Archive for July, 2009

Sir J. G. LATHAM 5.sjg.02 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Koshi

July 28, 2009

No. 387

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Hsinking, Nanking, Shanghai and Peking

February 27, 1941

# 435.

Circular. Message from London # 136, February 24th.

Part 3 of 3.

(It is this system that the people of the British Empire, with the sympathy and support of the whole British speaking world, are resolved to extirpate from the continent of Europe. His Majesty’s Government have no designs upon the integrity or independence of any other country, and they seek no advantage for themselves except the satisfaction of having rid the earth of a hateful terror and of restoring freedom to the many insulted and enslaved nations of the European continent. This they would regard as the greatest honor that could reward them, and the crowning episode in what, for the Western world, is a long continuity of history.) (Monsieur MATSUOKA, with loftiest motives, has hinted at his readiness to act as the mediator between the belligerents—the Prime Minister is sure that, in light of what he has said and on further reflection, Monsieur MATSUOKA will understand that in a cause of this kind, not in any way concerned with territory, trade or material gains, but affecting the whole future of humanity, there can be no question of compromise or parley.) (It would be a matter of profoundest regret to His Majesty’s Government if by any circumstances Japan and this country were to become embroiled, and this not only because of their recollection of the years during which the two countries were happily united in alliance, but also because such a melancholy event would both spread and prolong the war without, however, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, altering its conclusion.) (Foreign Office, S.W.) 1-(—–) (the February) (date).

Trans. 3-19-41

No. 388

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Washington (Koshi) Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

February 28, 1941

# 438.

Circular. In 4 parts—complete. Action London as # 063.

His Imperial Japanese Majesty’s Minister for Foreign Affairs acknowledges the receipt of the note of His Britannic Majesty’s Prime Minister dated February 24, 1941, and takes pleasure to apprise the latter that the statements and remarks contained therein have been duly noted.

The Foreign Minister trusts that Mr. Churchill is not necessarily expecting observations to be made upon them. He wishes, however, to take advantage of the opportunity to state that no hint whatever of his readiness to act as mediator between the actual belligerents was in-

Page A-203

tended to be conveyed in his memorandum addressed to His Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. (Nor) did he ever imagine of any possibility of such a hint to be read into any part of the text.

The Foreign Minister took occasion in his memorandum to refer to the mediation now taking place in Tokyo as Mr. Eden had made allusions to it and incidentally took the liberty of stating in a general and abstract manner the views he has always cherished, in order to make clear the aspiration and attitude of his country concerning the problem of peace or the recovery of normal conditions throughout the world.

The Foreign Minister believes that it will not be entirely out of place to reiterate what he has said on more than one occasion in reference to the Tripartite Pact, inasmuch as this matter was touched upon by Mr. Eden in his conversation with Ambassador Shigemitu. The Tripartite Pact was concluded as and remains a peace pact in the sense that it was entered into largely with a view to preventing a third Power from participating in the European war or Sino-Japanese conflict, thus limiting the participants and dimensions of the war and also to bringing about peace at the earliest possible date.

Japan’s ideals were epitomized in the preamble of the Pact and it is needless to say that Japan is remaining absolutely loyal to the aims and ideals enunciated, will always find herself standing by her allies under the Tripartite Pact. The Foreign Minister would equally deplore and regret, if by any untoward circumstances Great Britain and this country were to become embroiled, not only because of the recollection of the years during which the two countries were united in alliance, but also because such a tragic eventuality would be fraught with the danger of destroying modern civilization to the undoing of the best part of Humanity. February 27, 1941.

Trans. 3-10-41

No. 389

FROM: London (Japanese Ambassador)

TO: Washington

March 10, 1941

# 35.

Message to Tokyo # 171. Part 1 of 3 [a].

Re my # 154 [a].

On the 3rd of March Australian Premier MENZIE who is here in the War Cabinet made a speech and in my interview of the 4th, Prime Minister CHURCHILL took it upon himself to refer to it. CHURCHILL avoided using the word “appeasement” and chose a French word “detant”  [sic] which means a slackening of strained relations. In this speech MENZIE answered in a manner Your Excellency’s first message to EDEN and proposed that difficulties in the Pacific be overcome through the frank exchange of opinions. It emphasized the importance of friendly relations with Japan.

