Archive for May, 2009

attaché if circumstances 4.aic.002002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

May 31, 2009

No.  605

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)                                                               December 2, 1941

TO: Santiago                                                                                        Circular # 329.

(In 3 parts complete.)

(Tokyo to Rio as Circular # 2432, on 29 November.)

Re my Circular # 2409[a].

The following are added this date to my Circular # 2409[a], for special use in your area. Please  use them together with the others (after making them up in a table).

(Translator’s Note: Underlined values are doubtful due to garbles. Probable correct value added below in parenthesis.)

Code Word                                                                                    Meaning

ASAHINA                               From ‑‑‑‑‑ (blank) ‑‑‑‑‑ (date), Japanese ships stopping here will not be allowed to take on fuel.



DATE                                      Please telegraph probable amount of ‑‑‑‑‑ (blank) ‑‑‑‑‑ that can be imported.

KAWAHARA                          I estimate we can probably import about ‑‑‑‑‑ (blank) ‑‑‑‑‑ tons of ‑‑‑‑‑ (blank).

NIWAGUCHI (Kawaguchi)     It is impossible to carry out ‑‑‑‑‑ (blank) ‑‑‑‑‑.

NAKAMUTA (Nakamura)      Are in the process of arranging for importation of ‑‑‑‑ (blank) ‑‑‑‑‑.

SATUNAKATA (Munakata)   Send communications via ‑‑‑‑‑ (blank) ‑‑‑‑‑ (coun­try).

KAZAMA                                Communications will be through offices stationed in ‑‑‑‑‑ (blank) ‑‑‑‑‑ (country).

TOKUSIMA                            Japanese ship should arrive in ‑‑‑‑‑ (blank) ‑‑‑‑­ (country) on ‑‑‑‑‑ (blank) ‑‑‑‑‑ (month) ‑‑‑‑‑ (day).

TAKENOUTI                          It is possible for Japanese ships to come to ‑‑‑‑ (blank) ‑‑‑‑‑ country?

YA GI (Yanagi)                       It is not possible to send Japanese ship to ‑‑‑‑­ (blank) ‑‑‑‑‑ (country).

TONEGI                                  It is possible to send Japanese ship(s) to ‑‑‑‑‑ (blank) ‑‑‑‑‑ (country).

Part 2

TAKAGI                                  Minerals

SAWAMURA                          Lead

SUMI (Kasumi)                 Mercury

IWASAKI                                Petroleum

HIROHATA                            Diamonds for industrial use.

ITAMI                                     Platinum Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

KADA                                     Copper

NAKAGAWA                         Carat

MAEHATA                             Peru

MASUKO                                Chile

SENEDA                                 Colombia

TAKENAKA                           Paraguay or Uruguay (?)

SIMAZU                                  Paraguay or Uruguay (?)

IMAZAWA                              Venezuela

FUJIKAKE                              San QINY[b]

HASIMOTO                            Cuba

SINDŌ                                     Havana

TIBA                                       Rio de Janeiro

TOZAWA                                Sao Paulo

Part 3

HASEGAWA                           Riberao Preto

IRIFUNE                                 Santos _

ENOMOTO                             BAURU

BEPPU                                     Curityba

TIKAMATU                            Belem

SUETUGU                               Buenos Aires

OKIZUMI                                Santiago

YAMATO                                Lima

UMEGAWA                            Bogota

HARA                                     Caracas

ISONO                                     Montevideo (?)

FUKAMATI                            Asuncion


Relay from Rio de Janeiro to TPT[c], Lima, Sao Paulo. Mexico City relay to Washington, Panama, Havana, Caracas (?), Bogota.

[a] See IV, 423.

[b] Code value in QINY (probably Salvador or Domingo.)

[c] Probably “Buenos Aires and Santiago.”

Trans.  12‑5‑41

No.  606

FROM: Rio (Ishii)                                                                                December 10, 1941

TO: Buenos Aires                                                                                Circular # 352.

(Japanese Plain Text.)

Special report. Outline of the war situation.

