchange. The gist of it is given in my separate telegram #1910[a]. I have transmitted this message together with the separate wire to Nantai. [a] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  Not available. Trans. 10-21-41 [A-249] No. 487 October 17, 1941 #210 (in 3 parts, complete). http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET  FROM: Ankara Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  TO: Tokyo Re your Circular #2148[a]. While I accede to what you say concerning Japanese-American negotiations, my views, based on the situation obtaining here and other circumstances, may be found at variance, much as it is to be regretted; however, in view of the extreme gravity of the situation I make bold to submit my humble opinion without reflecting on the presumptiousness of it. 1. The gist of what you said may not be entirely clear to me, however as I see it, the head office, by obstructing America’s entry into the war through Japanese-American negotiations, is attempting to prevent the spread of the European war to the Far East, which would inevitably result in Japan being forced to participate in the war, and is turning its attention to the carrying out of a national policy which has as its objective the effecting of a solution of the China incident, but is there not danger that this policy may have just the opposite effect at this time, and make Japan’s position increasingly more difficult. 2. I realize of course that in order to solve the present crisis and carry out our fixed national policy, it is absolutely essential that first a basis be found for the solution of the China incident. But as you are well aware, the progress of the China incident has shown little advance up to the present. Not only that but unless we change our passive attitude of attempting to avoid friction with England and America by continuing the permit of the existence of foreign concessions and extraterritoriality there is no hope of our ever being able easily to settle the problem. To manifest a further disposition to negotiate with America which has taken decisive action in oppressing Japan through the freezing order and other injustices is to further display our hand, and will result inevitably in the further encirclement of Japan and strengthening of aid to Chiang Kai-Shek, who, strengthened by this, will naturally dream of ultimate victory with the help of Britain and America and we will have to make up our minds that the solution of the incident by our own strength will be more and more difficult. 3. Next, in regard to your desire to hinder America’s participation in the war through Japanese-American negotiations and so prevent the spread of the European war to the Far East, I am wondering from my observations here as to whether that is not impossible of realization. I fear that there may be a slight difference of opinion but it goes without saying that it is America that has primarily been the ringleader in the policy of encirclement of Japan in the Orient and of preventing Japan from carrying out her national policy. America recognizes the absolute necessity of aiding England in order to overthrow Germany, hence the basis of her foreign diplomacy is related to the question of the European war, I believe. Therefore, I do not believe it is going too far to say that American participation in the war will be conditioned more by the future trend of the European war itself rather than by the surrender of our rights growing out of the state of Japanese-American relations, as long as we continue to take the present attitude. Especially, if we continue to manifest this apparent desire to cling vainly to Japanese-American negotiations, America will no doubt come to the conclusion that there is no will to fight in Japan, and I do not believe that it is impossible that American attitude toward Germany will eventually stiffen and America will find herself participating in the war. On the one hand I wonder if America’s recent drastic steps have not been the result of Japan’s attitude. (It appears that Germany and Italy are very displeased. Not only that but I hear frequently the remark that Japan’s attitude as viewed from here is that of an enemy.) As a matter of fact if we really have the determination to fight I think it would be best to terminate these negotiations immediately and manifest a resolute attitude. [A-250] THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR 4. To sum it all up, to continue negotiations with America in view of the situation existing in the world today would not