Chang Chun-li, Chang Po-ling, Chang Chun, and Chang Li-luan Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

No. 1038
October 1, 1945 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
#319.
FROM: Canton http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US

TO: Tokyo

(To be handled in Government code. Strictly Secret.)
(Separate telegram.)

1. Concerning control of military supplies as well as other materials benefiting the enemy and being shipped into the unoccupied territories:

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(a) Banning of shipment into enemy territories by way of unoccupied coastal region centering around Macao, Burma, and Koshu District of French Indo-China. Also strict control of shipment of all materials other than the above which would benefit the enemy.

(b) Especially the inflow of materials beneficial to the enemy is being effected by smuggling ships from Macao sailing with full intention of breaking through Japan’s anti-Chinese blockade. Therefore, the port of Macao should be watched constantly, and all smuggling stopped.

(c) Japan should cooperate with the Macao Government for the purpose of stopping as well as controlling the following two items. With this purpose in view, the Government of Macao should accord all facilities necessary for cooperating with the personnel and ships belonging to Japanese organizations within the Macao territory and should also be responsible for their protection.

2. They should close the organizations connected with the Chungking regime as well as expel enemy persons whom the Japanese have indicated.

(a) There are espionage organizations of the Chungking regime, and these organizations are working toward creating disorder within the unoccupied territories. The Macao authorities should disband these organizations as they are indicated to it by the Japanese.

(b) These authorities should thoroughly suppress as well as punish members of the enemy firms and transportation companies who have formed themselves into secret societies.

3. A thorough-going suppression of anti-Japanese propaganda, opinions, as well as societies.

(a) They should control anti-Japanese newspapers whether printed in Chinese or in any other language; also opinions, broadcasts, moving pictures, and political movements inimical to the Nanking regime.

(b) Suppression of terroristic activities and refusal of admittance into the country of terroristic persons.

Trans. 8-23-41


No. 1039
October 13, 1941
Circular 2166.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Net

Lisbon to Tokyo #194.

I called on the director of the bureau of political affairs of the Foreign Office on other business, and the director told me that on the night of the 16th of September a Portuguese patrol boat at Macao belonging to the Government Office was fired upon without warning by a Japanese military patrol boat. A flag was flown immediately to show that it was a Portuguese vessel, but the firing continued. Fortunately, there were no casualties, but representation was immediately made to—–and protests were also lodged in Tokyo.

While he had not asked me to call especially for this, he wanted to take this opportunity to acquaint me with the facts—–. As there are matters I need to take up with the Colonial Ministry, please advise me as to the facts of this incident by return dispatch.

Trans. 10-16-41

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 1040
August 20, 1941
Cir. #747.
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Net

Message to Tokyo #1553.

HQ spy report.

1. The leaders in Enan[a] announced on the 15th that besides TINSYOU (Ch’en Shao-yu)[b] mentioned in my #1533[c], RINYO (Lin Piao)[b], RINSOKAN (Lin T’su-han), RYURAKUSHO (Lin Po-Chao) and others have decided to leave by air for Moscow on the 24th; and that by taking advantage of the British-American-Soviet Conference, they would bring about a favorable turn in the boundary settlement.

2. TOEICHO (Teng———-) arrived in Hong Kong on the 17th. The reason for his visit was to confer with each faction, and to have them request headquarters to convoke the National Association for Assisting the Administration as promptly as possible, as well as assisting the liaison officials in Chungking in preparation for the Moscow conference.

3. The leaders in Enan sent a wire to Latimore to the effect that it was in favor of the joint negotiations among Britain, America, the Soviet and China; and at the same time said strongly that the demands of the headquarters consisted of none other than for its legitimate existence, recognition of equal treatment for the Communist Army, and for the development of the northwest section. We understand that SHUONRAI (Chou En-lai)[b] also expounded at length to Latimore that the Communist Party’s political demands consisted of reorganization of the National Association for Assisting the Administration; partial reorganization of the JU. GYO Administration Bureau, and abolition of the Right Wing of the Anti-Communist platform.

Relayed to Peking, Nanking, Hsingking and Hong Kong.

[a] Yurian-Fu, Shensi Province.
[b] Chinese Communist leader.
[c] Not available.

Trans. 8-30-41


No. 1041
September 4, 1941
#1640.
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

Re my #1553[a].

HQ reports that he has found out that MAO TSE-TUNG[b] arrived at Hami[c] on August 19th and left on the 25th for Moscow. MAO, it seems, remained for six days in Hami, busying himself with general discussions concerning the future development and expansion of the Chinese Communists, as well as discussions concerning the establishment of better relations between the Nationalists and Communists. His business in Moscow concerns a complete compromise on all problems between the Nationalists and the Reds, together with the equipment and instruction of the Communist forces. MAO is planning to expand both the area and activities of the Communists and to work out a concrete joint policy between the Chinese and

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Soviet Red forces. It appears that in Moscow he plans to work out the details of future anti-Japanese strategy and the new and greater role to be played therein by the Communists.