There was a meeting of the Foreign Press Association, the British and American reporters, together with a number of foreign reporters and other well-known people, had taken their seats, and in response to a wide appeal this speech was made. MENZIE stated that Japan sent influential Mr. KAWAI as Minister to Australia to match Australia’s appointment of Sir J. G. LATHAM, and went on to eulogize these emissaries. In response to this speech, labor representatives in the Australian Government charged that this was an appeasement policy, and the opposition Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire here in London also made an ado over it, but MENZIE resolutely denies their accusations and has published a statement that this is not an appeasement policy to placate anyone little by little, but is a realistic policy designed to do away with difficulties. On the 6th

Page A-204

the Australian Government announced that its views differed in no wise from those of the Premier.

Well, I think that we can take this speech of MENZIE’s as a gesture of friendship from Great Britain who earnestly desires peace in the Pacific Ocean. The tone of the newspapers since then has also led me to this conclusion.

[a] Parts 2 and 3 not available.

[b] Not available.

Trans. 3-13-41


Washington (Nomura) 5.wn.2 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

July 24, 2009

No. 108

FROM: Washington (Nomura)

TO: Tokyo Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

May 10, 1941

# 289.

I have heard confidentially a statement to the effect that a decision will be reached within one or two days. Secretary of State HULL, I understand, is waiting impatiently for an answer (I have it confidentially that he will wait until late the night of today, the 10th). As it will be impossible to delay any longer than that, I wonder whether any further extension of the time will make the ultimate moment come too late? Should we fail to take this opportunity, I understand that it is their opinion that these conversations will result in failure. I greatly fear that this most favorable opportunity for adjusting the diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States may slip through our hands and I am greatly worried.

Whether or not we open negotiations along the lines of my # 273 [a], though you have in successive messages outlined your decisions, in view of the critical nature of the situation, please let me have the best plan under the present conditions.

[a] See I, 81. Nomura reports conversation with Secretary Hull during the morning of the 7th with regard to the “oral statement” and the neutrality pact.

Trans. 5-14-41

Page A-71

No. 109

FROM: Washington (Nomura)

TO: Tokyo

May 12, 1941

# 292.

Part 1 of 2. [a]

Yesterday, the 11th, at 10:00 p.m. (noon on the 12th Japan time), when I talked with the Secretary of State he said:

“As we are now conducting talks and negotiations, I have been exercising a great deal of secrecy in regard to them and have absolutely made no reference to them in my press conferences. Knowing Your Excellency’s discreetness and astuteness you likewise, I am sure, are carefully guarding its secrecy.” With this statement he received my memorandum.

I replied: “I am well aware of this. My one mission is the question of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. Aside from that I have no other purpose.”

The Secretary said: “I, too have been on the point of retiring from public life but in view of the threat of war I have remained in office. Neither one of us are diplomats in the professional sense.” And later he said; “When I asked you not to transmit this to Japan, it was because its disclosure would have a great effect upon the domestic tranquility of the United States.” Then again he told me very confidentially that a great deal of time would be required in order to rest equanimity. Again he went on to say: “In view of the way in which the Japanese Government handles diplomatic questions, though they come under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Minister, War and Navy Ministers too are able to bring great pressure to bear. In addition to which, the Premier exerts much control.”

[a] See I, 111, for Part 2.

Trans. 5-14-41

No. 110

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Washington

11 May 1941

# 209.

Strictly secret.

It goes without saying that this matter should be handled in absolute secrecy and we have been exercising extreme caution in this regard. It is absolutely forbidden to discuss this matter with the members of your office staff except those directly concerned, not to mention the Financial Attaché in New York (?). Rumor of this matter has reached our financial circles from New York and a certain amount of information has reached Germany from America. Therefore, please be increasingly careful regarding maintaining secrecy.

Trans. 5-12-41

Page A-72

No. 111

FROM: Washington (Nomura)

TO: Tokyo

May 12, 1941

# 292.

Part 2 of 2. [a]

When I told him the reasons for our revisions, in view of the fact that he questioned me with regard to the evacuation of China, I told him that we plan to evacuate all in accordance with our commitments with the exception of those troops stationed in North China and Inner Mongolia who are there to suppress Communism. The Secretary of State then asked: “Should the China incident be concluded, will not Japan with these troops carry out her Southward movement?” I replied: “Our true intent is peaceful Southward penetration.”

The Secretary of State said: “For us to wait until Hitlerism has penetrated to our borders before attempting to block it, would be disastrous. Therefore, it is necessary that we forestall it so that it will not approach us.” (Since this is an argument which we must guard against, I intend to develop plans to check it.)