only result in the bringing of incalculable harm to the settlement of the China incident but would have the exactly opposite effect of actually enabling America to participate in the European war—–(50 groups missing)—–. Moreover, unless we are prepared to make important concessions there is no use to expect big things of Japanese- American negotiations. And it is also very evident that, even though we assume that a certain degree of understanding might be worked out in Japanese-American relations through the exercise of diplomacy, this understanding would be powerless to prevent German-American relations from growing steadily worse and eventually lead to war, and in the event we also would be forced into war from the standpoint of moral principles.———-and it cannot but be my most ardent wish that the above negotiations will be terminated and that we will adhere to the spirit of the Tripartite Pact and in harmony with our fixed national policy devote ourselves wholeheartedly to the establishment of the New Order in East Asia. [a] Not available. Trans. 10-22-41 No. 488 August 21, 1941 #122. FROM: Panama (Akiyama) http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET  TO: Tokyo Chief of Office Routing. Re your #65[a]. We encountered considerable difficulty in finding a person to whom we could entrust the diagrams[b] for delivery. We did give a copy of the explanatory notes only to Colonel Yamamoto (Assistant Attache in Washington) who passed through here en route home during the middle of last month. By the end of this month, we plan to have it, together with findings of subsequent investigations and the diagram, taken out of here. They will be transferred to the Legation in Peru, undoubtedly.   Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  Translator’s note: Last sentence garbled—contents guessed at. [a] See III, 492. Trans. 9-10-41 No. 489 August 26, 1941 #133. FROM: Panama (Akiyama) TO: Tokyo The six members of the House of Representatives Military Affairs Committee who have been inspecting defenses in Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Antigua, Trinidad, and Georgetown arrived here by plane on the 23rd. They have made arrangements with the high command to spend a week inspecting military defenses, new equipment, condition of progress and fortifications on [A-251] both the Atlantic and the Pacific in the Canal Zone, after which they will return via Nicaragua, —–, and Mexico. Trans. 9-3-41 No. 490 August 28, 1941 #138. FROM: Panama (Akiyama) TO: Tokyo I completed the presentation of my credentials on the 28th. Trans. 9-5-41 No. 491 September 10, 1941 #72. FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) TO: Panama You are appointed Minister (?) to Costa Rica in addition to your present post (?) as of the 10th. Trans. 9-15-41 No. 492 September 12, 1941 #154. FROM: Panama (Akiyama) TO: Tokyo Re my #119[a]. To be handled in Government Code. When I arrived here to take up my duties, I found that Consul IZAWA was attending to—–(in charge of accounts) and Vice Consul HARA to—–. Under the present political circumstances and in view of the advisability of the whole staff working cooperatively for the country, I believe it is necessary to clarify the following points: 1. Are the duties which IZAWA is performing here since he has been sent here to be considered in the same light as duties performed by one who has been formally stationed here? If it is to be so considered, what reason is there for not making him the head of the Consulate? At present IZAWA is responsible for collecting intelligences in the Canal Zone and for making contacts with outsiders. However, since the local officials do not (recognize ?) because of regulations, the qualifications of any official below the rank of a Consul, we find it quite inconvenient in the performance of duties. We need, therefore, to make matters clear to the Panamanian officials and at the same time bring about order within the office. 2. As I understand it, since about 1937 Vice Consul HARA has been chiefly engaged in commercial duties and for this reason he is not supposed to be the head of the Consulate. There is need of deciding who should be held responsible for such duties which are being performed by persons acting instead of HARA, namely such matters as—–. receipt of visa fees and fees connected with sending of telegrams for non-official purposes, which necessitate contact with foreign—–and foreign persons. Should such duties be performed by someone representing HARA or by IZAWA who is in charge of accounts?