The Imperial Army and Navy engaged the American and British armies in war from before dawn on the 8th and the situation up to noon on the 9th has been ascertained as follows:

1. The Imperial Navy carried out a withering air attack on the American fleet and air force before dawn on the 8th, at Hawaii, sinking 2 battleships, seriously damaging 4 battleships, seriously damaging about 4 large cruisers (the above has been confirmed), shooting down and damaging many enemy planes. Besides an aircraft carrier is believed to have been sunk by one of our submarines outside of Honolulu Harbor but this is not yet confirmed. We suffered a slight loss in planes and no loss to the fleet.

2. The combined Imperial Army and Navy Air Corps attacked on the 8th the Philippine Air Force and strategic air bases, shooting down 40 planes at Iba and 50 to 60 planes at Clark Field. Our loss was two planes.

3. Early in the morning of the 8th, the Imperial Navy bombed military objectives in Davao, Wake and Guam, inflicting heavy damage. In Guam, the warship Penguin was sunk. Also a detachment of the Navy subjected Midway to heavy fire on the afternoon of the 8th, burning down an airplane hanger and fuel reserves. Our losses were nothing.

4. Before dawn on the 8th, the Imperial Navy air corps carried out night bombing of the Tengaa and Seretaa air bases near Singapore as well as the aviation headquarters and other important military objectives. There appeared to be great damage inflicted but since it was dark this is not confirmed. Although the enemy countered fiercely we suffered no damage.

5. The Imperial Army and Navy, under unified command, easily occupied Thailand on the afternoon of the 8th.

6. In southern China the Imperial air corps attacked an enemy air base north of Hong­kong in the early morning of the 8th. It was subjected to fire from low altitudes and 12 of the 14 planes there were burned. Also before dawn on the 8th, the Imperial Navy sank the British gunboat Jeitoreru and the American gunboat Wake surrendered. In Peking and Tientsin the American Marine Corps was disarmed. The Shanghai international concession was completely occupied by the Army and Navy under local leadership by noon on the 8th, and the English concession at Shamen was completely occupied during the morning of the 8th.

Please inform Argentina, Peru, Chile, Sao Paulo, Mexico, Cuba, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela.

Trans.  12‑11‑41



No.  607

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii)                                                              November 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 478.

Re my # 473[a]

For your information investigations subsequent to the dispatching of the said boat are as follows:

1. As stated in my caption telegram the obtaining of commodities here is becoming more and more circumscribed. However, it is still possible to purchase wool, hides, quebracho, linseed, etc. Also with the exception of tungsten there are prospects of our being able to purchase the positive metals. (At present Japanese merchants have on hand for shipment in December more than 3500 tons of borax and linseed, etc.)

2. The gold purchasing power of local Japanese merchants is at present 2,000,000 yen. It would be well to increase exports of Japanese merchandise to Argentina as much as possible, especially high priced commodities such as raw silk, in order to increase our reserve purchasing power. In case this does not suffice there  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire   is nothing else to do but ship gold bullion.

3. Furthermore in regard to loading, etc. with the exception of the Toa Maru, which was requisitioned by the Navy, this office has been responsible for all the arrangements made by the merchants. And even in the case of the Toa Maru many awkward situations developed. Hence in the future I think it would be advisable to have this office responsible for all the transactions inasmuch as we are responsible for directing the merchants and also for the contacts with government offices. So, in the future regardless of whether the ship in question is a naval vessel or not, as soon as arrangements are completed for dispatching a ship, please notify this office as soon as possible, giving all the details pertaining to loading, such as good to be loaded, amounts, firms concerned, etc.

We will get in touch with the attaché if circumstances require.

[a] Not available.

Trans.  11‑20‑41

No.  608

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii)                                                              October 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 457.

Argentina’s September trade with Japan:

Exports                                                                                          7,162,614 pesos

Imports                                                                                          3,391,523 pesos

Trans.  11‑6‑41

No.  609

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          October 24, 1941

TO: Buenos Aires                                                                                # 226.

Nothing is known of arrangements with KAWASHIMA for Foreign and Domestic Com­merce (officials) TANAKA and KATO. As it is difficult to get accommodations, please help them to get places on the next boat.

Trans.  11‑19‑41


Muto 2.mut.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

May 17, 2009


  1. C.                                                                                                    250.00

F. Aid for refugees actual and

miscellaneous expenses                                                          600.00 yen


Kihara                                                                                          3,717.96

Nakamura                                                                                    1,584.00

Kajiya                                                                                          1,143.96

Total                                                                                            6,445.92

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

  1. Peso   808.83
  2. Yen    150.00
  3. 1,500.00
  4. C.                                                                                                    125.00
  5. D.                                                                                                   375.00
  6. F.                                                                                                    390.00
  7. D. (Emergency)                                                                              375.00

This is the end.

