No. 1139
September 2, 1941
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

(Request message.)


We see no opportunity of bettering the trade situation now in the doldrums. Of military goods we have been able to secure 230 tons of copra and 50 tons of hemp. In addition, we have made application for the export of 15 tons of cotton cloth and 825 tons of hemp thread for the manufacture of tatami[a]. It is possible for us to purchase 40,000 guilders’ worth of material during the month of October. Therefore, please secure the approval of the Treasury Department, as well as the Yokohama Specie Bank so that our enterprises here can carry on their business affairs.

We shall endeavor to maintain at present figures the number of employees and coolies necessary for the operation of compressed air machines, equipment for the dehydration of products, as well as other necessary works. It is urgently required that we develop a counter-policy to offset the ever-expanding—–.

[a] Floor matting.

Trans. 9-341

No. 1140
September 2, 1941
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)

For my information, please send the fact concerning the mass resignation of the Japanese staff of the Handels Bank in Japan and of other Dutch firms as well as the facts concerning other boycotting actions.

Trans. 9-4-41



No. 1141
September 2, 1941
FROM: Batavia
TO: Tokyo

Secret outside the Department.

On the 4th, Secretary YAMAGUCHI is leaving Soerabaja for Japan aboard the Johore Maru. Since I am sending secret documents in his custody; please arrange at your discretion for his passing the customs at Yokohama with ease and convenience. Likewise, please make special arrangements to send a telegraphic official in order to take these things into custody afterward.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 1142
September 2, 1941
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

Re the first part of Circular #261[a] from Ambassador HONDA.

1. Conditioned by our military invasion of French Indo-China, it is a fact that the government of these islands has drastically stepped up their anti-Japanese tendencies and very evidently assumed an attitude of aid to China. This is evidenced by the unconvincing control exercised by the authorities here over the anti-Japanese editorials of the Chinese press, the solicitation of funds for the construction of military airplanes for Chungking among Chinese resident here, and their demand for suspension of publication of the Japanese-operated East India Daily News, Chinese character edition, as well as the Malayan language magazine, Sinarusuratan. However, on the other hand, in order that we may give a sufficiently clear picture of the situation, there is a small group of Chinese resident here whose anti-Japanese tendencies have slightly improved as a result of the activities of the government here. However, no sooner than they got the impression that these Chinese were coming slightly closer to us in feeling, it could be seen that they began to exercise their old tendencies on a still greater scale. Japanese who had good contacts with Chinese here were unmercifully exiled, and these Chinese friends were hauled unceremoniously to the police stations for questioning or possibly taken before the person in charge of Chinese affairs here. It has been anonymously reported that a statement has been made that they are in danger of their lives. Thus, they have begun to hinder our schemes with regard to the Chinese with more and more determination.

2. Therefore, when an excellent opportunity presented itself, I deliberately took the occasion to exchange arguments on the Sino-Japanese incident with the Chief of the Far Eastern Section, RO[b], who is chiefly in charge, within the government circles, of the handling of the Chinese question. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET At that time, the fundamental points of his argument relating to the Chinese here, I am giving below for your information.

(a) “I have lived in China, many, many years. In addition, since my return to the Netherlands East Indies, ten years ago, I have gradually come into repute in my handling of the Chinese question. I think I am pretty well aware of matters having to do with the Chinese, but the fact that Japan has set up the Nanking regime and is very anxious to overthrow the regime of CHIANG KAI-SHEK is, I think, extremely foolhardy and has slight chance of success. I, personally, cannot condone Japan’s effort to beguile the Chinese masses from CHIANG KAI-SHEK through the establishment of the Nanking Government made up of second-rate or worse individuals. There is no more logical course for Japan to follow in the settlement of the China incident than to reach a compromise with CHIANG KAI-SHEK. This is my firm belief.  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire


(b) “Though it is said that there are practically no Chinese living here in the Netherlands East Indies who support the Nanking Government, this is actually no exaggeration. All Chinese here give their support to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Furthermore, the Dutch Government recognizes the CHIANG regime, and because she does not recognize the Nanking regime, it can be clearly seen that the Netherlands Government entertains the same convictions.

(c) “WANG CHING-WEI, who heads the Nanking Government, is sold on the Asia doctrine. He advocates Sino-Japanese peace. His fundamental policy is the expulsion of the white man from East Asia. It is but natural that the Netherlands East Indies Government should oppose this theory. Therefore, the consequent reaction here is the decision to follow a course of seeing, to it that the Chinese on these islands are not swept off their feet.