Warspite 2.war.00100298 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

April 8, 2009

No. 311
October 16, 1941
#243.
FROM: San Francisco
TO: Tokyo  http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG
Re my #217[a].

The Russian freighter, MEJINSKI, is now in the process of docking. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG

The IGARKA is three days out of New York, the NANTES 7 days from Vladivostok, and the MICHULIN 10 or 12 days from Vladivostok.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

The NANTES is loaded with a large quantity of wheat, 20,000 barrels of fuel oil, and also some machine guns, tanks, etc.

Relayed to Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle, Portland.

[a] See II, 29.

Trans. 10-23-41


No. 312
October 12, 1941
#48.
FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi)
TO: Washington

Message to Tokyo #202.
Re my #185[a].

The Russian ship, Kiev, now in port here, will take on its load of war materials as soon as repairs are completed and proceed to Vladivostok when orders are received. For this purpose, it is equipped with a 500 watt radio for the reception of orders and war news from Moscow.

Relayed to—–, Seattle.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-22-41

[A-173]


No. 313
October 16, 1941
#2187 (Circular).
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Seattle

Henceforth, I would like to have you refer in your reports to the movement of warships as follows.

1. As long as there are no great changes in the movement and basing of warships, report on them at least once every ten days. In the event of priority intelligence, report such on each occasion.

a. The arrival or departure of American flagships of the fleet or scouting force.

b. Should more than ten vessels of any type arrive or depart from port at one time.

c. The arrival or departure of warships of countries other than the United States (give as detailed a report as possible on the class of—–).

2. Should patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes, report it at once.

Trans. 10-29-41


No. 314
August 18, 1941
#121.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
TO: Tokyo

1. The Douglas B-18, the Martin B-17A bombers, totaling 100 planes, as well as a number of heavy Boeing 24’s which have been stationed at Albrook Field in the past, completely disappeared about two weeks ago. I am attempting to find out where they went.

2. I have heard that approximately (35 or 45?) two-motored bombing planes are stationed at the newly constructed Agua Dulce Air Field in the province of Cocli.

Trans. 9-30-41


No. 315
August 18, 1941
#120.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
TO: Tokyo

Report on observations:

1. Ships moving through the Panama Canal toward the Atlantic:
August 15th Four U.S. submarines (number—–)
August 16th Two U.S. freighters
August 17th One U.S. freighter

2. Moving toward Pacific:
August 15th One U.S. freighter
One DeGaullist Government destroyer (Triomphant) (now anchored at Balboa)

[A-174]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

3.

August 17th
One U.S. destroyer anchored at Balboa.
One warship which appeared to be a cruiser was seen to arrive.

Recently five large-size destroyers have been in port (taking on fuel, rations and other supplies).

Trans. 9-29-41


No. 316
August 20, 1941
#123.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
TO: Tokyo

1. Please refer to (?) of my message #120[a]. The Triomphant left Balboa for Tohita on the 17th according to report.

2. On the 19th two United States freighters and 1 British freighter were observed to transit the Canal toward the Pacific.

[a] See II, 1036—Panama reports movements through the Panama Canal.

Trans. 10-11-41


No. 317

September 22, 1941#173.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
TO: Tokyo

Ships passing through the Canal between the 17th and 21st are as follows:

1. Pacific bound:
1 American Tanker
4 American Freighters Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

2. Atlantic bound:
2 American Tankers
4 American Freighters
1 English Freighter

Trans. 10-2-41

[A-175]


No. 318
September 28, 1941
#49.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama)  http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG

TO: Washington

Message to Tokyo #184.
Re my #183[a].

Recently the Diomede Class is understood to have had the upper section of the mast cut off. The British operate two vessels of this type as well.

[a] See III, 289.

Trans. 11-4-41


No. 319
September 30, 1941
Circular #51.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
TO: Washington

Message to Tokyo #188.

On the (29th ?) two (French ?) warships left port bound for the Pacific. One vessel of the Omaha class left port on the night of—–for an unknown destination. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  In spite of the rumor that the raider is in the neighborhood of the Galapagos, rumors are circulating that it is in water adjacent to the Canal.

Trans. 10-10-41


No. 320
October 2, 1941
#191.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
TO: Tokyo

Between the 30th and the 2nd, three American freighters and one English hospital ship transited the canal to the Pacific, and nine American freighters and one American liner transited the canal to the Atlantic.

Trans. 10-18-41


No. 321
October 4, 1941
#194.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
TO: Tokyo

Re my message #193[a].

One vessel left for the Pacific at 11:00 A.M. on the 3rd.

From the 3rd until the morning of the 4th, three American freighters and one French steamer moved out into the Pacific. During the same interval, seven American freighters, the “Union tanker”, one destroyer and two British freighters went through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic (one of the two British freighters was of the 10,000 ton class). All of the vessels bound

[A-176]

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

for the Atlantic went through the Canal successively. The two cruisers, which I mentioned in my caption message, accompanied these vessels as far as Balboa. Therefore, it would seem indicated that their entire cargoes were made up of military supplies. Relayed to Washington.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-18-41


No. 322
October 2, 1941
#190.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
TO: Tokyo  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

(2 parts—complete)

1. Since the recent shift in military aviation efforts to the Pacific Area the “Panama Air Depot” located at France Field was transferred to Curundu Heights (immediately adjacent to Albrook Field).