[a] Message dated 31 October concerns plans for handling money problems connected with staff salaries for July, August, September, October, November, following methods of remittance used by U.S.

Trans.  11‑12‑41

No. 386

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 8, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 2281.

(Strictly Secret.)

Re my circular # 2040[a].

From the Chief of the Telegraphic Communications.

Recently the number of messages designated “kinqu” has increased by leaps and bounds. Upon examining the material contained in these wires I find they are not of such enormous import that they require dispatching without loss of time or that in the event they are received late at night that they be communicated immediately to the Foreign Minister, Vice‑Minister, or any other of the principal offices for the evaluating of intelligence and certainly not of such vital importance that they need be passed on at that late hour to parties outside the department.

Among these wires there are those which have been designated “kinqu” with utter dis­regard for their contents. (Wires coming from the United States have on very frequent occasions used this most unnecessarily. Furthermore, there certainly is no necessity to put the words “very urgent” in English before the address.) There are so many telegraphic officials who have become so accustomed to marking wires, of little import, extremely urgent (please refer to my mail circular # 8 of 1939) that there is considerable danger of a grave error resulting from this practice.

After you have read and entirely assimilated my wire referred to above, I would like to have you give due consideration to the choice of “kinqu”, “daiqu” (which have been used in the past to designate urgency) and “sikyu.”

This wire is addressed to the United States, Germany, Thailand and Batavia.



“Kinqu” designation for “extremely urgent.”

“Daiqu” designation for “urgent.”

“Sikyu” designation for “Priority.”

[a] Not available.

Trans.  11‑12‑41

No. 387

FROM: San Francisco (Muto)                                                              November 9, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 282.

San Francisco to Tokyo # 285.

The FBI investigation of ‑‑‑‑‑[a] (who was president of the committee concerned last year, at the time when the organization was dissolved) and others connected with the organi­zation is being continued.

The FBI has seven able investigators on this job, so that it would seem as though they considered the case an important one.

Although judging from the type of investigation, it would seem as though they were most interested in gathering evidence to be used against ‑‑‑‑‑[a] and ‑‑‑‑‑, it also is apparent that the Department of Justice feels the necessity of looking into this case, due to the numerous statements being made by the Dies Committee regarding Japanese propaganda in the United States. It also may be that they hope to make this the excuse for demanding recall from the United States of all Japanese Consuls‑General and Consuls to Japan.

2. A rigid investigation of ‑‑‑‑‑[a] is being carried on. As he is officially registered as a foreign correspondent for the ‑‑‑‑‑, there is little dangerLouis J. Sheehan, Esquire of his being indicted (prosecuted). During the examination he will no doubt have to prove that he was hired by the ‑‑‑‑‑[a] at $350. per month. Therefore, please arrange matters there so that if ‑‑‑‑‑ should wire to “GO” of the ‑‑‑‑‑[a] for a confirmation of the above, “GO” is to wire back to ‑‑‑‑[a] this effect.

[a] DoD comment: Names withheld.

Trans.  11‑19‑41

No. 388

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 10, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 756.


Re part 2 of my # 716[a].

In regard to the purchase of dollars by the Yokohama Specie Bank, through the National City Bank, it is understood that the National City Bank Branch in Tokyo has as yet received no instructions from their home office. Is it possible that the home office of the National City Bank does not fully understand the situation?

[a]  Not available, perhaps # 711 meant, See IV, 365.

Trans.  11-18‑41



No. 389

FROM: Hsinking                                                                                  October 27, 1941 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 693.

Re my # 686[a].

The military are at present considering ways and means of disposing the matter involving the arrest of the four U.S. missionaries. If the Foreign Office wishes to express its desires in this matter, please do so at once.

[a ] Not available.

Trans.  10‑29‑41

No. 390

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 31, 1941

TO: Hsinking                                                                                       # 754.

Re your # 686[a] and # 693[b].