In our conversations we said that should the European war become a long one, the whole of our materialistic civilization will be destroyed. Our peoples will not be able to escape exhaustion and the only real victor will be Bolshevism. In referring to the extension of the war in the Pacific, we agreed that the war psychology of both countries would have to be diverted into more peaceful channels. It is clear that the United States does not desire an imbroglio with Japan and, at the same time, she is not at all anxious to become embroiled in a conflict with HITLER.

Our conversation lasted for forty minutes, and, promising to meet again, we parted.

I am most humbly indebted to Your Excellency for your untiring efforts. I am just now beginning to see a slight ray of hope and I am taking heart.

[a] See I, 109, for Part 1 reporting Nomura’s talk with Secretary of State Hull on the 11th.

Trans. 5-16-41



No. 112

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Washington (Koshi)

December 10, 1940

# 591.

With the appointment of Ambassador Nomura we wish to formulate a definite plan for our propaganda and information gathering work by seeking cooperation of Japanese bank and business officials in the U.S.

(Abstract-some values missing.)

Trans.  1-25-41

No. 113

FROM: New York (Iguchi)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

December 17, 1940

# 763.

(2 parts-completed.)

Re your msg. to Wash. # 591 [a].

As propaganda and enlightenment organs here, we have the Japan Institute, the Tourist Bureau, and the silk office of the Ministry of Commerce and Communication. Other groups whose importance we cannot ignore for collecting information are the financial adviser, the Army and Navy Inspection Offices, Representatives of Domei, ASAHI, NITINITI, AND YOMIURI, the Bank of Japan, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire the Specie Bank, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, N.Y.K., O.S.K., the Manchurian R.R. and OKURA Co.

In order to obtain the fullest cooperation from the above it is well to establish an information committee centering around the press attaché.

[a] See I, No. 112.

Trans.  1-9-41

No. 114

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Washington (Koshi)

February 5, 1941

# 056.

In connection with New York to Tokyo message # 763, [b] the business men (including Sumitomo’s representatives) and representatives of newspapers were invited to call there. One of my men discussed the following points with them:

(1) To have the various representatives of business firms engage in collecting intelligence material.

(2) To have all such representatives abroad (in the United States) cable their opinions and manipulations in so far as they are related to politics, through diplomatic channels so as to maintain secrecy.

We were able to obtain their agreement to cooperate with us in this respect, so please proceed with this program.

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We have the perfect understanding and agreement of the Army and Navy in this connection. They promise to give us whatever aid they can.

[a] See I, 112. “With the appointment of Ambassador Nomura we wish to formulate a definite plan for our propaganda and information gathering work by seeking cooperation of Japanese bank and business officials in the U.S.”

[b] Refers to above message and lists 18 Japanese organs in New York as potential sources of information.

Trans. 2-11-41

No. 115

FROM: New York (Iguchi)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

December 11, 1940

# 762.

(3 parts-complete).


1. In view of the fact that our Embassy’s propaganda effort in the U.S. has been chiefly confined to cultural enlightenment in the past, which by the very nature of the thing evoked little or no objection, we have been considering a plan since last year to strengthen our political propaganda methods. However, due to the increased vigilance and control exercised over foreign propaganda in general and over the 5th column activities in particular, since the outbreak of the European war, we cannot hope for too great a success in this field of propaganda. Nevertheless, the effect of the recently-signed tri-partite agreement will impose a greater necessity for just such propaganda efforts if the present Japanese-American relations are to be maintained. It is imperative, therefore, that we reconsider our efforts with a view to seeking more effective propaganda methods. While I realize that your office has been giving much thought to this question, I wish to submit herewith my views on this matter.

While cultural propaganda and enlightenment, no doubt, contribute much toward the promotion of amicable relations between Japan and America, the cost is prohibitive. Therefore, I suggest that, wherever possible, this type of propaganda be discontinued.

Political propaganda will meet with a great deal of obstacles which will cast some doubts on its successful outcome. However, we should strive to deal with fundamental problems in order to thwart the counter-propaganda in this country, which is based on the assumption that all foreign propaganda seek to divide the American people.

The set-up of the press attaché should be concentrated on the task of assembling information and of widening the intelligence net and its personnel. Especial effort should be made to establish personal contacts with the members of the press and persons influential in American politics and business. The intelligence net should be so organized as to be able to function, even if there should be a severance of diplomatic and commercial relations between Japan and the U.S.

2. In addition to the present work of investigating the activities of the American Communist party and of the Chinese by our Embassy, we should constantly keep watch over American politics and the economic and social activities of Soviet Russia in the United States, particularly as they affect Central and South Americas. For this task it is necessary not only to hire Americans, but also to have competent researchers sent from Japan.