2. Rear Admiral SADLER, Commander of the 15th Naval District, since the extensive activities on the Pacific end of the Canal, made public on the 1st a statement to the effect that because of the increase of naval supplies a four-story warehouse built on pier 18 (it will be completed the middle of November), the ammunition unloading pier (west of pier 18) consisting of 32 buildings, and the existing buildings in the neighborhood of the Balboa dry dock would all be taken over as warehouses. Furthermore, the petroleum supply tanks at Boca on the Pacific side and at Mt. Hope (the railroad junction from which the line branches to Colon and Ft. Randolph) on the Atlantic side (recently it is believed that these tanks have been camouflaged) have been taken over. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG

3. There are intelligences at hand concerning the construction of a good storage depot at Corozal which would contain sufficient foodstuffs to supply the Canal Zone for a six-month period, even though shipping routes between this point and the United States are severed.

Trans. 10-20-41


No. 323
October 6, 1941
#194.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama)
TO: Tokyo

The result of my investigations, as I reported in my secret letter #142[a], are as follows:

1. The airplane bases which the United States is constructing are located at La Chorrera in Panama province, (please refer to part 4 of my #149[a]) Chitre in Herrera province, Mensabe[b] in Los Santos province and at Remidios and Las Ra-Hasu in Chiriqui province.

2. The Panamanian airports already constructed which will be converted into military establishment are the ones at David in Chiriqui province and Paidonya[b] outside the limits of Panama City.

[

A-177]

3. Airports which have been surveyed but because of the poor condition of the terrain have not been constructed, are the airports at Guarare in Los Santos province and at eight other projected points.

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-7-41


No. 324
August 9, 1941
#254.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Manila

Re your #415[a] and #451(?)[b].

Please make secret investigations regarding the name of the ship and—–and subsequent conditions and wire. According to reports from doubtful sources the British battleship Warspite entered Manila on the 17th and sailed on the 18th for the west coast of America for repair of damages sustained. Please make secret investigations regarding the truth of this and wire result.

By the way the British cruiser Leander of the 7000 ton class resembles the Warspite from a distance.

[a] Not available.
[b] Dated July 28, 1941. Reports departure of British cruiser from Cavite.

Trans. 9-16-41

Vice Minister ŌHASHI 8.oha.1 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

April 3, 2009

Trans. 7‑19‑41

No. 836

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 15, 1941

TO: Berlin                                                                                            # 646.

As the Ambassador in France has already notified you, we have at last commenced negotiations with  France with a firm determination. This marks the first step in our southward advance; at the same time, it signifies a very grave life and death step in our relations with

A-436

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

England and America. We have thrown in our lot with Germany and Italy in harmony with the Tripartite Pact and intend to cooperate with them. Under the form of negotiations a request has come from the French government to the government to which you are accredited to get them to mediate a refusal or an amelioration of our demands. In case they dodge the issue, please ask them to help us from the flank and persuade France to accede to our requests.

Please relay this as instructions to Italy.

Please relay this to France.

Trans. 7‑18‑41

No. 837

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 16, 1941

TO: Hanoi                                                                                            # 1518.

(Circular)

Strictly Secret.

The Imperial Government, cognizant of the recent critical turn of the international situation, in order to carry out the establishment of the Far Eastern sphere of co‑prosperity, has in conference decided that the Imperial forces are to invade the southern portion of French Indochina with the view of securing military bases. On the 14th, formal representations to that effect were presented to the Vichy Government. Though the United States and England will attempt to thwart this, it is the Imperial Government’s firm intention to remove those barriers and to bring about the realization of our aims. Therefore, even though the French Government and the French Indo‑Chinese authorities oppose it, we are going to carry it through.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

With regard to these representations, we are now negotiating so that their reply of assent or dissent will be handed to us on the 20th, Japan time. As far as the Imperial Government is concerned, it makes no difference whether this invasion is carried out peacefully or in force. Our nationals living there we plan to remove to Takao [a] for the time being; therefore, after you have acquainted yourself with this, please make preparations along the following lines:

I. Saigon (on the basis of the former Consular area of jurisdiction). http://Louis-J-Sheehan.de

Item: Recommendations for evacuation. (Though these are not orders, all people are to be evacuated.) This recommendation is to be issued on the 21st: All are to be on board ship by the 23rd. The ship should sail at early dawn of the 24th. However, until this order has been wired, be most careful not to let it leak out.