[a] See III, 1040.
[b] Chinese Communist Leader.
[c] Town in E. Sinkiang, China. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US

Trans. 9-26-41


No. 1042
September 1, 1941
Cir. #1916.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsinking, Nanking & Shanghai

(Message from Hong Kong #441 on August 30.)

The following is a report made by XYZ.

At a reception held for—–, KO EN BAI[a], who is now in Hong Kong, spoke in the following manner regarding the question of joint action.

1. It looks as if joint military action between Soviet Russia and China will be agreed upon at least formally with the aid of Britain and the United States. In reality, however, the anti-Soviet faction made up of such persons as KA O KIN[b], RI SO JIN[c], and CHIN SEP, fearing Soviet Russia, has been following an opportunistic policy of compromising with Japan while advocating lengthy anti-Japanese resistance. (The—–is not satisfied with this state of affairs ?.)

2. The materials from the United States intended to give aid to China are not reaching in time their destination where they are needed. Take, for instance, airplanes. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  Although 200 machines have already reached China, since it is taking two days to assemble one plane, it would be more than a year before 200 planes will be used in the war. Consequently, despite the fact that 700 out of 1,000 pilots who have been training in the United States have reached China, they cannot be effectively employed. Furthermore, the best troops of the government are still far behind the front lines and are in—–and (Fukien ?). They have not yet given up their policy of putting pressure upon the Chinese Communists. Their so-called anti-Japanese counterattack is nothing more than more propaganda. Therefore, nothing will save Chungking but the formation of an anti-Japanese encirclement by Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia which is being brought on by Japan’s advance either northward or southward. Even if a war breaks out between Japan and Soviet Russia, most people are of the opinon that it will not benefit—–. Chungking will probably demand as a price for joint action with the Communists the (surrender ?) of—–in Sinkyo and Outer Mongolia, as well as the 18th Army. It seems that before taking joint action against Japan, Chungking will take steps to attain this objective. However, in view of the fact that the power to strike back at Japan is quite weak, joint action will not be effective.

3. Friction between—–and—–is as common as ever. The Chinese Communist Party leaders are afraid that should the Russian capital fall, the Nationalist Party would suddenly increase its pressure against them, and civil war will inevitably ensue. Furthermore, there is a tendency within groups all over China of separation taking place between the Nationalists and the Communists, and since in this Chungking cannot be asked to mediate, there is danger a split taking place very soon within the government. It being extremely difficult for the

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Nationalist Party to unify these conflicting factions, the Chinese political prospect is a matter of deep concern.

[a] HUANG YEN-PEI, an educator.
[b] HO YING-CHIN, member of Central Executive Yuan.
[c] LITSUNG-JEN, Inspector, Chief of 4th Army.
[d] CHEN CHENG, Commander of 18th Army and 14th Division.

Trans. 9-5-41


No. 1043
September 6, 1941
#1658.
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Tokyo

Message from JK received on the 4th.

It appears that the anti-Communist, pro-German trend is on the increase among the leaders of the Chungking general headquarters and it is understood that they recently adopted the following plans:

1. To spread propaganda to the effect that the subversive activities of the Chinese Communists render the continuation of resistance impossible and thus to increase the atmosphere favoring their schemes.

2. To unify the various armies and to increase the power of the purely Nationalist forces.

3. As far as diplomacy is concerned, to make it appear that they are in line with England and the United States, but in the meantime to seal amicable relations with Germany and Italy on the sly.

4. TANG EN-PO’s main forces are in the Funiu-Shan—–Tai Betsu San area[a]. TANG, as a Commander in name only, will lead the forces of LI PIN HSIEN[b] in an attack on the Indo-Chinese troops.

[a] In Honan Province.
[b] Commander of forces between Anhwei and Hankow.

Trans. 9-26-41


No. 1044
September 12, 1941
Cir. #814.
FROM: Shanghai
TO: Peking

Message to Tokyo #1702.

According to HQ, toward the end of September CHIANG KAI SHEK is planning to formally establish in Kunming military headquarters for southwestern territories and to appoint KA O KIN[a] as Commander in Chief and then to transfer to Kansi[f]—–and Yunnan the 140,000 men of the army under the command of RYU JI TAN.[b] However, HAKU SU KI[c], RI SAI SIN[d] and others are joining hands with RI KAN KON[e] and are persuading the Keietsu commanders to commence a southward movement. Especially RI SAI SIN on the 3rd and the 6th of September emphatically pointed out to CHIANG KAI SHEK that the Keietsu commanders were opposed to the southward move of the Central Army and urged that the Keietsu forces be per-

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mitted to return from Szechwan, Hupeh, Honan, Hunan and Kwangsi and thus strengthen the defenses in the southwest. As a result of all this, it is said that CHIANG’s plan of establishing the military headquarters had ended in a failure. CHIANG then sent a telegram summoning KA O KIN, who was staying in Kunming, and after watching developments for eight days, telegraphed HAKU SU KI in Kunming to organize the military headquarters instead of KA; however, HAKU replied by wire to the effect that he would like to have CHIANG himself go to the southwest and give his final word as to how the headquarters should be established.

