izawa 9.iza.991 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

No. 479 October 15, 1941 #668. FROM: Tokyo TO: Washington Re paragraph 2 of your #944[a]. As explained in my Circular #1819[b], the regulations regarding foreigners leaving the country are being applied to all foreigners alike and not merely to Americans only. Particularly at this time when Americans are desirous of utilizing the ships that are being arranged at this time we have talked to the departments concerned about making the red tape as simple as possible along the lines you suggested. However, the Americans who have remained up to the present time will require at least two or three weeks simply to dispose of their effects and make preparations after they have decided to return home, hence, many of them will not be ready for the boat this is being arranged now. This is a problem that is in no way connected with the leaving the country permit problem. Also, the American Ambassador resident in Tokyo should be fully cognizant of this situation. [a] See III, 478. [b] Not available. Trans. 10-16-41 [A-247] No. 480 October 13, 1941 #659. FROM: Tokyo TO: Washington Re your #921[a]. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET  The interests of Yugoslavia in Japan have been taken care of by France ever since 1919, but recently we had a note from the British Embassy in Tokyo to the effect that from now on the care of Yugoslav interests will devolve upon the said Embassy. Oral reply was made by the official in charge here that inasmuch as Japan has already recognized the Croatian nation, and does not recognize the existence of the Yugoslav nation, such a representation could not be acknowledged. You will please make reply accordingly in case any representation is made to you by the Yugoslavian Minister there or by the U.S. Government. [a] Not available. Trans. 10-14-41 No. 481 October 14, 1941 #945. FROM: Washington (Nomura) TO: Tokyo Request was made by the State Department on the 14th in an “Oral Statement” regarding fuel oil for heating and hot water for the Tokyo embassy and the Yokohama Consulate General. The Embassy and Consulate General made request for a permit to import this oil, but it was refused. Inasmuch as this concerns the efficiency of the work of the above two offices, the State Department requested that I make telegraphic request to the Japanese government for permit for the immediate importation of said fuel oil. While I realize that it will be difficult to accord special treatment to the American diplomatic establishments only, there is the problem of the supply of bunker oil to the Tatsuta, Hikawa, and Taiyo Maru to consider, and so I request that after due consideration arrangements be made to grant the above permit. Trans. 10-20-41 No. 483 October 15, 1941 #947. FROM: Washington TO: Tokyo On the 14th, the U.S. War Department announced orders issued to requisition for aid to Russia a shipment of light bombers which the Peruvian government had purchased in Canada, but whose permit for shipment had been withdrawn by the United States. The above (planes) appear to be 18 Douglas light bombers, for the most part completed two years ago. It is not entirely clear whether these will be shipped directly to Russia, or via England. Trans. 11-20-41 [A-248] THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR No. 484 October 16, 1941 #481. FROM: New York (Morishima) TO: Tokyo Re your #222[a]. AOYAGI is desirous of returning home at once for family reasons, though there is no telegraphic reply to my wire #39[a] regarding his appointed time. Since we are making preparations for his boarding the Tatsuta Maru, I plan to have AOYAGI take the ashes of WATANABE and one suitcase full of WATANABE’s personal effects. Kindly arrange for these pieces to be taken through customs. [a] Not available. Trans. 10-27-41 No. 485 October 16, 1941 #82. FROM: New York (Morishima) TO: Buenos Aires, Lisbon Circular Message to Tokyo #483. Re message from Rio to you #425[a]. The documents of this office have been sent by Courier KOGA (sailing from San Francisco on September 9 on return to Japan via Shanghai). [a] Not available. Trans. 10-31-41 No. 486 October 16, 1941 #1909. FROM: Shanghai TO: Tokyo “WA” report. I had a secret agent get from the United States Naval wireless station here the original text (in plain text) sent on the 11th by Secretary of State HULL to the Consul General in Shanghai. It is a telegraphic reply to the appeal sent by the American Chamber of Commerce in this city for relaxing the export license system and the control now being exercised over exchange. The gist of it is given in my separate telegram #1910[a]. I have transmitted this message together with the separate wire to Nantai. [a] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  Not available. Trans. 10-21-41 [A-249] No. 487 October 17, 1941 #210 (in 3 parts, complete). http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET  FROM: Ankara Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  TO: Tokyo Re your Circular #2148[a]. While I accede to what you say concerning Japanese-American negotiations, my views, based on the situation obtaining here and other circumstances, may be found at variance, much as it is to be regretted; however, in view of the extreme gravity of the situation I make bold to submit my humble opinion without reflecting on the presumptiousness of it. 1. The gist of what you said may not be entirely clear to me, however as I see it, the head office, by obstructing America’s entry into the war through Japanese-American negotiations, is attempting to prevent the spread of the European war to the Far East, which would inevitably result in Japan being forced to participate in the war, and is turning its attention to the carrying out of a national policy which has as its objective the effecting of a solution of the China incident, but is there not danger that this policy may have just the opposite effect at this time, and make Japan’s position increasingly more difficult. 2. I realize of course that in order to solve the present crisis and carry out our fixed national policy, it is absolutely essential that first a basis be found for the solution of the China incident. But as you are well aware, the progress of the China incident has shown little advance up to the present. Not only that but unless we change our passive attitude of attempting to avoid friction with England and America by continuing the permit of the existence of foreign concessions and extraterritoriality there is no hope of our ever being able easily to settle the problem. To manifest a further disposition to negotiate with America which has taken decisive action in oppressing Japan through the freezing order and other injustices is to further display our hand, and will result inevitably in the further encirclement of Japan and strengthening of aid to Chiang Kai-Shek, who, strengthened by this, will naturally dream of ultimate victory with the help of Britain and America and we will have to make up our minds that the solution of the incident by our own strength will be more and more difficult. 