Item: For the accommodation of all evacuees, the Osaka Shosen steamer, Kanju Maru, scheduled to leave Saigon July 18th, is to be held over at your port. With regard to this matter, all details have been cleared up with the Ministry of Communications.

With regard to the reason for the delay of the sailing of this ship, please give out the reason that it is due to loading and unloading delays. Please take every precaution not to allow the French authorities to learn of our plans.

Item: Have a member of your staff respectfully carry out the Imperial portraits and after the arrival of the boat in Takao, request that they be placed in custody of the Provincial Office. This staff member of yours is to remain in Takao until further orders.

Item: Only the absolutely essential telegraphic codes are to be kept. The rest are to be burned. Wire me a detailed list of those you burn.

Item: Telegraphic material, as well as secret material, are to be absolutely handled in exactly the same manner.

A-437

Item: I will further advise you by wire as to the movements of yourself and the members of your offices.

II. Hanoi (on the basis of the former Consular area of jurisdiction). Though as a matter of policy, we are not going to insist upon the evacuation of all nationals, persons in Junka [b] and other distant places are to move into Hanoi.

III. I have already secretly dispatched this to Saigon.


[a] Port in Formosa.

[b]Kana spelling.

Trans. 7‑17‑41

No. 838

FROM: Canton                                                                                    July 16, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 264.

(Secret outside the Department.)

Re my # 255 [a].

The troops to occupy French Indo‑China will leave here the 17th and arrive at SAIGON two weeks later after stopping over on HAINAN ISLAND.


[a] Not available.

Trans. 7‑18‑41

No. 839

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 16, 1941

TO: Berlin                                                                                            # 655.

On the 15th, Vice Minister ŌHASHI invited the German and Italian Ambassadors separately and told them as follows:

“In the name of joint defense of the area concerned, the Japanese Government has decided to demand of the. Vichy Government the right to acquire two naval bases and several air bases in southern French Indo‑China, and also that of occupying that region by the Imperial Army. Furthermore, Japan plans to complete all negotiations relative to these demands without giving Vichy much time—that is by the 20th—so as to prevent any move on the part of the opposition countries. Japan intends to carry out this plan even if French Indo‑China refuses to comply with the demands, or the United States and Britain interfere with its execution. However, this does not mean that Japan is of the mind to occupy French Indochina or to violate her sovereignty, or to break the treaties made with her. This plan is the first step in Japan’s southward advance which Germany has been looking forward to for a long time. In view of the close relation obtaining between Germany and Italy, and in consideration of Japan’s desire to obtain her object in as peaceful a manner as possible, Japan requests that they recommend France’s acceptance of Japan’s demands.” http://Louis-J-Sheehan.de

A-438

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Both Ambassadors replied that they would communicate this request to their respective governments at once.

Please transmit from Berlin and Rome to France.

Trans. 7‑20‑41

No. 840

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 19, 1941

TO: Vichy                                                                                            # 294.

(Strictly secret.)

Although there were some political alterations recently, it should be unnecessary to state that they in no way shall affect our foreign policy. It should be clear that the Cabinet shake‑up does not make the slightest change in our attitude with regard to French Indo‑China. I mention this fact because there may be some unnecessary confusion if the French government is under the erroneous belief that we intend to soften or change our attitude with the entrance of a new Foreign Minister into the Cabinet.

Please take steps, therefore, to prevent the French from getting the wrong impression.

Trans. 7‑22‑41

No. 841

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)                                                                      July 19, 1941

TO: Vichy                                                                                            # 295.