3. Although the Tourist Bureau and the Trade Promotion Bureau have been carrying on propaganda in the past, we should consider the inconsistency of having the Tourist Bureau giving out travel information when, today, no American tourists are permitted to travel in Japan.

Trans.  1-23-41

Page A-75

No. 116

FROM: Mexico (Miura)

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

January 28, 1941

# 037.

(In 2 parts-complete.)

(Strictly confidential)

1. In view of the present world conditions, particularly where U.S. activities are concerned, close contact should be maintained not only from the various offices in Central and South America to Tokyo and Washington, but among themselves as well. Through such means, all officials in the field should strive to use their knowledge and abilities to the fullest extent.

2. Where it is impossible due to lack of personnel or technical abilities, to make sufficient surveys, Washington or Tokyo should keep them informed by relaying the latest information and opinions gathered from the various other sources at regular intervals, say, weekly or biweekly. In this way we should keep our heads up to date.

3. Washington and New York should keep close tab on all activities by the U.S. in that area where they involve the Latin American countries and concern us indirectly. Whatever information picked up by them should be relayed without delay to our various offices in the Latin American countries. If nothing else, copies of all cables sent from New York and Washington to Tokyo concerning this matter should be sent to the offices in Latin America.

4. Tokyo should give sincere consideration to all reports and opinions submitted from Washington and the Latin American countries and, after studying the matter carefully, dispatch whatever instructions are deemed necessary.

5. Heretofore, personnel and financial allotments allowed the Latin American offices were equivalent to those of third and fourth rate countries. The Foreign Office should give this matter their serious consideration, and if necessary dispatch an investigation party. If circumstances seem to warrant it, personnel and allowances should be increased. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Trans.  2-5-41

No. 117

FROM: Buenos Aires (Omori)

TO: Mexico City (Koshi)

February 5, 1941

# 014.


Received from Tokyo as # 018.

Tokyo to Lima (?) # 010.

Re my (Tokyo ?) message to Santiago (?) # 007 [a].

It is desired that projects of this type be carried out in your country too. It is possible to do so, and if it is, is it advisable? Please discuss the matter with the more prominent Japanese merchants in that area and advise.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 2-20-41

Page A-76

No. 118

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Washington (Koshi)

January 30, 1941

# 043.

Foreign Office secret.

Heretofore, we have placed emphasis on publicity and propaganda work in the United States. In view of the critical situation in the recent relations between the two countries, and for the purpose of being prepared for the worst, we have decided to alter this policy. Taking into consideration the small amount of funds we have at our disposal, we have decided to de-emphasize propaganda for the time being, and instead, to strengthen our intelligence work.

Though we must give the matter of intelligence work our further study-in this connection we are at present conferring with the intelligence bureau-we have mapped out a fundamental program, the outline of which is contained in my supplementary cable No. 44 [a].

Please, therefore, reorganize your intelligence set-up and put this new program into effect as soon as possible.

Cable copies of this message, as “Minister’s orders” to Canada, Mexico, (a copy to be relayed from Mexico to Mexicali), San Francisco, (copies from San Francisco to Honolulu, Los Angeles, Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver), New York, New Orleans, and Chicago.

[a] See I, 119.

Trans. 2-7-41

No. 119

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)

TO: Washington (Koshi)

January 30, 1941

# 44.

(In two parts-complete).

(Foreign Office secret).

(1) Establish an intelligence organ in the Embassy which will maintain liaison with private and semi-official intelligence organs (see my message to Washington # 591 [a] and # 732 [b] from New York to Tokyo, both of last year’s series).

With regard to this, we are holding discussions with the various circles involved at the present time.

(2) The focal point of our investigations shall be the determination of the total strength of the U.S. Our investigations shall be divided into three general classifications: political, economic, and military, and definite course of action shall be mapped out.

(3) Make a survey of all persons or organizations which either openly or secretly oppose participation in the war.

(4) Make investigations of all anti-Semitism, communism, movements of Negroes, and labor movements.

(5) Utilization of U.S. citizens of foreign extraction (other than Japanese), aliens (other than Japanese), communists, Negroes, labor union members, and anti-Semites, in carrying out the investigations described in the preceding paragraph would undoubtedly bear the best results.

These men, moreover, should have access to governmental establishments, (laboratories?), governmental organizations of various characters, factories, and transportation facilities.