With reference to the missionaries concerned, they were involved in Korea in January and FebruaryLouis J. Sheehan, Esquire of this year. If they are involved in the Fukei incident, sentence of banishment is suggested. We have as yet received no report from the Army.

[a] Not available.

[b] See IV, 389.


extra-territorial rights in China 9.ext.00987 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

May 13, 2009

No. 180

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                  November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1193.

Extremely urgent (Part 1 of 2.)

Separate wire.

(To be handled in Government code.)


Strictly confidential, tentative and without commitment.

Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan.

Section 1.

Draft mutual declaration of policy.

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial design in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are  based:

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

Trans.  11-29-41

No. 181

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #1193.

(Part 2 of 2.)

(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes; the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

(2) The principle of internal economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuousLouis J. Sheehan, Esquire development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

Trans.  11-29-41

No. 182

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1194.

(Extremely urgent.) (Part 1 of 4.)



Secret Wire.

(To be handled in Government code.)

Section 2.

Steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan:

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.

Trans.  11-29-41

No. 183

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1194.

(Extremely urgent.) (Part 2 of 4.)

Secret outside the Department.

(To be handled in Government code.)

Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval air and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—military, politically, economically—any Government or regime in China other than the national government of the republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

Trans.  11-29-41

No. 184

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1194.

(Part 3 of 4.)

5. Both Governments will give up all extra-territorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.


Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

Trans.  11-29-41

No. 185

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1194.

(Extremely urgent.) (Part 4 of 4.)

Secret outside the department.

(To be handled in Government Code.)

8. Both Governments will agree upon applying the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

British Empire 1.bre.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

May 9, 2009

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           No Number.

Accept my congratulations on your appointment. Although I was instructed to carry out the policy of the former cabinet and endeavored to do my best, I was not able to do anything useful and naturally I have been keenly conscious of the responsibility. Since my appointment to this post, things have developed contrary to my wishes and, for this reason, I am deeply concerned. It should be fairly clear that I, with my limited ability, shall not be able to accomplish much in the future; I am afraid I shall be leading not only a useless existence but even a harmful one. Grateful for the kind encouragement which the former minister gave me, I would like to think over carefully what I should do; I would like also to return to Japan in the near future so that I may personally report the situation here to you and incidentally receive your instructions in all matters. Will you, therefore, give your approval at once. Inasmuch as both WAKASUGI and IGUCHI are men of ability and efficiency, there should be no objections to leaving matters in their hands after I have left.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 2

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           No Number.


Will Your Excellency please read this for your own information and then please transmit it to the Minister of the Navy.

My dear Mr. Minister:

Congratulations on your new appointment! When this humble Ambassador was appointed to his present post he asked for the fervent support of the whole Navy Department, but since I came to Washington I am sorry to say that there has been no cooperation between us. Furthermore, the Navy has not cooperated with the Foreign Office. The times do not permit of such lack of coordination. On the one hand the United States is faced by the European war and on the other hand by the Pacific problem, but still she has made no military move. I believe that there is a weak point here. Therefore, I had expected the United States to take a more less conciliatory attitude toward us as soon as the situation was favorable, but, contrary to my surmises, so far all America has done is to stick to her own national policy, and I am beginning to doubt if she can be reformed very much. I think that probably in the last analysis that is due to the fact that the United States has too many interests in China. My own desire has been to leave the China question out of the picture and work out some modus vivendi between our two countries. In my conversations with the Secretary of State I have shown this by my way of talking. However, the Secretary says that the China question is inseparably bound up with the stability of the Pacific. Some days ago I talked for an hour or more with HALIFAX. He said that the


British Empire has a great interest in the Pacific problem and he would like to see some modus vivendi worked out between Japan and the United States to avoid a crisis. He said that he would like to talk with Secretary HULL about this. Since then, however, I have had no chance to talk with him. Well, before I came here I had talked with all the cabinet officials of that time and thought I thoroughly understood the position of the Government; however, since then there have been two administrative changes and now I am left floundering.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire I cannot tell you how much in the dark I am. I have talked along my own lines with the Secretary of State so often that, if we now explore the situation from a new angle, all my presence would do would be to confuse the situation and cause an unfavorable reaction. There is no doubt about this. That is why I wired the other day that I would like to come home. If you have anything which you want the Foreign Office to transmit to me, please be sure to let them know.