Relayed to Nanking and Peking.

[a] HO YING-CHIN, Member of Central Executive Yuan.
[b] LIU TZU-TAN, Commander of Communist 26th Army.
[c] PAI CHUNG-HSI, Commander 9th Route Army, also Member of Central Executive Yuan.
[d] LI CHI-SHEN, Member of Central Executive Yuan, Military Inspector in Charge of Training.
[e] LI HAN-HUN, Commander, 56th Div. (Kwantung forces).
[f] Kana spelling.

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: It is not clear what is meant by “Keietsu.” The translator’s guess is that the word is a designation for the territories beyond Chungking.

Trans. 9-16-41


No. 1045
September 17, 1941
#599.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Hsingking

(Moscow to Tokyo #1139.)

Relaying #1139 from Moscow to Tokyo.

McAvoy, a reporter of the Chicago Times (who arrived here about a month ago via Chungking and Hami) told a member of the staff on the 12th that he had flown from Chungking to Alma Ata via Lanchow and Hami and then taken the train from there, arriving in Moscow about two weeks later. He seemed to think that Soviet aid to Chiang Kai Shek would not amount to much. There appeared to be many Soviet soldiers in Suchow and Lanchow and Hami, and ten Soviet soldiers accompanied him from Suchow and Lanchow to Alma Ata, he reported.

Trans. 9-24-41


No. 1046
September 26, 1941
#987.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Shanghai

(Secret outside the Department.)

According to reliable information, a group of 120 Air Corps officers of the Chungking Government sailed for the United States on board the President Pierce which left your port on September 22. Please send me details regarding this matter.

Trans. 10-1-41

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 1047
September 26, 1941
#677.
FROM: Nanking
TO: Tokyo

(Strictly secret.)

On the 25th, CHOU FUO-HAI[a] told HIDAKA[b] that in Hong Kong the other day ORIEN YUNG-MING told him the following:

Before allowing itself to be wheedled into a peace by the United States, Chungking wishes to be sure that it will be a sincere, complete, and lasting peace. It seems that CHIEN sent CHIANG KAI-SHEK recommendations that he make peace, and CHIANG replied that he would, as a matter of fact, welcome the cessation of hostilities but he could not be certain of making a good peace because Japan is so untrustworthy; that even if an agreement were entered into, after advancing either south or north and strengthening her international position, Japan would only come back again and bomb Chungking some more; that this is, as a matter of fact, her arriere pensee; that an understanding between Japan and the United States is impossible because opinion is so divided in Japan; http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.US

that SADAO ARAKI, TEIICHI SUZUKI, as well as SEIGO NAKANO are making incendiary statements liable to produce a governmental upheaval; that by autumn Germany will do her very level best to take Moscow, because if winter sets in before the fall of the Soviet capital, it will be a cold, hard time for the Nazis, and in the meantime England and the United States will be growing stronger and stronger; that, of course, Japan realizes that Germany will act with celerity and intends to keep pace with her.

CHIEN continued, “About October 30th I am going to Chungking and again warn CHIANG, but I don’t expect to get any results. In any case, if you have anything you want to tell him, please let me know. The other day CHOU TSUO-MIN came to Shanghai from Hong Kong, and he said that the United States is not telling the Chinese Ambassador HU-SHIH anything about the negotiations supposed to be going on between Japan and the United States. SOONG TSU-WEN, of course, should be in a position to know the facts, but his correspondence with CHIANG would lead you to believe that he is in complete ignorance. Thus, Chungking seems to be utterly in the dark. The other day a rumor was going the rounds in Chungking to the effect that the United States was going to be satisfied with the evacuation of Japanese troops from Honan only and that she would let the Japanese forces remain in Hopei. CHIANG grew quite belligerent and went so far as to make a statement that he captured Lang Chow September 18.”

[a] Minister of Finance and Police.
[b] Commercial Attache in Shanghai.

Trans. 9-30-41


No. 1048
September 27, 1941
Cir. #494.
FROM: Peking
TO: China Net

Peking to Tokyo #637.

Confidential within the Ministry.

From the Ambassador to the Foreign Minister.

On the 27th, Harada, in a casual conversation with Yang Yu-hsun, the Director of the National Socialist Party, learned that Lu Ting-kuei, the Shanghai Secretary of the party, had

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gone to Hong Kong to explain the purposes of the National Socialist Party to a select group there, and to obtain the consent of party leaders there to establish contact with Chang Chun-li. It is rumored that a meeting of the party will be held in the near future, probably during October. It would be unfortunate if the party’s reputation were to be impaired. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

The “Four Chang Movement” (Chang Chun-li, Chang Po-ling, Chang Chun, and Chang Li-luan) had been advocating a peace on all fronts. Since the death of Chang Li-luan it is evident that the three Changs will have to carry on for the sake of the party’s future.

The substance of this message has been repeated to Shanghai. Please repeat to Hong Kong.

Trans. 10-2-41

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