3. Next, in regard to your desire to hinder America’s participation in the war through Japanese-American negotiations and so prevent the spread of the European war to the Far East, I am wondering from my observations here as to whether that is not impossible of realization. I fear that there may be a slight difference of opinion but it goes without saying that it is America that has primarily been the ringleader in the policy of encirclement of Japan in the Orient and of preventing Japan from carrying out her national policy. America recognizes the absolute necessity of aiding England in order to overthrow Germany, hence the basis of her foreign diplomacy is related to the question of the European war, I believe. Therefore, I do not believe it is going too far to say that American participation in the war will be conditioned more by the future trend of the European war itself rather than by the surrender of our rights growing out of the state of Japanese-American relations, as long as we continue to take the present attitude. Especially, if we continue to manifest this apparent desire to cling vainly to Japanese-American negotiations, America will no doubt come to the conclusion that there is no will to fight in Japan, and I do not believe that it is impossible that American attitude toward Germany will eventually stiffen and America will find herself participating in the war. On the one hand I wonder if America’s recent drastic steps have not been the result of Japan’s attitude. (It appears that Germany and Italy are very displeased. Not only that but I hear frequently the remark that Japan’s attitude as viewed from here is that of an enemy.) As a matter of fact if we really have the determination to fight I think it would be best to terminate these negotiations immediately and manifest a resolute attitude. [A-250] THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR 4. To sum it all up, to continue negotiations with America in view of the situation existing in the world today would not only result in the bringing of incalculable harm to the settlement of the China incident but would have the exactly opposite effect of actually enabling America to participate in the European war—–(50 groups missing)—–. Moreover, unless we are prepared to make important concessions there is no use to expect big things of Japanese- American negotiations. And it is also very evident that, even though we assume that a certain degree of understanding might be worked out in Japanese-American relations through the exercise of diplomacy, this understanding would be powerless to prevent German-American relations from growing steadily worse and eventually lead to war, and in the event we also would be forced into war from the standpoint of moral principles.———-and it cannot but be my most ardent wish that the above negotiations will be terminated and that we will adhere to the spirit of the Tripartite Pact and in harmony with our fixed national policy devote ourselves wholeheartedly to the establishment of the New Order in East Asia. [a] Not available. Trans. 10-22-41 No. 488 August 21, 1941 #122. FROM: Panama (Akiyama) http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET  TO: Tokyo Chief of Office Routing. Re your #65[a]. We encountered considerable difficulty in finding a person to whom we could entrust the diagrams[b] for delivery. We did give a copy of the explanatory notes only to Colonel Yamamoto (Assistant Attache in Washington) who passed through here en route home during the middle of last month. By the end of this month, we plan to have it, together with findings of subsequent investigations and the diagram, taken out of here. They will be transferred to the Legation in Peru, undoubtedly.   Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  Translator’s note: Last sentence garbled—contents guessed at. [a] See III, 492. Trans. 9-10-41 No. 489 August 26, 1941 #133. FROM: Panama (Akiyama) TO: Tokyo The six members of the House of Representatives Military Affairs Committee who have been inspecting defenses in Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Antigua, Trinidad, and Georgetown arrived here by plane on the 23rd. They have made arrangements with the high command to spend a week inspecting military defenses, new equipment, condition of progress and fortifications on [A-251] both the Atlantic and the Pacific in the Canal Zone, after which they will return via Nicaragua, —–, and Mexico. Trans. 9-3-41 No. 490 August 28, 1941 #138. FROM: Panama (Akiyama) TO: Tokyo I completed the presentation of my credentials on the 28th. Trans. 9-5-41 No. 491 September 10, 1941 #72. FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) TO: Panama You are appointed Minister (?) to Costa Rica in addition to your present post (?) as of the 10th. Trans. 9-15-41 No. 492 September 12, 1941 #154. FROM: Panama (Akiyama) TO: Tokyo Re my #119[a]. To be handled in Government Code. When I arrived here to take up my duties, I found that Consul IZAWA was attending to—–(in charge of accounts) and Vice Consul HARA to—–. Under the present political circumstances and in view of the advisability of the whole staff working cooperatively for the country, I believe it is necessary to clarify the following points: 1. Are the duties which IZAWA is performing here since he has been sent here to be considered in the same light as duties performed by one who has been formally stationed here? If it is to be so considered, what reason is there for not making him the head of the Consulate? At present IZAWA is responsible for collecting intelligences in the Canal Zone and for making contacts with outsiders. However, since the local officials do not (recognize ?) because of regulations, the qualifications of any official below the rank of a Consul, we find it quite inconvenient in the performance of duties. We need, therefore, to make matters clear to the Panamanian officials and at the same time bring about order within the office. 2. As I understand it, since about 1937 Vice Consul HARA has been chiefly engaged in commercial duties and for this reason he is not supposed to be the head of the Consulate. There is need of deciding who should be held responsible for such duties which are being performed by persons acting instead of HARA, namely such matters as—–. receipt of visa fees and fees connected with sending of telegrams for non-official purposes, which necessitate contact with foreign—–and foreign persons. Should such duties be performed by someone representing HARA or by IZAWA who is in charge of accounts?


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