Regarding my # 273 [a]:

Since the military preparations have been completed, the time for embarking on the enterprise has been set for the 24th, regardless of whether the French accept or reject, and orders to proceed will be issued on the 23rd, Japanese time [b]. You will therefore act upon the following:

1. If the French reply to your # 366 [c] is favorable, you will then immediately hand them the note mentioned in my # 276 [d] and secure their consent to my # 293 [e] paragraphs 1 to 5, and advise me by return dispatch as to the results.

2. If the reply to the above is a refusal, or a conditional reply, which will be taken as a refusal (If French conditions are in such phrases as to not alter the sense of our demands, they need not be considered a refusal, but in such a case you may accept them with reservations that the approval of your home government will be necessary) you will then immediately make special effort to cause the French government to reconsider along the following lines and advise us as to results by return dispatch:

“Matters having reached the present stage, we must be free to take such course as we deem necessary, and the military will begin advance into Southern French Indo‑China on the basis of our‑planned action. We desire that orders be issued to the French Indo-China authorities at once that they take all effective and appropriate measures, when our advance is made, as will avoid the necessity of any clash of armed forces. If the French government does not act in harmony with this request of ours and an unfortunate clash of arms should result we of course cannot guarantee that serious changes may not be brought about in the status of French Indo‑China, much as we would regret this. If the

A-439

French government does give full consent to our demands (in my # 293 [e]) before the time for issuing the above mentioned marching orders to the military, there is a possibility that the situation can still be cleared up in a peaceful manner by negotiations, and we therefore wish to strongly urge upon the French government that they reflect seriously and reconsider.”

3. In your dispatch reply, giving the final attitude of the French on the basis of the above paragraphs 1 and 2, whatever their attitude is, be sure that your reply reaches us on or before the 23rd, Japan time (taking into consideration differences in time and time required for sending, receiving and decoding the message).


[a] See II, 812 and 813. “Outline of line of reasoning to be used in presenting demands on France for F. I. C. bases. Japan does not want to appear to be forcing the French, but they are determined to accomplish their purpose, peacefully if France accepts, militarily if she refuses.” Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[b] 0000 23 July, Zone‑9 (Tokyo time) is 1000 22nd, Washington time, and 1500 22nd, GMT.

[c] Not available 20‑7‑41.

[d] See II, 817. Text of note to be handed the French on presenting the demands for F. I. C. bases.

[e] Not available 20‑7‑41, see II, 843.

Trans. 7‑20‑41

No. 842

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 20, 1941

TO: Hanoi                                                                                            # 187.

(Part 2 of 2) [a].

3. On the 17th, the Ambassador for the second time called on DA [b] and gave him a strict warning to the effect that if, unfortunately, French cooperation is not forthcoming and a reply rejecting our proposal is made, we will take military action in accordance with our plans and preparations (the recent change of Cabinet has no influence whatsoever on this particular policy). At the same time, the Ambassador requested an early reply from the French Government. To this, DA [b] agreed and promised that after careful consideration he would reply by Saturday.

4. Furthermore, yesterday I wired Ambassador Kato the following instructions:

In case the French reply of the 19th is (1) an acceptance of our demands, he should make them accept all our demands after exchanging diplomatic notes with them. If the reply is (2) a rejection or a condition reply (in which case he should regard it as a rejection, he should not accept it and then tell them that Japan has no alternative other than commencing free action and that, in accordance with plans already established, the army will occupy southern French Indo‑China. He should, in that case, ask them to issue an order to the French Indo‑China authorities to take effective and suitable measures in order to avoid clash of forces. He should warn the French Government that in case the French Government does not comply with our request and these measures are not taken and, as a result, an unfortunate incident of a military clash occurs, we cannot promise that there will not be an important change in the status of French Indo‑China. We should inform them that inasmuch as it goes without saying that the Japanese Government does not wish to see any incident occur, the whole question could be settled in a peaceful manner if the French Government recognizes our demands as a whole on the 23rd at the latest. He should strongly urge the French Government to consider and reconsider this question. (3) He should tell them to make all

A-440

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

arrangements so that their reply will reach Japan not later than the 23rd, whether that reply is one or the other of the two kinds mentioned above.


[a] Part 1 not available.

[b] Probably Darlan, Vice Premier of France.