(d) “At the present time, martial law has been put into effect on these islands, and everything is on a wartime footing. The people are united, and in order that the Netherlands home government might be restored, they are ready to fight. The 1,500,000 Chinese resident here on these islands are an important and integral part of the society of the Netherlands Indies. Their well-being greatly affects the peace, order, and economic livelihood of all living on these islands. Therefore, the Netherlands Indies authorities have definitely decided to follow a policy of unequivocally crushing out political schemes from abroad directed toward the Chinese resident here.”

3. Having said all this, I endeavored to refute him with all the strength that I could command. RO, however, would not be convinced and adamantly stuck to his statements. Not only is the situation like this, but recently the fact that the police strength on these islands has been greatly augmented has made it extremely difficult for us to carry on our schemes toward the Chinese residents here. As a consequence, the situation practically means that we can do nothing directly. Therefore, I would like to have our organs here for the manipulation of public opinion as well as those who work in the development of our schemes remain passive for a little while. For the time being, we are concentrating our efforts in the collection of intelligences having to do with the activities of Chinese here as well as other things.

4. Therefore, in the meantime, until we have securely brought French Indo-China and Thai within our sphere of influence, I think that it would be most propitious for us to strengthen our schemes with regard to the Chinese here. For this purpose, I would like to have sent to these islands influential persons in whom the Nanking Government has much confidence, who can command large numbers of followers among the Chinese here, who will have for their main objective the preaching of the doctrine that the Chinese and the Japanese are one, as well as set up organizations to influence Chinese opinion. These men would have absolutely no relations with either this office or with Japanese persons but would meet in large and small groups and talk with influential Chinese as well as substantial individuals of that group here.

Please transmit this message to Ambassador HONDA in China, and to other competent diplomatic officials to whom this information, in your good judgment, might be usable.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 1143
September 4, 1941
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo



Secret outside the Department. Re your #510[a].

1. Since then I have conferred with the banks concerned to work out a practical method and have drawn up the following proposal:

(1) Permission has not yet been issued generally with regard to receiving of deposits made by Japanese.

(2) In the case of bank deposits, we believe that we should accommodate those who are withdrawing from the islands by our accepting their deposits but that we should do so on condition that a method of payment be held in reserve so that we may avoid the danger of the deposits being assessed in case of default in payment of obligations. Those who are withdrawing from the islands should, before their departure, follow the procedure of filling out a fixed form requesting the consulates to take custody of their money in guilders, but actually have the Yokohama Specie Bank or the Bank of Taiwan take the money in trust (in case of those residing in islands in which there are no Japanese Banks, the money should be collected at the consulate and remitted to either Soerabaja or Batavia). —–the banks which have thus accepted the money in trust should draw up a detailed list of the deposits and send the list through the consulates to both the Foreign Office and to their main offices and complete all procedures that would enable the banks to make loans.

(3) In view of the necessity of keeping secret from the Netherlands Government the fact of thus making loans of the money in Japan, the South Seas Association should be made to act as an intermediary body, giving all advice relative to the movement of those who have withdrawn from the islands, as well as determining quickly in all cases the amount of loan to be made and thus be responsible for issuance of loans.

2. We would like to put this proposition into effect at once if you have no objections to offer and so we would appreciate your wiring us your reply at once.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-6-41

No. 1144
September 6, 1941
Circular #1946.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Batavia

It is necessary to decide what sort of explanation should be given in Japan and in your area with regard to deposit security loans to be made to agriculturists and to the Japanese who are withdrawing from the islands. Will you, therefore, take up the matter with the branches of the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan respectively and wire me at once your decision with regard to the following items? Will you also keep the matter in strict secrecy, since there is no telling that there is no danger of the plan failing as a result of carelessness on the part of Japanese residents, and devise methods most suited to the actual conditions. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

1. In the case of cash accounts of special cash accounts, would it be possible to convert that portion which serves as a loan security into a fixed deposit and to keep the certificates of deposit in care of the branch banks? Is there not a danger of its becoming known to the outsiders even if it is possible?


2. In case the certificates cannot be kept in the banks, is there a convenient method whereby they could be transferred to the Consul Generals’ office for keeping and whereby the depositors could thereafter be prevented from drawing on the deposits?

3. What method should be used to establish connection for the purpose of ascertaining the difference resulting from loan repayment and deposit repayment in the event it is impossible to carry with oneself a bankbook or a certificate of deposit.

4. In the case referred to in paragraph #3, by what method would it be possible to identify the drawer with the depositor?

5. In case some members of a family are withdrawing and the other members are remaining, by what method may information be exchanged with regard to the (amount?) of loan to be made between loan payments and deposit payments? Is there any method whereby the withdrawal of the portion applied to loan security can be prevented?

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 1145
September 6, 1941
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Menado

Re your message #94[a].

Secret outside the Department.