(6) Utilization of our “Second Generations” and our resident nationals. (In view of the fact that if there is any slip in this phase, our people in the U.S. will be subjected to considerable persecution, and the utmost caution must be exercised).

(7) In the event of U.S. participation in the war, our intelligence set-up will be moved to Mexico, making that country the nerve center of our intelligence net. Therefore, will you bear in mind and in anticipation of such an eventuality, set up facilities for a U.S.-Mexico international intelligence route. This net which will cover Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru will also be centered in Mexico.

(8) We shall cooperate with the German and Italian intelligence organs in the U.S. This phase has been discussed with the Germans and Italians in Tokyo, and it has been approved.

Please get the details from Secretary Terasaki upon his assuming his duties there.

Please send copies to those offices which were on the distribution list of No. 43 [c].

[a] See I, 112.

[b] Has no bearing on this subject. # 732 probably an error.

[c] (See No. 4)-See I, 118.

Trans. 2-7-41

No. 120

FROM: New York (Morishima)

TO: Tokyo

February 26, 1941

# 60.

The situation is very strained and we have to review our Embassy’s intelligence and propaganda work. On this subject last year I sent you my # 762 [a]. You in return sent # 43 [b] and # 44 [c] in the form of instructions to Washington. I am endeavoring to strengthen and further revise my work here in New York and in order to achieve liaison and cooperation, I consider it necessary to have Consul FUKUSHIMA, who has been doing this kind of work all along and who knows his business, make a trip to New York before going back to Japan. Therefore, I want you to be sure to approve of this.

Relayed to Los Angeles.

[a] New York discusses plan to strengthen the Japanese political propaganda methods in the United States for 1941.

[b]Tokyo directs Washington to reorganize their intelligence set-up and put into effect the new program which will de-emphasize propaganda and strengthen intelligence work. See I, 118.

[c] Outline of major points in connection with setting up of intelligence organization in the United States. See I, 119.

Trans. 3-6-41

No. 121

FROM: Mexico (Miura)

TO: Tokyo

February 14, 1941

# 16.

Some recent messages have been badly garbled. I suspect that American companies may be purposely garbling the texts.

Trans.  2-18-41

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pirate 5.pir.0098 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

July 18, 2009


Cartman decides to become a pirate, and takes Butters and a small group of recruits with him to help make his dream come true.

Full Recap

Cartman comes into the lunchroom with news, pirating is back. He shows them a map and how he plans to get to Somalia. Seeing a chance, Kyle tells Cartman it’s an awesome idea and that Cartman should leave right away. When Cartman is suspicious about why Kyle doesn’t want to go, Kyle reminds him he is Jewish and can’t be a pirate. Cartman makes an announcement over the school’s PA system; he’s looking for pirates to join him who aren’t Jewish, Mexican or Ginger. The new pirates gather for their first meeting. Captain Cartman’s crew consists of Clyde, Butters, Ike and Kevin (with light saber). Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Cartman has purchased their tickets for Somalia. At the airport, Butters has some reservations, but Cartman gives an impassioned speech and the pirates are bound for Somalia. They get off the bus in Mogadishu and don’t see the pirate paradise they dreamed about. Using a phrasebook they ask the locals where the pirates are. Oblivious to the danger, Cartman’s band walks into the pirate headquarters. Cartman notes that these aren’t pirates, they’re just black people. The Somali pirates don’t know what to make of this bunch of white kids, but seizing the opportunity they send the boys out on a boat to be used as hostages. The boys thinking they are going out on their first pirate mission are disappointed at the size of the pirate’s ship. Cartman starts “leading” the mission, when Clyde has a breakdown. The pirates approach and stop a French vessel. The pirates start a negotiation, 5,000 Euros for the kids, but Cartman takes over when he feels the Somali pirates are doing it all wrong.


Much too the kid’s ignorance, the Somali pirates are threatening to kill them.

Kyle is happy, he’s just found out that Cartman is missing; however, he’s no longer happy when he finds out that his little brother Ike has joined the pirate gang. Now Kyle is feeling guilty. Cartman wants to know when they are going to start plundering. The French pay the ransom and the Somali pirates let the kids go on board the French vessel and leave. Captain Cartman and his crew are now on board the French ship and he is taking charge, but it isn’t until Kevin fires up his light saber that the French take the threat seriously. They put the French crew in lifeboat and take command of the huge French vessel, which Captain Cartman deems a real pirate ship when they take it back to the pirate port. Captain Cartman takes over the Somali pirates, who aren’t quite sure what to make of all this, but they go with it, even when he leads them in the song “Somalian Pirates We”. The French crew is found and tells about the pirates with the terrible light saber. The government decides they need to take out the pirates where they live. At Skull Cove, Cartman is celebrating the good life, when there is a disturbance. The Somali pirates have taken another hostage, Kyle.