Trans. 7‑24‑41

No. 843

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 20, 1941

TO: Vichy                                                                                            # 296.

(Message to Berlin # 670).

(Strictly Secret. To be handled in Government Code.)

Ambassador KATO informs us by telegram that the French Government says that out of consideration for the Berlin‑Vichy armistice treaty, it will be necessary to confer closely with the Germans on this matter. On this excuse, they are postponing an answer. Therefore, today Vice‑Minister OHASHI called on Ambassador OTT, saying that the Japanese Government has already completed all preparations, and regardless of whether Vichy accepts or refuses, is determined to take certain action. If military action is inevitable, there is no guaranteeing that the status of French Indo‑China will not be affected. This is sure to have a bad effect not only upon Tokyo‑Vichy relations, but also upon Berlin‑Vichy relations. Consequently, will you please advise the French to accept the Japanese proposal. Ambassador Ott replied, “Well, you know we are now at war with Russia, so by what logic do you imagine that we are in a position to take a strong attitude toward Vichy? No, sir, I cannot tell you what attitude the German Government is going to take in this matter. All I can do is say that I will transmit immediately to Berlin what you have told me.”

Will you, too, on the basis of these statements of mine, ask the German Government to advise the French and wire me back what they say.

Trans. Not dated

No. 844

FROM: Vichy                                                                                      July 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 388.

Re my # 386 [a].

On the 20th, I conferred with Foreign Minister DARLAN and Council President BUNOA MESIAN (?) (LENOIR MESSIEN). Though, as a result, I have not officially received any reply as yet, the details of why I think they are going to comply with our demands are given in the telegram describing our conversation. http://Louis-J-Sheehan.de


[a] Not available.

Trans. 7‑21‑4

A-441

No. 845

FROM: Vichy                                                                                      July 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 389.

Re my # 386 [a].

After conferring with DARLAN on the afternoon of the 19th, I received your # 295 [b], and so the morning of the 20th I again met DARLAN and told him that instructions received after the conversation of the previous day showed that Japanese troops will be sent very shortly, and for this reason it is clear that Japan cannot allow him as much time as I said she would allow. I then asked him to issue the necessary orders to the officials in French Indo‑China to the effect that armed clashes should be avoided in order to prevent any possibility of unfortunate incidents, for if any unfortunate incidents occur, we cannot be certain that it will not have a far‑reaching effect on the status of French Indo‑China. As I have previously referred to this matter several times, Japan does not want any such thing to happen. We would like to have the French Government’s acceptance of our proposals by 6:00 p.m. on Tuesday, the 22nd. Thus, I urged him to reconsider the question. To this DARLAN replied by asking whether he was right in understanding that what I said consisted of (1) an objection to the French reply given yesterday, (2) a request that an order be transmitted to the authorities in French Indo‑China not to offer resistance, and (3) a repeated demand that France accept the proposals. I replied that he was right, and DARLAN seemed to understand it all very well. He answered that a reply will probably be given tomorrow after conferring with Marshal PETAIN. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire


[a] Not available.

[b] See II, 841 in which Tokyo advises that the occupation would take place on the 24th regardless of whether France accepts or rejects the proposals.

Trans. 8‑5‑41

No. 846

FROM: Vichy                                                                                      July 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 392.

After my conversation with Foreign Minister DARLAN described in my # 389 [a] of the 20th, I talked to BUNOIR MESSIAN. I asked him if he had heard what I told DARLAN the previous night, and he replied that he had just conferred with Colonial Minister PURATON on this matter at DARLAN’s residence, as a result of which a final decision had been reached:

(a) France recognizes Japan’s demands.

(b) Japan shall first of all make a public statement concerning the maintenance of territorial integrity of French Indo‑China.

(c) The French forces will cooperate with the Japanese only in resisting the infringement of third powers and will cooperate in no aggressive schemes whatever.