While I have great sympathy for the blows suffered by our people living abroad, the complete settlement of the problem is not simply a question of our relations with Netherlands East Indies. In a time of difficulty like the present, Japanese living at home and abroad must impartially bear sacrifices. I am very much afraid that people who, as a result of temporary discomfort and unnecessary panic, give up their rights and privileges by such a compromise as leaving the country will find it impossible to get new passports and come back to reopen their businesses unless there is a complete change in the future. Even if there is no possibility of attracting business now, try to persuade our people to stay for a few months at least, even if their books show a deficit. Get them to stand firm rather then flee from danger, and work out a policy which fits the local circumstances. For the present there is nothing to do about trade and shipping except to decide again when Netherlands East Indies shall have issued definite instructions in regard to supplying goods to Japan.

Please notify Batavia, Macassar,—–,—–, from Batavia—–to here —————.

[a] Not available. Trans. 11-17-41

No. 1146
September 5, 1941
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Batavia (Riyoji)

Re your #333[a].

Am sending all of the 4000 yen disbursements for this year out of the trade promotion fund, office expense and miscellaneous funds. Therefore, please arrange for intelligence reports to be sent from time to time.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-9-41



No. 1147
September 6, 1941
FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa)
TO: Tokyo

(To be handled in government code.)

To the Vice-Minister.

1. On the 5th, HO[a] called on me and said that according to a report sent by Consul ISHIZAWA to PA[b], the Netherlands East Indies Government will hereafter refuse to permit the export of petroleum to Japan unless Japan:

a. Issues a statement declaring that by her occupation of French Indo-China, she has no intention of attacking the Netherlands East Indies; and

b. Withdraws her troops from—–.

He proceeded to explain, saying, “Even if the aforementioned a and b were carried out, an unconditional export of petroleum would not be permitted, and the kinds of oil which will be permitted will be limited to those which would not increase the fighting power of Japan.   Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire  Experts were at work then in order to decide what kinds of oil will be included in this category. Since I had expected the results to be defined in the near future, I confidentially gave you the information, and since you persistently questioned me, I confidentially disclosed to you in a frank manner what I knew of trends in the Government. I did not make any demands upon—–. However, the content of a telegram from PA differed greatly from the information I had given you, and since it was given in such a form as if the Netherlands East Indies Government was demanding the withdrawal of troops, I have been questioned by the Governnor-General and by MO.[c] If what I tell you in confidence and as a special favor is going to be misrepresented in such a way, I had better refrain hereafter from telling you frankly what I think.”

There was nothing in my report which could have caused such a misunderstanding. This, it seems to me, was due to Minister PA himself confusing the issues pertaining to concessions, with those pertaining to the sale of oil, because of his lack of sufficient understanding of the history of the matter. I would like to have a wire of inquiry sent.

2. Now HO had spoken frankly about this matter to me as a special favor because he was in close touch with me five years ago when he was assisting HA in arranging the ISHIZAWA-HARUTO agreement, and because after the agreement had been signed, he had, together with me, assisted in the solution in Japan of the questions which arose between the Exporters’ Guild and the Netherlands business firms. As it may be clearly gauged from the conversations which took place between me and HO during the recent Japanese-Netherlands negotiations, in many cases HO’s opinions ultimately form the policy of the Netherlands East Indies Government and, therefore, should he hereafter cease talking to me, it would become extremely difficult for us to judge the trend of affairs. I, therefore, ask you to invite Minister PA to your office as soon as possible and get him to wire a telegram of explanation in order to correct this misunderstanding. I think this would help to clarify my position as well as HO’s to the Governor-General and Mo, and so please—–the matter and wire me the gist of the conversation you had.

[b] PABST.
[c] VAN MOOK, Director of Economic Affairs.

Trans. 9-20-41


No. 1148
September 6, 1941
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Batavia

Re my #550[a].

At noon today, the 6th, the Finance Ministry granted, as a special favor limited to this time only, export permission to the Dutch firms. The permit covers the total amount of 1,588,100 yen and about 1200 or 1300 tons. Please tell HO[b] the circumstances which I have explained in my past telegrams and which led the Foreign Office and the related offices to offer this facility. Furthermore, no matter in how friendly a manner it is considered, under the present circumstances we cannot issue a permit for the amount handled by Handel’s. Both the Ministry and HA understand the situation very well, and they are wiring the details to the Netherlands East Indies Government. Please be so informed.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-10-41

No. 1149
September 6, 1941
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Batavia

From the Fuel Bureau to B.O.M.

We think that 12,000 gilders’ worth of crude oil will not keep up business for more than a single month’s time.