CNNN reports on the pirate crisis. The pirates are demanding 10 millions Euros for the safe return of their latest hostage. Captain Cartman believes that Kyle might want to join his band after all, but Kyle is only there to get his brother back. Kyle tries telling Cartman it isn’t safe to live in Somalia. Butters and Ike are taking inventory of their latest pirate booty, when one of the pirates asks them why they wanted to be pirates. Butters and Ike talk about their hate for school and homework, while the Somali pirate tells them that he would like to have an opportunity to go to school and have homework. He tells them more that make them think again about their decision to be pirates. Captain Cartman has Kyle walking the plank, when Butters and Ike return to with their decision to want return home (and Clyde breaks down to). Captain Cartman won’t have it and he calls his Somali pirates to arms. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Offshore the pirates see a ship, it is a US Navy ship loaded with Seals, and they have orders to shoot to kill all but the white kids. And they do. Captain Cartman’s pirating days are over.


pee wee 9.pee.002002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

July 8, 2009


Stan becomes coach of a Pee Wee Hockey team and for the benefit of one his players he tries to make them into a team of winners. Meanwhile his father deals with the memory of Stan’s performance in a Pee Wee hockey game from years earlier, when Stan had the opportunity to score the game winning goal.

Full Recap

Stan is having trouble with his job at the paper Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire and the situation is made worse when his bike gets towed, making it impossible for him to deliver his papers. He goes to see a Park County government official, to see if he can get his bike back, but it isn’t so easy. The official wants him to learn something along the way by coaching Park County’s Peewee Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Hockey team. At the recreation center Stan meets his team. They’ve got a lot of questions for him, none of which he can really answer, especially the ones they ask after he finds out that one player, named Nelson, has leukemia. The Adams County coach and team make an appearance and their team appears to be more organized Stan’s team is. Stan’s team wants him to make sure that they don’t lose their game against Adam’s County. Stan returns home and he tells his parents that he’s coaching the Peewee hockey team. Randy tries to remind Stan about something that happened to Stan when he was a Peewee hockey player. Stan recalls nothing of the event, other than going to Shakey’s afterward. Randy is convinced that Stan is trying to try prove something to himself and forget his past failure. Randy has a nightmare, where in a flashback we see the moment, where a 4-year-old Stan had the opportunity to win the game for his team, but his game winning shot wasn’t quite good enough (just a few inches short of the goal line). Randy seems to have more a problem with Stan’s past failure than Stan does. When Nelson’s leukemia takes a turn for the worse, Nelson’s parents come to the rink to ask Stan for some advice on how to talk to their son, or better yet would Stan go to see him at the hospital. After all, they are just his parents, whereas Stan is his coach. At the hospital, Stan tries to talk with Nelson and answer his questions. Nelson asks Stan that if he can’t make it so he can’t have cancer anymore, can he at least win tonight’s game for him.
At the hockey rink the game is about to begin. Stan tries to negotiate with the Adam’s County coach to see if he will give Park County a break and allow them to win tonight’s game for Nelson. The Adam’s County coach is only interested in winning. Stan’s team is afraid they will get cancer if they don’t win the game for Nelson. The game begins, but both teams seem to be evenly matched as they play at Peewee speed. After three periods the game ends in a 0 – 0 tie and neither team ever got their sticks on the puck. Stan goes back to the hospital to

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find out that Nelson’s cancer seems to be a tie. The County official finds Stan at the hospital and tells him that their team has a game against Denver County in-between periods at a Colorado Avalanche game.

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Stan tells his team that just like the movies they’ve got to believe in themselves and they will win in the end. One the players tell Stan that in the movies they usually get a really good player, preferably a Canadian, to join the team. Stan gets a ringer in the form of Kyle’s little brother Ike. While Stan works on his game plan, his father gets worked up about the upcoming game at the Pepsi Center. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire He reminds Stan that he has two options, “win or lose”.
At the Pepsi Center the second period ends in the game between Colorado and Detroit in a 2 – 2 tie. Stan tries to fire up the troops and reminds them that the movies say they are going to win this 3 minutes exhibition game. Only there isn’t going to be a game, the other team was a no show. The Colorado Avalanche hearing about the emotional crap that the team has gone through they allow the Park County Peewees to take their place in the 3rd period against the Red Wings. The Red Wings take full advantage of the situation and slaughter the Peewees by scoring 30 goals on them. Detroit wins the big game and become champions. Back at Hell’s Pass Hospital, Nelson realizes that there is “no hope.”

dui 3.dui.002002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

July 6, 2009


After receiving a DUI, Randy attends an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting where he realizes that he is powerless to control his drinking problem. But when a statue of the Virgin Mary begins to bleed, he sees it as a miracle that can cure him of his ‘disease.’