BUNOIR continued: “You will get an official reply on this matter today or tomorrow from Foreign Minister DARLAN. In the meantime, let me say in connection with the statement mentioned in (b), if France should order its officials to cooperate in this manner without explaining why, we could not expect them to do it and still maintain their honor as soldiers. You Japanese ought to be particularly capable of understanding that, I think, because you have a military code of morals of your own. Furthermore, this statement is

A-442

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

absolutely necessary to satisfy the public mind in France. We expect you to make some sort of public announcement, say like the one contained in Premier KONOYE’s message to Marshal PETAIN. Let me say also that this cannot be done too soon. Now with respect to (c), as I said, France is cooperating with you Japanese militarily purely and simply for defense, and we will not engage in any military collusion whose objective is aggression. I want you to well understand this.”

This is all for the moment.


[a] See II, 845.

Trans. 8‑2‑4

No. 847

FROM: Vichy                                                                                      July 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 393.

As to (2) in my # 392 [a], the French authorities might demand a confirmation in the form of a protocol or a diplomatic note or in some other form. In regard also to (2), they might want to insert in the protocol or in the French reply a clause to the effect that the French Indo‑China Army shall not participate in any plans of an offensive nature. They might also ask that the period of validity of the agreement be definitely fixed. In case they make these requests, will you give preliminary consideration as to whether they should be complied with or not, and if they are to be complied with, in what form it should be done. I would appreciate your informing me by return wire.

Relayed to ‑‑‑‑‑.


[a] II, 846.

Trans. 8‑2‑41

No. 848

FROM: Vichy                                                                                      July 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 394.

In the light of what you have said in the last part of your # 287 [a], I presume that it is your desire to have the final text of the protocol in the two languages. Today when speed is the prime requisite and under the present situation in which courier service or any other form of reliable service is out of the question, it cannot be said that there will be no misunderstanding on how the Kana spelling should be used. Furthermore, if both languages are used in the final text, the French authorities would probably take a great many days in examining the translation. Therefore, I think there is no other way but to use only the French language for the final text. I would appreciate your giving me your opinion by return message. http://Louis-J-Sheehan.de


[a] Not available.

Trans. 8‑2‑41

A-443

No. 849

FROM: Hanoi                                                                                      July 21, 1941

TO: Vichy                                                                                            # 2.

Special Message. Part 1 of 2 of 10 (??).

(Abstract—very badly garbled.)

The following is a digest of the first paragraph. (In French.)

The exceptional facilities which the French Government is disposed to accord to the Japanese cannot under any circumstances have the character of a military occupation.

The Japanese must remain strictly confined to the needs of the military operations. They are subject to French military authorities and entirely under the latter’s control. The Japanese shall, however, be accorded freedom of passage between the point of disembarking and the zone of operations.

(Part 2)

Japanese military activity shall be limited to the territories located north of the Red River. In the zone of operations the French administrative and military authorities shall remain in their posts and in possession of all their powers. The Japanese shall act through the mediation of the French authorities in dealing with the native populations.

The armed Japanese forces landing at the same time cannot under any circumstances, exceed two thirds of the effectives actually mobilized in Tonking, that is, not in excess of 25,000 men.

The Japanese army promises (1) to bear all the costs of transporting, stationing and installing of its personnel and material.

Trans. 7‑25‑41

No. 850

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     July 21, 1941

TO: Hanoi                                                                                            # 196.

Re my # 191 [a].

After seeing Foreign Minister Darlan on the 20th, Ambassador Kato talked with the Minister of Colonies, and others. As a result of these conferences the French Government agreed:

(1) To recognize Japan’s demands.

(2) To announce officially Japan’s participation in the defense of Indo‑China territory.

(3) That Japan alone, and no third power, shall cooperate with the French Indo‑Chinese army.

Regardless of whatever Foreign Minister Darlan’s formal reply may be, from the viewpoint of the honor of the French Army, and of French chivalry, it is absolutely necessary that the import of Prime Minister Konoye’s message to Marshal Petain be considered, and that this move is inevitable in view of conditions in France.

Consequently, we anticipate Foreign Minister Darlan’s concurrence in our views on the foregoing three points and a public proclamation to that effect.

A-444

THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

The details of actual landing points, numbers of troops and places to station them, will be decided upon as soon as the French make the official recognition of our demands.

Keep in touch with Admiral Sumida.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire


[a] Not available.