It is true that recently 10,000 gilders were remitted through the Mitsui Bank, but the Dutch East Indies officials, having frozen it, did not reimburse us; and so, henceforth, for the sake of continuing business, we believe that we must once more devise a means of raising funds. After conferring with the Consul-General, the Yokohama Specie Bank, and other competent persons regarding the above policy on raising funds, by all means please wire me your ideas.

Now, in addition, I want you to do everything in your power in connection with refunding the 10,000 gilders to Mitsui.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 1150
September 6, 1941
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

Repeat message.

From the B.O.M. Home Office to the Fuel Bureau.

The Exchange Control Board notified the Mitsui Bank in Soerabaja that it will not permit remittances to be sent from Japan to the B.O.M. accordingly, although we are now conferring with each of the interested parties with regard to some counter plan to this. Yesterday, we received a wire to the effect that 10,000 gilders had been remitted from the guilds. After



this until there is an order from this office, do not let anything like this happen. Address all wires meant for B.O.M. to this home office.

Will your office kindly assume the responsibility of wiring this to the guilds.

Trans. 9-10-41

No. 1151
September 6, 1941
FROM: Batavia (Ishizawa)
TO: Tokyo

Secret outside the Department.

Re telegraphic matter.

1. Will you please devise code words and send them by return wire for the following firms in addition to the list which you have given in your Circular #1907[a] and your separate telegram #531[b]:

B.O.M.; Takeda Chobei; Nanyo Kaiun; Nomura Toinko Shokusan; Daido Boeki; and Iwai Shoten.

2. There are two of your messages numbered #544[b]. One deals with a German Consul embarking on a Japanese ship and the other has to do with the loading of ships in Thailand and the Netherlands East Indies. Please be informed that we have filed the latter as your #549[b].

[a] See III, 644.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 1152
September 10, 1941
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Batavia

Re your #934[a].

Code Words Company
OTFUV Takeda Chobei
OVDAW Nanyo Kaiun
OSGOT Nomura Kaigaijigyobu
IFTIG Daido Trading Company
IGSOH Iwai Shoten

As to messages having to do with B.O.M., those whose content—–requires strict secrecy should be sent in machine code or in some secure Foreign Office code.

[a] See III, 1151.

Trans. 9-12-41


No. 1153
September 6, 1941  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Cir. #1947.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET
TO: Singapore, Batavia

(Strictly secret.)

After you have made an immediate investigation on the following matters, please make a report, sending it to us in an appropriate manner.

1. Please inform me as to the various types of fishing entered into by Japanese from the point of view of their use in fishing of gasoline-powered vessels (“gasoline-powered vessels” is a military term for vessels known as “sea arks” which have a considerable cruising ability).

2. In regard to these fishing concerns who operate these so-called “sea arks”;

(a) List the number of vessels for each concern separately.

(b) Give the tonnage of each vessel.

(c) The speed of each vessel.

(d) Whether or not they have wireless equipment.

(e) Give the present position of each ship.

(f) Should we require the use of these fishing vessels, please advise us as to the method by which we could transmit instructions for each vessel. (This is particularly important.)

(g) The time of day we should wire these orders. (This is particularly important.)

(h) Please ascertain the length of time required subsequent to receipt of orders to move from their present position to the southern part of French Indo-China.

Trans. 9-10-41

No. 1154
September 8, 1941
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa)
TO: Tokyo

Strictly Secret.

Re your Circular #1947[a].

1. The Taichen Company (owned and operated by Noboru Ogura) and the Oshiro Company (owned and operated by Moryuki Oshiro) are the two fishing Companies operating here.

2. (a to e) The Taichen Company operates four ships; the Oshiro two ships. All vessels are propelled by 80 h.p. gasoline engines. The tonnage of these ships is 20 to 25 tons. They have a speed of 7 knots. Cruising range for the vessels of the Taichen Company is thirteen days and nights each. The vessels of the Oshiro Company can stay out of port nine days and nights. None of these vessels have communication facilities. All of these vessels ply alternately from the fishing harbor of Batavia to the fishing areas of Banga and Belitoeng and return.

(f) This office can communicate to the vessels in Batavia harbor on the same day. It will require approximately one day and a half subsequent to receipt of instructions by this office for those vessels on the fishing grounds to be informed. Six days and nights will be required for these ships to sail from Batavia to the southern end of French Indo-China. With each of these vessels towing two fishing barges, eight days and nights will be required to navigate that distance.

Furthermore, three days and nights are required in sailing from the northernmost fishing area in Netherlands East Indies waters to the Natoena Islands. In their considered opinion, they must be advised at least one week before they are to start for southern French Indo-



China, in order that each of the vessels mentioned above may make preparations and make such repairs as are necessary for a safe voyage.

[a] See III, 1153.

Trans. 9-13-41


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