Full Recap

The boys are at their karate class where their instructor reminds them about the need for discipline. After class they are waiting for Stan’s father to give them a ride home. Randy shows up, but he’s been drinking and has a couple of beers with him to “keep his buzz going.” Stan is worried, but his father assures them that he is only “driving while he’s drinking.” While trying to show the boys a skill they will need in the future (peeing into a bottle while driving) Randy gets pulled over and fails the sobriety test. He and the boys are taken to the police station where they spend the better part of the whole night. At school the next day Stan is embarrassed and tells the Kyle and Cartman that he doesn’t want anyone to know about his father’s behavior. Much to Stan’s embarrassment, as part of his punishment Randy is going to elementary schools telling about the dangers of drinking and driving and Mrs. Garrison adds a few comments about being like “Stan’s dad.” Randy also attends his first AA meeting and is horrified to learn that he is powerless and has a disease. Knowing that he has a deadly disease that he can’t cure himself Randy starts drinking, hoping for a miracle to cure his disease. In a nearby town called Bailey there is a statue of the Virgin Mary at St. Peter’s church. The statute has started bleeding out of its ass. Randy is watching the local news coverage of the event and becomes interested when he believes the statue will help cure him of his disease.
At an AA meeting Stan comes in and asks who’s in charge, he wants to know who was responsible for making his father think he has a disease. Stan tells them that his dad only needs to learn the discipline to control his drinking. Stan is shown to the door. Meanwhile at St. Peter’s, a cardinal is on the scene to confirm the miracle and after being splashed in the face with blood, he does just that. Randy gets behind the wheel of his car with intention of going to the statue to get cured of his alcoholism. Stan winds up driving him there. There is a long line of people waiting to be cured and Randy is a “butter and a dirty line cutter” and manages to work his way to the front of the line. He gets splashed in the face with blood and decides that he won’t drink anymore and throws his bottle away. He declares his cure a miracle. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Back at home five days later and Randy is praising Christ. He invites Stan to come with him to an AA meeting at Whistlin’ Willy’s. While there Randy catches sight of a Channel 4 newsbreak. The new pope, Benedict XVI, has come to see the statue and after being sprayed in the face with blood declares that it is not a miracle. He says that the statue wasn’t bleeding out its ass, it was bleeding out of its vagina and since chicks do that all the time, it’s no miracle. Randy now knows that he wasn’t cured, feeling powerlessLouis J. Sheehan, Esquire   he orders some drinks and others from his meeting quickly follow suit. Stan finally gets his father to see that all he really needs is discipline to drink responsibly.

barn dance Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

July 2, 2009


Cartman has been absent for school for some time, and the boys go to his house to find out what’s wrong. Cartman has become depressed about not having a father. Cartman confronts his Mother about it, and she says that he was conceived at the 12th Annual Drunken Barn Dance. Meanwhile, Kyle and Stan Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire enter a videotape they made of Cartman holding a tea party with stuffed animals in the weekly contest held by America’s Stupidest Home Videos.

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As the bus stop, Cartman is missing. The other boys decide to skip school and go to check on him. At Cartman’s home, they find him in the backyard having a tea party with stuffed animals. They find the sight disturbing and Stan suggests they go to get him help. They talk with Mr. Mackey who says that Eric is suffering from emotional distress. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire He gives them a video camera to tape Cartman’s behavior so that he can make a diagnosis. The boys videotape Cartman’s tea party. Later at dinner, Cartman asks him mother about who his father is. His mother starts to tell him about the birds, the bees and the “12th Annual Drunken Barn Dance.” She tells him at this event that she met Chief Running Water at this event and that he is his father. At the Marsh home, Stan and Kyle are watching TV with Grandpa who switches the channel over to America’s Stupidest Home Videos after they’ve see a commercial for an upcoming TV movie featuring Terrance & Phillip in “Not Without My Anus,” an HBC movie of the week. Stan and Kyle think the …Videos program sucks. Hearing a knock at the door, Stan answers to find Cartman dressed in Native American gear. Since he now knows he is father is a Native American Cartman tries to get in touch with his roots. Cartman wants to borrow Stan’s bike so he can go to the reservation (to find his father). The boys decide they need to get their videotape over to Mr. Mackey quickly, but a chance to win $10,000 from the …Videos program gives them other ideas on what to do with the tape. Cartman confronts Chief Running Water; who tells him that that the last man he remembers seeing his mother with was Chef.
Kenny tries getting a go-cart started as Stan confirms to Kyle that he has sent their video into the …Videos contest. Cartman shows up, no longer in Native American gear, he is now dressed like a homeboy and he plans to go “chill with my dad.” Kenny gets the go started and gets dragged for a wild ride, that winds up killing him. Cartman appears at Chef’s home and tells him about what Chief Running Water told him about the drunken barn dance. Chef sings him a song (that explains nothing about the question at hand). He then tells Cartman what he remembers about the barn dance; the last man he saw Cartman’s mother with was Mr. Garrison (with Mr. Hat). On the …Videos program Stan and Kyle find out their videotape of the tea party has made it to the finals. At the local bar, Cartman confronts Mr. Garrison about him being his father. Mr. Garrison lets Cartman know that there isn’t anyone in South Park who hasn’t sex with his mother. Dr. Mephisto offers Cartman the chance to have DNA testing done to help him find his father, at a cost of $3000.
At the bus stop Cartman tells them about his need for $3000. They tell him about their chance to win $10,000 in the …Videos contest. As the …Videos program airs, Cartman sees their entry, his tea party, which gets him really pissed off. Unfortunately they take second place to Grandpa Marsh’s videotape of Kenny being killed by the train and only get $3000, which they give to Cartman to get his DNA testing done.
After the DNA testing has been done, Dr. Mephisto has narrowed the list of possible fathers down to: Officer Barbrady, Chef, Jimbo, Mr. Garrison, Ned, Chief Running Water, Gerald Broflovski, himself, his little friend Kevin or (as he says) the 1989 Denver Broncos. The narrator reiterates the question “Who is Eric Cartman’s father?” and that listing (with one notable change) as the episode ends on a cliff hanger.
Kenny dies when he is run over by a train, after he is pulled to the railroad tracks by his runaway go-cart.

moore 2.moo.0001 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

July 1, 2009

The purpose of this report is to relate the way in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) became involved in the investigation of the Majestic 12 documents in the late 1980s. The story is a strange and convoluted one and involves the surveillance of U.S. citizens and authors, liaisons with the Air Force (and possibly the CIA), and even allegations of Soviet intelligence links to the story. That the FBI has had involvement in the UFO subject is no secret: in 1976, the researcher (and author of the book The UFO-FBI Connection, 2000) Bruce Maccabee obtained via the Freedom of Information Act more than one thousand pages of UFO- related files from the FBI that dated back to 1947; and since then additional files have surfaced on a variety of issues linked to the UFO controversy. But what of the FBI link to MJ12? The first person to publicly air the original batch of two MJ12 documents – the so-called Eisenhower Briefing Document and the Truman Memorandum – was the British author Timothy Good, who did so in May 1987 in his book Above Top Secret (Sidgwick & Jackson, 1987). Essentially, the first document is a 1952 briefing prepared by Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter for President-elect Eisenhower, informing him that a UFO and alien bodies had been recovered from the New Mexico desert in 1947. The second is a 1947 memorandum from President Harry Truman to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, authorizing the establishment of MJ12. Shortly after Good’s publication of the documents, additional copies surfaced in the USA via the research team of Stanton Friedman (a nuclear physicist), William Moore (the co-author of the book, The Roswell Incident (Granada Books, 1980) and Jaime Shandera (a television producer). Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Moore had been working quietly with a number of intelligence “insiders” who had contacted him shortly after publication of The Roswell Incident in 1980. From time to time various official-looking papers would be passed onto Moore, the implication being that someone in the U.S. Government, military or Intelligence Community wished to make available information on UFOs that would otherwise have remained forever outside of the public domain. It was as a result of Moore’s insider dealings that a roll of film negatives displaying the documents was delivered in the mail to the home of Shandera in December 1984. Moore, Friedman and Shandera worked carefully for two and a half years in an attempt to determine the authenticity of the documents. With Timothy Good’s release, however, it was decided that the best course of action was to follow suit. As a result, a huge controversy was created that continues on fifteen years later.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire